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INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON
GLOBAL LABOR GOVERNANCE:
ORGANIZING, LEGAL MOBILIZATION AND
DECOLONIZATION
Chaumtoli Huq*

INTRODUCTION
Labor movements around the world have explored various forms of
global labor governance 1 mechanisms2 to hold multinational/transnational

*
Author is an Associate Professor of Law at CUNY School of Law teaching contracts,
labor and employment law courses and co-directs the Workers’ Rights Clinic. Research
assistance was provided by Andrew Miller, Erin Quinn and Rex Santus. Thanks to Marley
Weiss for providing early comments to an abstract of this article. Thanks to César F. Rozado
Marzán, Ethel Brooks, Jeffrey Hermanson, Gautam Mody, Markus Kaltenborn and Sarosh
Kuruvilla for reading drafts of this paper and providing comments. This article was presented
at the 8th Critical & Alternative Thinking to Governance (CATG)’s Corporate Governance
Research Symposium. Thanks to specific feedback by corporate governance scholars including
Beate Sjåfjell, Ingrid Molderz, and Wafa Khilf. Of course, any errors or omissions are mine.
Special thanks to academic support staff Midiam Ramirez. MJIL Editor in Chief Grace Webber
Brody, Managing Articles Editor Emilia Truluck and staff editors were gracious and
enormously helpful in giving my ideas greater clarity. Marvin D. Cabrera provided an EnglishSpanish interpretation of my interview with Victor Garrido and other innumerable forms of
support so I could timely complete this article. This article is dedicated to him.
1.
Governance is an “amorphouse term” “that encompasses complex global processes
“involving multiple actors that interact at different levels of interest.” See Roberto Dominguez
& Rafael Velasquez Flores, Global Governance, OXFORD RSCH. ENCYC., INT’L STUD. (July
30, 2018); see also Claus Offe, Governance: An “Empty Signifier”?, 16 CONSTELLATIONS 550,
553 (2009) (“Governance . . . may apply to all kinds of political or social units, such as
corporations . . . municipalities, interest organizations, individuals, states, subsections or the
entirety of the international system. Governance especially takes place where [due to the
absence of a state-analogous “world government”] state-organized hierarchies are insufficient,
namely in the sphere of global governance.”). It is “the exercise of power in the absence of
overarching political authority” by a diverse group of actors and institutions that make decisions
and “enforce compliance with norms and rules at the supranational level.” JAMIE K.
MCCALLUM, GLOBAL UNIONS, LOCAL POWER: THE NEW SPIRIT OF TRANSNATIONAL LABOR
ORGANIZING 28 (Cornell Press 2013).
2.
Global governance has been used in the context of analyzing varied voluntary
initiatives and agreements like the Global Framework Agreement (“GFA”) based on the
International Labor Organization (“ILO”) standards and U.N. Global Compact which have
come to be referred to as global labor governance. See Anke Hassel, The Evolution of a Global
Labour Governance, 21 GOVERNANCE: INT’L. J. POL’Y, ADMIN. & INST. 231, 232 (2008). Here,
I use global labor governance also as a series of efforts by unions, worker organizations and
Non-Governmental Organizations (“NGO”) to employ diverse strategies to regulate
multinational and transnational companies to abide by labor law and norms.
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companies (“MNCs” or “TNCs”) 3 accountable for ensuring workers’ rights
throughout their supply chains.4 Global Framework Agreements (“GFA”),
one such global labor governance mechanism, are agreements between global
unions and MNCs covering international labor rights. This article will
examine the wide-ranging H&M Global Framework Agreement (“H&M
GFA”) to develop some insights into global labor governance and on the type
of agreements and socio-political contexts that are likely to yield meaningful
material changes in the lives of workers. 5 The H&M GFA is worthy of close
study because it ostensibly protects workers’ interests at factories where its
garments are produced, operating in countries such as Bangladesh,
Cambodia, India, Myanmar, and Turkey.6 The agreement requires H&M to
work with its direct suppliers and subcontractors to “respect human and trade
union rights in the workplace.” 7 Further, it promotes “signing of collective
agreements.” 8 It also establishes a non-binding, three-tiered structure for
implementation and resolution of labor disputes. In analyzing the H&M GFA
and GFAs generally, this article will contextualize these agreements within
the diffuse, complex, variegated web of international human rights law to
assess their potential for ensuring fundamental labor rights. 9 This article
focuses on the H&M GFA because H&M presents itself as “an ethical
company”10 committed to social justice and pledges to be a leader in the
fashion industry on labor, environment, and sustainability issues.11

3.
Multinational companies and transnational companies are similar for the most part,
except in that MNCs tend to be more centralized in their management structure.
4.
MCCALLUM, supra note 1, at 3, 11 (describing how since the 1970s unions have used
a wide range of strategies to subject companies to workers’ oversight and that governance
struggles constitute the heart of labor transnationalism).
5.
In assessing success, this paper relies on Kuruvilla’s definition in the context of labor
transnationalism: where one partner “must obtain some material benefits such as a higher wage
and better working conditions or strategic gains such as collective bargaining rights.” See
Santanu Sarkar & Sarosh Kuruvilla, Constructing Transnational Solidarity: The Role of
Campaign Governance, 58 BRITISH J. INDUS. REL. 1, 28 (Mar. 2020).
6.
IndustriALL Global Union and H&M Sign Global Framework Agreement,
INDUSTRIALL GLOBAL UNION (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.industriall union.org/industriallglobal-union-and-hm-sign-global-framework-agreement (last visited Mar. 29, 2021).
7.
Id. at 3.
8.
Id.
9.
See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, INT’L LABOUR
ORG. [“ILO”], https://www.ilo.org/declaration/lang—en/index.htm (last visited Nov. 20,
2021).
10.
H&M scored higher than any other global fashion brand and retailer on a 2020
independent report in regard to how much it discloses about its workplace policies, practices,
and impacts. See Hannah Marriott, H&M Tops 2020 Fashion Transparency Index as 10 Brands
Score Zero, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/fashion/2020/apr
/21/hm-tops-2020-fashion-transparency-index-as-10-brands-score-zero.
11.
See 2020 SUSTAINABILITY REPORT, H&M GROUP, https://hmgroup.com/wp-content
/uploads/2021/03/HM-Group-Sustainability-Performance-Report-2020.pdf (last visited Nov.
10, 2021) [hereinafter 2020 Sustainability Report].
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Specifically, as it relates to labor rights, H&M states it is dedicated to
constructive dialogue with trade unions and other labor organizations
representing employees.12 As one of the top two largest fashion retailers in
terms of revenue,13 H&M has the potential to lead the way in labor
protections for its global workforce. If labor rights can be actualized through
the H&M GFA, its impact on the 1.6 million workers in H&M’s global supply
chain could be transformative, and it could help set labor standards for other
workers in the apparel industry.14 Moreover, H&M employs a workforce that
is predominantly comprised of women workers,15 which can provide insights
on how and whether global labor governance is attuned to gender when
addressing labor rights. 16
Historically, international law scholars have not sufficiently engaged
with social movements and theories on social movements to expound on legal
developments and successes. 17 This article aims to disrupt this trend by
evaluating the H&M GFA and GFAs generally using three social movementoriented theories: organizing theory, legal mobilization theory, and
decolonization theory. It employs these theories to assess the implementation
of the H&M GFA in three Asian production countries: Bangladesh,
Cambodia, and India. These critical social movement perspectives are crucial
to assessing institutional forms of global labor governance like GFAs, both
as they relate to international law and their impact on workers’ lives. 18 This
12.
See H&M SUSTAINABILITY COMMITMENT, H&M GROUP 3–5 https://hmgroup.com
/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Business-Partner-Sustainability-Commitment_en.pdf
[hereinafter 2020 Sustainability Commitment] (related to workplaces, H&M is committed to
safe workplace, non-discrimination, fair work, fair living wage, freedom of association and
collective bargaining).
13.
Sijuola Olanubi, Top 5 Largest Fashion Retailers in the World, THARAWAT MAG.
(Dec. 15, 2018), https://www.tharawat-magazine.com/facts/top-5-largest-fashion-clothingretailers-world/; Barbara Farfan, The World’s Largest Fashion Apparel Retailer, THE BALANCE
(Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.thebalancesmb.com/worlds-largest-fashion-apparel-retailer2891805.
14.
Hassel, supra note 2, at 246 (describing how private regulatory pressures on leading
firms in an industry to improve their labor practices can have an impact on their industry as a
whole due to inter firm competition).
15.
See INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS IN THE FOOD RETAIL, GARMENT
AND CHEMICALS SECTORS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THREE CASE STUDIES, ILO 34 (2018)
[hereinafter ILO IFA Report] (reporting that 80% of garment workers in developing countries
are women).
16.
Stephanie Barrientos & Barbara Evers, Gendered Production Networks: Push and
Pull on Corporate Responsibility, in NEW FRONTIERS OF FEMINIST POL. ECON. 44 (Shirin M.
Rai & Georgina Waylen eds., 2014) (considering the gendered aspects of the globalization of
garment production, absence of a gendered power analysis in global production and how NGOS
and trade unions have used corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) to promote the rights of
women workers).
17.
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law and Social Movements: Challenges of
Theorizing Resistance, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 397, 402 (2003) (explaining lawyers tend
to take a “juro-centric” approach from public international institutions).
18.
See id. at 405.
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article also pays particular attention to the H&M GFA’s impact on gender
through an analysis that scholars M. Jacqui Alexander and Chandra Talpade
Mohanty call a “transnational feminist praxis.”19 Transnational feminism is
an intersectional analysis that is attuned to race, gender, and the logics of
globalization. 20 It is praxis-oriented to understand the historical, social, and
cultural processes that occur both locally and transnationally to shape
gendered social relations. 21 This analysis is particularly important in the
apparel industry where the vast majority of garment workers are women from
the Global South, 22 as these women are often segregated into lower paying
jobs within the industry.23 Thus, any global labor governance solutions within
international law that seek to improve workers’ rights must account for the
racialized and gendered nature of this workforce. 24 Such an analysis should
not be separated from an assessment of how the GFAs impact workers and
their international labor rights. 25 Instead, research on the effectiveness of
GFAs should answer how gender categories are challenged or reinforced by
these agreements. 26 Feminist praxis surfaces the gendered and racial
components in any discussion of workers, troubling the notion that any global
governance mechanism is gender-or race-neutral.
Applying organizing, legal mobilization, and decolonization theories to
the H&M GFA reveals some general insights on GFAs and global labor
19.
M. Jacqui Alexander & Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Cartographies of Knowledge and
Power: Transnational Feminism as Radical Praxis, in CRITICAL TRANSNAT’L FEMINIST PRAXIS (A.
Swarr & R. Nagar eds., 2010); see About FFW, FEMINIST FREEDOM WARRIORS, http://
feministfreedomwarriors.org/tags.php?keywordstags=insurgent+feminist+ (last visited Mar. 29,
2021); M. Jacqui Alexander & Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies,
Democratic Futures (Routledge 1997).
20.
See Alexander & Mohanty, supra note 19, at 23.
21.
Id. at xix.
22.
See Anne Garland Mahler, What/Where is the Global South, GLOBAL SOUTH STUD.,
U. VA., https://globalsouthstudies.as.virginia.edu/what-is-global-south, citing Anne Garland
Mahler, Global South, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES LITERARY & CRITICAL THEORY (Oct. 25,
2017) (broadly addressing spaces and peoples negatively impacted by contemporary capitalist
globalization).
23.
ILO Report, MOVING THE NEEDLE: GENDER EQUALITY AND DECENT WORK IN
ASIA’S GARMENT SECTOR 5 (Mar. 2021), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-asia
/—-ro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_789822.pdf.
24.
See generally Cochav Elkayam-Levy, A Path to Transformation: Asking the
“Woman Question” in International Law, 42 MICH. J. INT’L L. 429 (2021) (detailing the role
of gender in international law and urging the use of the gender question to identify rules that
might seem neutral).
25.
See Barrientos & Evers, supra note 16, at 58 (detailing the success of women NGO’s
campaigns using corporate responsibility depends on whether women’s wages and working
conditions improve).
26.
ETHEL C. BROOKS, UNRAVELING THE GARMENT INDUSTRY: TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZING AND WOMEN’S WORK, 82, 112 (U. Minn. Press 2007) (discusses how, in focusing
on a particular type of global worker and workplace abuses in a transnational labor rights
campaign to resist corporate domination, labor activists have managed to leave aside other
structures of domination).
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governance and their potential to actualize labor rights for garment workers
in the supply chain. While they are distinct theories emerging from varied yet
interrelated social movements, they orient the evaluation of the GFA from the
vantage of workers it seeks to protect. These theories also foreground an
examination of international labor and human rights law outside of the formal
spaces of law and situates the GFAs in social movements seeking to advance
global labor rights. 27
Organizing theory, originating primarily from the U.S. labor movement,
emphasizes building worker power in contrast to strengthening formal
institutions. 28 Organizing theory reveals the often top-down nature of how
global unions negotiate GFAs in ways that reduce national unions 29 to
bureaucratic administrators of the agreements rather than recognizing them
as local catalysts to organizing that could support the fundamental right of
freedom of association. 30 A top-down approach obscures the multi-layered
spaces for the potential organizing and empowerment of workers, especially
for women workers who experience gender-based harassment and have no
mechanisms for redress.31 This article’s analysis of the H&M GFA will show
that GFAs that do not arise from grassroots worker mobilization, but instead
are implemented from grass-top32 NGOs and global unions, have not resulted
in lasting measurable concrete gains for workers or strengthened the capacity

27.
See Rajagopal, supra note 17, at 428 (arguing for expanding analysis in international
law to include social movements’ literature and the type of micro-level anthropological type
analysis they provide).
28.
See Simon R. De Turberville, Does the “Organizing Model Represent a Credible
Union Renewal Strategy?”, 18 WORK, EMP. & SOC’Y 775, 776 (2004) (analyzing the
organizing model where members use innovative techniques to empower themselves within
their employment and broader social relationships).
29.
Here I use national unions or national trade unions to distinguish them from global
unions or global union federations (GUFs). National unions are from one country and may work
in different trades and occupational categories to increase labor rights and power in their
country. GUFs are international federations of national trade unions.
30.
The top-down nature of GFAs is not a given, as shown from the corporate governance
campaign by Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”) in G4S that began in the United
States and was globalized through solidarity efforts with national unions in India and South
Africa. See MCCALLUM, supra note 1, chs. 4 & 5.
31.
See generally Peter Dicken, Philip Kelly, Kris Olds & Henry Yeung, Chains and
Networks, Territories and Scales: Towards a Relational Framework for Analyzing the Global
Economy 1 GLOB. NETWORKS 89 (2002) (discussing a networked approach to analyzing the
global economy which considers social structures and processes that constitute, evolve,
transform, and reproduce power relations, and identifies agents of resistance and opposition that
could orient the economy toward justice).
32.
With the proliferation of non-profit/non-governmental organizations advocating for
varied causes, the phrase “grasstops” is used to describe elite driven efforts on behalf of
marginalized communities or the executive leadership of nonprofits to distinguish from
grassroots where impacted individuals and communities take action. See INST. FOR CORP.
CULTURAL AFF’N, THE A TO Z OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 342 (Wayne Visser,
Dirk Matten, Manfred Pohl & Nick Tolhurst eds., 2010) (providing a general definition of
NGOs, noting grasstops as leaders of NGOs).
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for sustainable worker power. 33 In a workforce that is predominantly
composed of women workers, a gender-neutral dispute resolution mechanism
fails to protect women from sexual and other forms of workplace abuse and
harassment and falls short of addressing gendered demands such as maternity
leave protection.34
Legal mobilization theory emerges from sociology literature on social
movements’ interactions with law to describe any process by which an
individual or collective actor invokes legal norms, institutions, or discourse
to influence policy and create rights.35 Applied to GFAs, legal mobilization
theory reveals that the formalist, non-confrontational, and top-down lawbased strategies of governance agreements, often created and implemented
with little regard for the social context and realities in which the agreements
are to operate, repeatedly render them ineffective. Such agreements make it
easier for MNCs to superficially respond to labor movements’ demands
without providing any real accountability or evaluation of social outcomes.
Agreements that rely on the goodwill of MNCs without any binding rules that
force them to redress labor rights violations have not brought about
substantial improvement in labor conditions.36 As such, these agreements risk
falling into the common pitfall of voluntary business and human rights
initiatives of not holding corporate actors responsible for upholding human
rights.37 Instead, they give a false impression of the creation of new legal
rights within the international law realm, while the relationship between
workers, direct employers, and MNCs has not been substantially altered to
shift power dynamics, and spaces for worker power have not increased.

33.
McCallum, supra note 1, at 146 (stating not all GFAs are the same, and the ones that
are most useful are those that emerge from “struggle and conceived as one part of a
comprehensive industrial strategy” not a standalone policy document).
34.
See e.g., Juanita Elias & Hayley Stevenson, Women Workers in the Global Economy:
A Feminist Critique of the Core Labour Standards, in 4 ETHICS, L. & SOC’Y 331–40 (Jennifer
Gunning, Soren Holm & Ian Kenway eds., 2017) (“Taking the Kenyan flower industry as a case
study, Hale and Opondo show that numerous codes of conduct govern the production of flowers
in Kenya. These codes have generated some limited improvements in the working conditions
of the largely female labour force; however, on the whole, these codes have failed to penetrate
patriarchal and neoliberal structures which render women workers vulnerable to sexual
harassment and discrimination, and dangerous and unhygienic conditions.”).
35.
For a general theory on legal mobilization for social movements, see Michael
McCann, Legal Mobilization and Political Struggle, in RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY AND
THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 9 (Michael McCann ed., 1994).
36.
See Renée-Claude Drouin, Promoting Fundamental Labor Rights Through
International Framework Agreements: Practical Outcomes and Present Challenges, 31
COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 591, 612 (2010) (in the absence of legal threat, GFA becomes a
matter of corporate goodwill).
37.
Patrick Feuerstein & Gary Herrigel, The Limits of Global Labor Governance and an
Emerging Perspective, 18 ECON. SOCIO.: EUR. ELEC. NEWSLETTER 6 (2017); see also
McCallum, supra note 1, at 36 (voluntary codes of conduct “have limited impact on labor
conditions”).
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Decolonization theory38 exemplifies the problems of universalizing a
labor governance model that is rooted in European labor movement struggles
and is not conscious of the anti-colonial histories of labor movements in the
Global South. 39 Further, it demonstrates the perils of uncritically
transplanting these frameworks to formerly colonized countries where labor
laws and policies are holdovers from the colonial state40 and where neoliberal
economic policies require workers to meet the business interests of the global
economy. 41 Arising from these historical and contemporary social contexts,
national laws and policies are often hostile to unionization.42 Finally, the
decolonial lens spotlights how the universalization of a European labor
governance framework rooted in collaboration and social dialogue, 43 rather
than in conflict or confrontation (for example, the right to strike), 44 ignores
the power asymmetries faced by workers in the supply chain under global
capitalism.45 Further, a social dialogue approach fails to create legally

38.
Decolonization connotes multiple meanings: as a historical process, where
Europeans left by force or voluntarily in response to anti-colonial movements in Asia, Africa,
Latin America, and also as a theoretical framework examining European colonialism and its
continuing impact. See James Le Sueur, An Introduction, in THE DECOLONIZATION READER 2
(James Le Sueur ed., 2003).
39.
See Jens Steffek & Leonie Holthaus, The Social-Democratic Roots of Global
Governance: Welfare Internationalism from the 19th Century to the United Nations, 24 EUR.
J. INT’L REL. 117 (2018) (discussing the rise of labor governance models stemming from U.S.
and the U.K. with figures such as Albert Thomas, once the Director of the ILO in the early 20th
century and other ILO officials who were involved in labor organizing in European nationals
and “believed that European labour standards defined what the inhabitants of the colonies ought
to aspire to.”).
40.
See Sarosh Kuruvilla & Bryan Mundell, Introduction, in COLONIALISM,
NATIONALISM, AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE THIRD
WORLD 6 (Sarosh Kuruvilla & Bryan Mundell eds., Jai Press 1999).
41.
See Valerian DeSousa, Colonialism and Industrial Relations in India, in
COLONIALISM, NATIONALISM AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
65 (Sarosh Kuruvilla & Bryan Mundell eds., 1999).
42.
See Todd E. Vachon, Michael Wallace, & Allen Hyde, Union Decline in a Neoliberal
Age: Globalization, Financialization, European Integration, and Union Density in 18 Affluent
Democracies, 2 SOCIUS July 19, 2016, at 13–14 (finding that “European integration has been
part of a larger neoliberal project designed to undercut workers’ power and unleash the forces
of the free market.”).
43.
See David Trubek, Jim Mosher & Jeffrey S. Rothstein, Transnationalism in the
Regulation of Labor Regulations: International Regimes and Transnational Advocacy
Networks, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1187, 1200 (2000) (social dialogue between labor and
management emerged at the European Union level as a way to create labor standards where
management resisted legislation at the EU level).
44.
See also Michael Fichter & Jamie K McCallum, Implementing Global Framework
Agreements: The Limits of Social Partnership, 15 GLOB. NETWORKS S65, S69 (2015)
(describes a hybrid labor-management model combining dialogue and conflict).
45.
See Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garavito, Global Governance and Labor Rights: Codes of
Conduct and Anti-Sweatshop Struggles in Global Apparel Factories in Mexico and Guatemala,
33 POL. & SOC’Y 203, 211 (2005) (discussing how the voices of Global North and South –
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enforceable rights that workers can use to improve labor standards at their
workplace and exercise their freedom of association, while also serving to
mute labor militancy and organizing. 46 Universalizing a labor governance
agreement formulated outside of the countries in which they are meant to
operate in, without any understanding of the local social, economic and
historical context, will limit the potential of such agreements to actualize
labor rights in production countries. Rather, these types of agreements can
replicate political and economic hierarchies formed through colonialism and
imperialism.47
To develop insights into global labor governance, this article focuses on
the implementation of the H&M GFA in Bangladesh, India, and Cambodia,
including a discussion of the Accord on Building and Fire Safety, an
international safety agreement negotiated between global fashion brands
including H&M, unions, and non-governmental organizations in
Bangladesh. 48 As such, it contributes to the scholarship by examining the
actual impact of GFAs on local contexts.49 Modest, episodic successes shown
here suggest that GFAs can be strengthened to actualize their goals of
building worker power and improving freedom of association rights. 50 This
NGOs, unions – within governance systems need new rules of decision-making to overcome
the dominance of Northern actors to enable the development of labor groups in the South).
46.
See Samira Manzur, Drusilla K. Brown, Jette S. Knudsen, & Elizabeth Remick, After
Rana Plaza: From Building Safety to Social Dialogue (May 3, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2961808 (in an interview with a representative of the Accord
about social dialogue tactics that were implemented by international, often European entities,
the representative said: “Social dialogue projects are meaningless. Money is going to people
with no experience with labor and industrial relations and that have no experience with
Bangladesh. The international development projects are benefiting from the tragedies, and that’s
just not right. The money could be put to better use.”); see also Peter Evans, Is it Labor’s Turn
to Globalize? Twenty-ﬁrst Century Opportunities and Strategic Responses, INST. FOR RSCH. ON
LAB. & EMP. 352, 359 (2010) (“In the Global South, the necessity of changing global power
relations in order to secure workers’ rights locally is more harshly apparent, as local workers
are undercut by policies demanded by global rule-makers, Northern governments and ‘the
markets.’”).
47.
Antony Anghie, The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial
Realities, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 739, 748 (2006) (discussing while formal colonialism ended,
subordination of formerly colonized states continued through new economic forms).
48.
Accord on Building and Fire Safety, BANGL. ACCORD (2008)
https://bangladeshaccord.org/ [hereinafter BANGL. ACCORD].
49.
See Christina Niforou, International Framework Agreements and Industrial
Relations Governance: Global Rhetoric versus Local Realities, 50 BRITISH J. INDUS. REL. 352,
352 (2012) (dividing scholarship on GFAs to two strands: one that examines the potential
impact on labor standards and second that examines their actual impact).
50.
See e.g., Jane Wills, Bargaining for the Space to Organize in the Global Economy:
A Review of the Accor-IUF Trade Union Rights Agreement, 9 REV. INT’L POL. ECON., 692
(2002) (discussing Acco-IUF Trade Union Rights Agreement (TURA) and how it helped an
organizing campaign for hotel workers in New York); Pamela K. Robinson, International
Framework Agreements: Do Workers Benefit in a Global Supply Chain?, in SHAPING GLOBAL
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 176 (Konstantin Papadakis ed., 2011) (discussing how the Central
American trade union Coordinadora Latinoamericana de Sindicatos Bananeros (COLSIBA)
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article demonstrates that GFAs can also be an effective global labor
governance mechanism within the international law realm to enforce
international labor law and international human rights law generally.
However, GFAs, as currently implemented and as illustrated by the H&M
GFA, are not realizing their potential in these areas. Section I is a brief review
of the literature on GFAs, placing them in the broader context of international
human and labor rights law. Section II examines the H&M GFA specifically
and its implementation in Cambodia, India, and Bangladesh. This section
relies on publicly available information and case studies 51 on the H&M
GFA’s effectiveness in Asia, experts 52 interviewed for this article, and
analogous studies on private forms of regulation of MNCs in the region.53
Section III applies three social movement-oriented theoretical perspectives
from the literature to GFAs to assess whether the H&M GFA has yielded
measurable benefits to workers in these three countries and how it can be
improved to do so. As such, this article employs a hybrid empiricaltheoretical approach to derive insights on global labor governance. From this
focused study of the H&M GFA in Asia, the article concludes with some
reflections on the potential of GFAs in general to improve labor rights under
international law.

coordinated other national unions which contributed to the success of an agreement with
Chiquita ); see also Felix Hadwiger, Global Framework Agreements: Achieving Decent Work
in Global Supply Chains. Background Paper, INT’L LAB. OFF. GENEVA 40 (2016)
(summarizing some successes to include unions in Brazil shutting down the company to force
it to rehire terminated union representatives, in Turkey used the GFA to build international
solidarity to support a unionization campaign, reinstatement of fired train members in Cambodia
and Peru).
51.
See Andrea D. Ellinger & Rochell McWhorter, Qualitative Case Study Research as
Empirical Inquiry, 7 INT’L J. ADULT VOCATIONAL EDUC. & TECH., July–Sept. 2016, at 1
(describing case studies as a powerful form of empirical inquiry that investigates a
contemporary phenomenon in depth in a real-world context that provides key insights to the
issues studied. There are different sources for case studies including documents, interviews).
52.
Zoom Interview with Athit Kong, President, Coalition of Cambodian Apparel
Workers’ Democratic Union (CCAWDU) (July 22, 2021); Zoom Interview with Victor Garrido
Sotomayor, Member, Confederacio Sindical de Comisiones Obreras/Trade Union
Confederation of Workers’ Commissions and International Coordinator, Inditex GFA for
IndustriALL (July 21, 2020); Zoom Interview with Gautam Mody, General Secretary, New
Trade Union Initiative (NTUI) of India (July 31, 2021); Zoom Interview with Apoorva Kaiwar,
Regional Secretary, South Asia, IndustriALL (Aug. 6, 2021); Mats Svensson, Industrifacket
Metall (August 11, 2021); Interview with Nazma Akter, Executive Director of Awaj Foundation
and President of Sommilito Garments Sramik Federation of Bangladesh (Aug. 27, 2021) These
semi-structured interviews took place on zoom and were recorded. The author thanks each of
the interviewees for taking their time for these interviews. Any errors in attribution or failure to
accurately represent their views is entirely that of this author.
53.
See SAROSH KURUVILLA, PRIVATE REGULATION OF LABOR STANDARDS IN
GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS: PROBLEMS, PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 3 (Cornell Univ. Press
2021).
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I. GLOBAL LABOR GOVERNANCE: GLOBAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS
Historically, labor rights have been advanced through national
legislation, but globalization has challenged the effectiveness of this
approach. 54 This has been described as a regulatory gap. 55 With production
traversing national boundaries, new forms of global labor governance
mechanisms have emerged to address labor rights.56 These governance
strategies seek to exert discipline and control over MNCs to mitigate the
impacts of capitalism such as widening income inequality (particularly along
race and gender lines), unsafe working conditions, and environmental
degradation.57 Four main approaches to global labor governance involving
distinct actors have been identified in the literature: (1) engaging public
international organizations like the International Labor Organization (“ILO”),
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”),
and the United Nations (“UN”) which establish international legal
frameworks for labor law; (2) global unions seeking to regulate TNCs through
international/global framework agreements (“IFAs”58or “GFAs”); 59 (3)
MNCs entering into private and voluntary forms of regulation 60 through
54.
See Feuerstein & Herrigel, supra note 37, at 6; see also MCCALLUM, supra note 1,
at 12 (stating that governance struggles emerged as a structural response to mitigate global
capitalism).
55.
Maayan Menashe, Private Actors as Transnational Regulators: The Case of
Freedom of Association, 49 INDUS. L.J., Mar. 2020, at 1, 5 (2020).
56.
See e.g., Isabelle Schömann, Andre Sobczak, Eckard Voss & Peter Wilke,
International Framework Agreement: New Paths To Workers Participation In Multinationals’
Governance, 14 TRANSFER: EUR. REV. LAB. & RES. 111–26 (2008); see also MCCALLUM,
supra note 1, at 3; Hassel, supra note 2, at 231; Wills, supra note 50, at 675 (discussing ways
unions have and can intervene in the global economy to secure workers’ rights); Helena du
Preez & Paul Smit, The Role of International Framework Agreements in Transnational Labor
Regulation, 41 S. AFR. J. LAB. REL. 64 (2017); KURUVILLA, supra note 53, at 3.
57.
See MCCALLUM, supra note 1, at 11.
58.
IFAs are defined as “bilaterally negotiated agreements” by multinational
corporations and global unions. See Michael G. Sherrard & Gerlind Wisskirchen, Next Up for
North American Employers and Unions? International and Corporate Social Responsibility, 29
ABA J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 245, 247 (2014). In earlier literature, agreements between global
unions and companies were referred to as International Framework Agreements (“IFAs”). More
recently, they are referred to as GFAs.
59.
For a helpful introduction to GFAs, see a collection of essays edited by Konstantin
Papadakis, SHAPING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK
AGREEMENTS (Konstantin Papadakis ed., 2011); Jeremy Blasi & Jennifer Bair, An Analysis of
Multiparty Bargaining Model for Global Supply Chains (Int’l Lab. Off., Inclusive Lab. Mkt.,
Lab. Rel. & Working Conditions, Conditions of Work and Employment Series Paper No. 105,
2019); see also Niforou, supra note 49, at 352; Hassel, supra note 2, at 231, 243 (describing
IFAs as the most comprehensive form of establishing labor standards negotiated by global
unions); Barbara Fick, Corporate Social Responsibility for Enforcement of Labor Rights: Are
There More Effective Alternatives?, 4 GLOB. BUS. L. REV., no. 2, 2014, at, 1, 11 (stating that
IFAs are a response to globalization).
60.
Sarkar & Kuruvilla, supra note 5, at 32 (summarizing various examples of private
regulations which include setting standards benchmarked to the conventions of the ILO,
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corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) programs; and (4) states and
corporate actors forming multi-stake-holder initiatives. 61 The result of these
polycentric global labor governance approaches is a diffuse 62 and a
decentralized public-private regulatory system that operates within the
international law realm. 63 Each of these governance approaches involves
multiple actors responsible for upholding international human rights and
labor law, including public international bodies such as the ILO, voluntary
and norm-setting initiatives by the UN, internal voluntary corporate
regulation such as codes of conduct through corporate CSRs, and global
framework agreements between global unions and MNCs. There are limits to
the effectiveness of these governance mechanisms 64 and their ability to
improve labor standards over time. 65 However, of these strategies, labor
advocates have found GFAs negotiated between global unions and MNCs to
be the most promising to address labor rights in supply chains, as they avoid
the jurisdictional limits of state regulations, 66 the voluntary nature of CSR,
and the limits of collective bargaining agreements between direct employers
and unions. 67

auditing to comply with codes of conduct and incentives for suppliers to improve compliance);
Jinsun Bae, How Has Private Regulation Improved Labor Practices in Global Supply Chains:
An Empirical Examination, in PRIVATE REGULATION OF LABOR STANDARDS IN GLOBAL
SUPPLY CHAINS: PROBLEMS, PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 79, 99 (Sarosh Kuruvilla ed., 2021)
(after reviewing auditing data from multiple industries in India over several years, the author
finds there is no basis to conclude private regulations is working well).
61.
Kuruvilla & Mundell, supra note 40, at 6.
62.
See generally S.J. Rombouts, The International Diffusion of Fundamental Labor
Standards: Contemporary Content, Scope, Supervision and Proliferation of Core Workers’
Rights Under Public Private Binding, and Voluntary Regulatory Regimes, 50 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 78, 83 (2019) (mapping in detail how the ILO standards were integrated into the
international human rights law, evolved into “hybrid governance forms combining public and
private actors” and became further embedded into international human rights law).
63.
Hassel, supra note 2, at 244 (describing the evolution of global labor governance as
evolving from ILO standard setting toward a normative orientation with public and private
actors creating a decentralized private regulatory system); see Rombouts, supra note 62, at 132–
73 (overviewing labor standards in public and private international law sources).
64.
See Feuerstein & Herrigel, supra note 37, at 6, 8; see also Bae, supra note 60, at 98
(explaining that no evidence to conclude that private regulation is working well overall);
Hadwiger, supra note 50, at 1; see also Dimitris Stevis & Michael Fichter, International
Framework Agreements in the United States: Escaping, Projecting, or Globalizing Social
Dialogues? 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 667 (2012) (describing IFAs as “contested terrains”
with some positive, some negative).
65.
See Stevis & Fichter, supra note 64, at 669 (describing positive outcomes as limited
or episodic meaning the results are ad hoc reactions to particular disputes); Fichter &
McCallum, supra note 44, at S71 (finding no systemic pattern of successful implementation of
GFAs); see Bae, supra note 60, at 98.
66.
See du Preez & Smit, supra note 56.
67.
Blasi & Bair, supra note 59, at 5; see also Feuerstein & Herrigel, supra note 37, at 8
(stating that GFAs seeks to impose binding global labor standards on MNCs).
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Before discussing the H&M GFA’s impact on Asian producing countries
in section II, this section seeks to contextualize GFAs within international
human rights law and discuss their significance as the preferred model among
labor advocates for achieving global labor rights. First, the section notes how
GFAs directly relate to international labor and human law by incorporating
fundamental labor rights into the agreements, how they emerged in a response
to voluntary initiatives to hold MNCs legally accountable to human rights,
and their potential to operationalize international labor standards at the local
level. Second, given GFAs’ potential to advance global labor rights
notwithstanding gaps and constraints, this section reorients and refocuses
GFAs on workers and organizing in production countries, highlights the need
for empirical research on their actual impact in the Global South, and attempts
to radically shift GFAs toward their emancipatory potential. 68

A. GFAs’ Relationship to International Labor Law and International
Human Rights Law
GFAs are a form of private regulation of MNCs based on agreements
between Global Union Federations (“GUFs”)69 and MNCs. However, GFAs
do not operate within a legal vacuum. GFAs emerged from two developments
within international law: the convergence of international labor and human
rights law and the efforts within international human rights law to hold MNCs
accountable to human rights.
The ILO is the main public international body that sets labor standards
through binding and non-binding conventions applicable to states.70
Fundamental labor rights are included as part of the international bill of rights
reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”),71 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), 72 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

68.
Here, emancipatory is used in the broadest sense of articulating the promise of human
and labor rights as aspired to by social movements. See Adelle Blackett, Theorizing
Emancipatory Transnational Futures of International Labor Law, 113 AM. J. INT’L L.
UNBOUND 390, 391 (2019) (on emancipatory labor law); Lorenzo Cotula, Between Hope and
Critique: Human Rights, Social Justice and Re-Imagining International Law from the Bottom
Up, 48 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 473, 476 (2020) (on emancipatory human rights).
69.
See Global Unions and Federations, AFL-CIO, https://aflcio.org/about-us/ourunions-and-allies/global-unions, (last visited Nov. 13, 2021) (explaining different types of
global unions).
70.
Home, ILO, https://www.ilo.org/global/lang—en/index.htm; see also Rombouts,
supra note 62, at 86 (2018) (for an overview of ILO); see also Hassel, supra note 2, at 236.
71.
G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, art. 23, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHR] (“Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection
of his interests.”).
72.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 22, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association
with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.”).
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(“ICESCR”). 73 In 1998, through the ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work (“ILO Declaration”),74 labor rights were
aligned with universally recognized human rights to derive four areas of
fundamental labor rights: 75 Freedom of Association (Conventions 87 and 98);
Non-Discrimination (Conventions 100 and 111); Prohibition on Forced Labor
(Conventions 138 and 182); and Prohibition on Child Labor (Conventions
138 and 182). 76 ILO member states are required to respect these principles
even if they have not ratified the specific conventions.77 Relevant to the focus
of this article, freedom of association is now firmly established as a central
right within international human rights law. 78 It is viewed as a right that can
enable the protection of other fundamental labor rights against forced labor,
child labor, and discrimination.79 Once ILO fundamental labor rights were
fully integrated within the human rights framework, this led to a “diffusion”
of labor rights into other international human rights instruments. 80
With globalization and the increased power of MNCs in the lives of
workers, 81 the ILO Declaration and human rights law proved inadequate to
protect labor rights because they applied to nation-states, not MNCs.82 In
73.
International Convention on Economic and Social Rights, art. 8, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (setting forth a more robust right to form unions including the right to strike).
74.
Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, ILO (June 18, 1998,
revised June 15, 2010), https://www.ilo.org/declaration/lang—en/index.htm. While the right to
strike and take collective action is not explicitly stated in the ILO Convention, it has been
recognized as essential to freedom of association. See Rombouts, supra note 62, at 125.
75.
The distillation of the ILO Conventions to four fundamental principles raised
concerns as to whether the obligatory nature of some of the ILO Conventions would be
weakened or suggest that the other Conventions are not equally important. See Philip Alston &
James Heenan, Shrinking the International Labor Code: An Unintended Consequence of the
1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 221, 223 (2004).
76.
Rombouts, supra note 62, at 82, 125.
77.
Id. at 90.
78.
Id. at 120.
79.
ILO, supra note 75.
80.
Rombouts, supra note 62, at 98–100; see also Hassel, supra note 2, at 236–37
(describing how the shift from global labor governance standards promulgated by ILO to the
development of four fundamental rights allowed for greater flexibility by the ILO to integrate
these principles into other debates on human rights such as trade and labor).
81.
Errol P. Mendes, Corporate Power and Human Rights, in Global Governance, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMBATING THE TRAGIC FLAW 174, 228 (2014)
(noting the proliferation of MNCs are larger than many national economies, dominate over
global economic activity, and have a major impact on global governance); Robert C. Blitt,
Beyond Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Charting an Embracive
Approach to Corporate Human Rights Compliance, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. 33, 36 (2012)
(discussing the rise of MNCS and how they were outperforming many national economies by
the 20th century).
82.
Jackie Smith, Economic Globalization and Labor Rights: Towards Global Solidarity,
20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 873, 876 (2014) (noting that while states are subject
to international law, there is no way to hold corporations legally accountable).
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response to this gap, 83 a growing field of law and academic study referred to
as Business and Human Rights emerged seeking to hold MNCs accountable
to human rights law. 84 Results of this growing field included the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 85 the ILO Tripartite Declaration of
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 86 the UN
Global Compact,87 and the UN Guiding Principles of Business and Human
Rights (“UNGP”). 88 However, these initiatives to hold MNCs responsible for
human rights violations are primarily voluntary. 89 Though there are efforts,
mainly led by nations in the Global South, to have a binding treaty 90 to hold
MNCs accountable to international human rights and labor laws, such efforts
have not succeeded and have been vigorously opposed by MNCs.91 There is,

83.
Consumer campaigns were instrumental to propel MNCs to adopt voluntary
standards to regulate their business activities. MNCs also wanted to protect their brand and
avoid liability. Hassel, supra note 2, at 239.
84.
See generally JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2013).
85.
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ORG. ECON. COOP. DEV. [“OECD”]
(2011), https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/ (recommendations by participating governments
urging MNCs to respect the human rights of those affected by its business activities including
the protection of the environment in addition to labor rights); see Hassel, supra note 2, at 241.
86.
See Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and
Social Policy, ILO (5th ed. 2017), https://www.ilo.org/empent/areas/mne-declaration/lang—en
/index.htm.
87.
The Global Compact sets forth ten principles that businesses agree to follow in
partnership with U.N. efforts to promote human rights, labor standards, environment and
corruption. U.N. Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (last
visited Nov. 7, 2021); see also Evaristus Oshinebo, The UN Global Compact and Accountability
of Transnational Corporations: Separating Myths from Realities, 19 FLA. J. INT’L L. 1, 12–20
(2007) (outlining the background, goals and structure of the Compact). The purpose of the
Global Compact was to integrate private actors into the human rights field that had been the
domain of state governments and public international bodies such as the ILO and U.N. See
Hassel, supra note 2, at 241.
88.
The guidance is organized around three core pillars: reaffirming states’ duty to
protect human rights, urging businesses to comply and respect human rights, and having
effective remedies when rights are violated. See U.N. Secretary-General, Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Guiding
Principles]; see also UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, BUS. & HUM. RTS.
RES. CTR., https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/un-guiding-principles (last visited Nov.
20, 2021) (collection of resources on the Guiding Principles). See also Blitt, supra note 81, at
42–49 (reviewing history of Guiding Principles and each of the pillars).
89.
Rombouts, supra note 62, at 147–48; Menashe, supra note 55, at 7.
90.
For background on the history and background on obtaining a binding treaty, see
Binding Treaty, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR., rhttps://www.business-humanrights.org/en/bigissues/binding-treaty/.
91.
Salil Shetty, Corporations Have Rights. Now We Need a Global Treaty on
Their Responsibilities, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2015, 9:10 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/jan/21/
corporations-abuse-rights-international-law.
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however, promising national legislation by countries to regulate their own
MNCs. 92
Within this complex web of normative and voluntary regulations, GFAs
represent private agreements between MNCs and GUFs seeking to enforce
labor standards. GFAs are benchmarked by ILO Conventions 93 and their
related jurisprudence. 94 They reflect a “paradigm shift” within the mostly
voluntary efforts to enforce labor rights. 95 The vast majority of GFAs
incorporate ILO Conventions96 on labor, to varying levels of detail, as well
as the UDHR,97 UN Global Compact,98 and UNGP. 99 Typically, they
incorporate ILO core labor rights, including the freedom of association and
the right to collective bargaining, but differ in language from a statement of
principle supporting those rights to a stronger language of commitment that
the suppliers will respect those rights. 100 However, they differ from union
92.
See, German Parliament Passes Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence Law, BUS.
& HUM. RTS. CTR. (June 16, 2021), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news
/german-due-diligence-law/; see also Modern Slavery Act 2015, c.30 (UK) (requiring
companies to report on the risks of modern day slavery in their supply chains).
93.
ILO, supra note 74.
94.
Renée-Claude Drouin, supra note 36, at 593 (noting GFAs derive content from ILO
instruments which is a core building block to the agreements).
95.
Fichter & McCallum, supra note 44, at S69.
96.
Michael G. Sherrard & Gerlind Wisskirchen, Next Up for North American Employers
and Unions? International and Corporate Social Responsibility, 29 AM. BAR ASS’N J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 245, 254 (2014) (explaining that agreements refer explicitly or implicitly to the
fundamental labor rights).
97.
Hadwiger, supra note 50, at 10.
98.
The UN Global Compact is a voluntary effort by the U.N. based on the CEO’s
commitment to sustainability principles and partnerships with the U.N.. It draws its Ten
Principles from the UDHR, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and U.N. Convention Against Corruption.
See The Ten Principles of the U.N. Global Compact, U.N. GLOB. COMPACT (2018),
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles.
99.
Hadwiger, supra note 50, at 10; see also GUIDELINES FOR GLOBAL
F RAMEWORK A GREEMENTS (GFAS ), I NDUSTRI ALL GLOB . U NION 1, 2 (2014)
http://www.industriall-union.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/GFAs/
industriall_gfa_guidelines_final_version_exco_12-2014_english.pdf.
100.
IndustriALL, the GUF involved in the H&M GFA, has identified content that a GFA
must have, including an explicit reference to ILO Conventions and jurisprudence rights in the
1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles Rights at Work. These conventions should
take precedence over national laws if unfavorable. The GFAs must recognize international labor
and human rights standards such as UNHR, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,
ILO Declaration Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, Guiding Principles,
and U.N. Global Compact. Further, they must cover the company’s operations globally, commit
that suppliers and subcontractors adopt these standards, guarantee to treat unions positively, and
to refrain from anti-union activities. Also, union representatives should have access to the
workplace, and contain an effective mechanism for implementation. See Guidelines for Global
Framework Agreements (GFAs), supra note 99, at 2; see also Niforou, supra note 49, at 353;
see also Lone Riisgaard, International Framework Agreements: A New Model for Securing
Workers Rights, 44 INDUS. REL 707, 709 (2005).
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negotiated collective bargaining agreements at the national level in that they
rely on policy principles and do not create new legally enforceable rights. 101
GFAs operate alongside other initiatives to hold MNCs responsible for
upholding labor and human rights including the UNGP and OECD
Guidelines, but with a distinct labor focus. 102 GFAs focus on the labor
practices within MNC business practices, while mechanisms like the UNGP
address the broader human rights obligations of businesses. 103 International
human rights laws and GFAs play a mutually reinforcing and interrelated
role.104 GUFs can negotiate stronger GFAs by reasoning that business and
human rights guidance serve as a minimal floor to business’ obligations.
Although the GFAs reference the ILO Conventions and human rights law,
which is an important reaffirmation that MNCs should abide by those
rights,105 they do not give GFAs enforcement authority under those human
rights instruments (instruments which are themselves soft law). The ILO
could play a greater role in encouraging GFAs by facilitating the negotiation
of GFAs under its own social dialogue and supervisory process and providing
neutral arbitration and technical services. 106 As GFAs evolve in content107
and move toward implementation mechanisms that bind MNCs to labor
standards, they have the potential to create a legally enforceable obligation
on a MNC to uphold international labor rights in their supply chain. 108 As a
101.
Niforou, supra note 49, at 353; see also MCCALLUM, supra note 1, at 37 (detailing
how GFAs do not give new rights but provide a mechanism to uphold labor standards where
national legal systems cannot); see also Zoom Interview with Gautam Mody, supra note 52
(describing GFAs as a framework for collective bargaining).
102.
See Rashmi Venkatesan, The UN Framework on Business and Human Rights: A
Workers’ Rights Critique, 157, J. BUS. ETHICS 635, 635 (explaining that although the Guiding
Principles bring clarity and uniformity to business human rights standards, the voluntary aspect
of the principles limit the ability to bring about substantive change for workers).
103.
Hadwiger, supra note 50, at 29–30.
104.
Id. (discussing the role UNGP can play in strengthening GFA); Menashe, supra note
56, at 4 (describing how private actors can shape public norms).
105.
See Zoom Interview with Gautam Mody, supra note 52 (explaining significance of
MNCs acknowledging ILO standards and the right to trade unions).
106.
Renée-Claude Drouin, The Role of the ILO in promoting the development of
international framework agreements, in CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND
AGREEMENTS: AN EMERGING GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS FRAMEWORK 237
(Konstantinos Papadakis, ed., 2008); see also Papadakis, supra note 59, at 14 (ILO or other
public institutions may provide an effective monitoring of agreements and remedies for breach);
Hadwiger, supra note 50, at 47–51 (recommending revising ILO Tripartite Declaration of
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy and for the Declaration’s
greater role in supporting GFAs).
107.
Hadwiger, supra note 50, at 43 (reviewing GFA from 2007 to 2015 and describing a
qualitative evolution of GFA, a second generation of GFA requiring more implementation, and
dispute resolution that facilitate unionization).
108.
See TORSTEN MÜLLER, HANS-WOLFGANG PLATZER & STEFAN RÜB, FRIEDRICHEBERT–STIFTUNG, INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT – OPPORTUNITIES AND
LIMITATIONS OF A NEW TOOL OF GLOBAL TRADE UNION POLICY (2008) (while GFAs are now
soft law tools, over time, they could create transnational structures); Menashe, supra note 55,
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result, MNCs can be subject to international human rights law. 109 Like any
enforceable private agreement, GFAs could be enforced in national courts.110
They can also be enforced via binding arbitration.111 Of course, MNCs are
not obligated to enter into GFAs, but consumers and other stakeholders 112 can
pressure MNCs in a particular sector to sign GFAs. 113
GFAs have the potential to operationalize international labor standards
that have until now been elusive, particularly in the decentralized and
fragmented production common to the garment industry. 114 GFAs have
contributed to modest successes in terms of increased trade unions and higher
union membership. GFAs have historically been lumped together in the
literature with other non-binding voluntary CSR initiatives because they often
do not go far enough to hold MNCs legally accountable to international
human rights law. Their effectiveness varies widely by content, negotiation,
implementation, and ability to modify, adapt, and change in response to

at 3 (on private labor regulations notes that “private norms can with time institutionalize into
public hard law”); Blitt, supra note 81, at 41 (using the example of UDHR to argue aspirational
non-binding principles or soft law can become part hard law in the form of treaty and customary
international law over time); see generally ALEXANDRIA HARRINGTON, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND GOVERNANCE: TREATY REGIMES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
IMPLEMENTATION (Routledge 2021) (surveying economic, social, environmental treaty
regimes through the lens of the sustainable development goals, argues that soft law instruments
can be entrenched and operationalized into national and international law).
109.
See Mendes, supra note 81, at 188.
110.
See Alvin L. Goldman, Enforcement of International Framework Agreement Under
U.S. Law, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 605, 612 (2012) (discussing the enforceability of IFA
in federal labor law, state contract law, consumer protection laws).
111.
E.g., BANGL. ACCORD, supra note 49, ¶ 5; INTERNATIONAL ACCORD FOR HEALTH
AND SAFETY IN TEXTILE AND GARMENT INDUSTRY, BANGL. WPENGINE.COM, ¶ 50 (Sept. 1,
2021) (extending the Bangladesh Accord), https://bangladesh.wpengine.com/wp-content
/uploads/2021/08/1-September-International-Accord-on-Health-and-Safety-in-the-Textileand-Garment-Industry-public-version.pdf; Richard Croucher, Mark Houssart, Lilian Miles &
Philip James, Legal Sanction, International Organisations and the Bangladesh Accord, 48
INDUS. L.J. 549, 550 (2019) (legal enforcement of the safety agreement via arbitration
contributed to its success); John R. Trentacosta & Leah R. Imbrogno, Contracting for
International Arbitration in the Global Supply Chain, MICH. B.J. 30, 30–32 (2018).
112.
See Changing the Face of the Global Textile and Garment Industry, INDUSTRIALL
GLOB. UNION, http://www.industriall-union.org/changing-the-face-of-the-global-textile-andgarment-industry (last visited Nov. 20, 2021) (noting that global unions are pursuing a strategy
to obtain GFA by sector).
113.
Blitt, supra note 81, at 60 (urging companies to take the “higher ground” and comply
with applicable human rights to eliminate exposure to human rights liability, eliminate
uncertainty by making human rights compliance contingent on host country, avoids conflicts
from a patchwork of policies, and the increase of public goodwill); see also Hassel, supra note
2, at 232, 235 (noting that companies within a sector can pressure or motivate each other to set
common labor standards); but see ROBINSON, supra note 50, at 177 (cautioning that a major
company in a sector adopting a labor agreement does not prevent worker violations by other
companies).
114.
See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 26, at xviii.
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diverse social contexts. 115 However, how GFAs interact with international
human rights law, now and in the future, will be key to ensuring that
fundamental labor rights and human rights are enforced. 116 GFAs are a
growing part of the labor movement’s strategy, as discussed below, but also
have broader potential within international human rights law. Because they
incorporate by reference broader human rights instruments, GFAs can be
vehicles to make environmental and other human rights enforceable on
MNCs in conjunction with a related public international body. They offer one
of the most promising legal strategies for social movements to address
growing inequalities under globalization where international law has
previously been inadequate. 117
As a form of global labor governance, GFAs have additional implications
for international law.118 As a governance mechanism implementing ILO
standards and international human rights at the national and sub-national
supplier level, GFAs evidence nascent formation of a “global administrative
space.” 119 Scholars Nico Krisch and Benedict Kingsbury have described the
“global administrative space” as a trend within international law where a
“strict dichotomy between domestic and international” is blurred, the
interplay of officials and institutions operate at varied levels, and
administrative law functions grow to hold global governance accountable.120
This emergent global space has been rightly discussed with concern as having
an “imperial character,” with developments potentially undermining
democracy. 121 While GFAs do not yet play this global administrative
function, the expansion of arbitration or binding dispute resolution
mechanisms as part of their implementation made operable at the local level
and tiered to the global level may create this functionality.122 In fact, GUFs

115.
Stevis & Fichter, supra note 64, at 670–71 (identifying four factors to explain why
the impact of IFAs has been varied from no impact to episodic).
116.
Cf. HARRINGTON, supra note 108 (looking at the soft law of SDGs to argue that if
entrenched and operationalized through various environmental, social and economic treaties,
they can be effective, and shape international law).
117.
See Gralf-Peter Calliess & Moritz Renner, Between Law and Social Norms: The
Evolution of Global Governance, 22 RATIO JURIS 260, 261 (2009) (“[L]egal theory has largely
failed to grasp the intricate relationship between law and social norms in the context
of global governance regimes that might even necessitate a reconsideration of the concept
of law itself.”).
118.
Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global
Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 10 (speaking about
global governance generally, not GFAs, as questioning orthodoxies of international law
including that new rules of global regulations are not derived from sources of international law).
119.
Id.
120.
Id. at 1.
121.
B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the
Making, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L.1–2.
122.
Hadwiger, supra note 50, at VII (describing the evolution of the content of GFAs as
increasingly complex and technocratic); see also Drouin, supra note 36, at 631 (discussing
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do seek to use GFAs as a means to create a global industrial relations system,
given that national trade unions and industrial relations policies are
inadequate to ensure workers’ rights in the global supply chain.123 Concerns
about the imperial nature of an advancing global space further highlight why
a decolonization approach to GFAs is critical if they are to be advanced as a
global legal strategy for labor movements. Given GFAs’ potential to operate
in a liminal space between international law and domestic regulation, as
international agreements implemented at the national level by national
unions, they have the potential to advance an emancipatory vision of global
labor rights.124

B. Significance, Constraints, and Gaps of GFAs
Global agreements by GUFs have emerged as a preferred global labor
movement strategy.125 According to Isabelle Schömann of the European
Trade Union Confederation: “IFAs represent a new means by which unions
at all levels are able to raise awareness and promote union rights and
additional core labour standards and to make them applicable within the scope
of multinationals’ activities, thus ‘adapting’ domestic (legally) binding rights
outside their national scope of application.” 126 These agreements are an
important alternative to “normative approaches deployed by international
organizations” and “voluntaristic forms of labor regulations originating from
corporate behavior.”127 They are described as an essential “part of the toolbox
of global industrial relations and cross-border social dialogue.” 128 Because
this governance mechanism involves global trade unions, it should

processes within ILO to enhance the effectiveness of the GFA including providing dispute
resolution services and technical assistance to trade unions).
123.
Papadakis, supra note 59, at 2–3 (noting that framework agreements are the closest
to industrial relations given they are negotiated between employers and worker representatives.
They offer unions the opportunity to coordinate across borders that could lead to improved
working conditions across supply chains).
124.
Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 118 (discussing global governance generally as not
fitting easily within the “classical, inter-state, consent-based models of international law”).
125.
Ludger Pries & Veronika Dehnen, International Framework Agreements: A Thread
in the Web of Transnational Labor Regulation, EUR. J. INDUS. REL., 2014, at 1, 3 (discussing
various types of IFAs from an industrial relations perspective whereby unions can implement
labor standards. Global union federations are included as a partner to business approaches,
which view orderly labor-management relations as effective management processes and how
that impacts their effectiveness); see ASHOK KUMAR, MONOPSONY CAPITALISM: POWER AND
PRODUCTION IN THE TWILIGHT OF THE SWEATSHOP AGE (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2020).
126.
Schömann et al., supra note 56, at 111, 122. See also MCCALLUM, supra note 1, at
12, 38 (GFAs are described as part of a larger industrial relations strategy to expand the
bargaining power of national unions).
127.
Feuerstein & Herrigel, supra note 37, at 8.
128.
Blasi & Blair, supra note 59, at 14; see also du Preez & Smit, supra note 56, at 96
(describing IFAs as a “vital and innovative tool” transnational labor).
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presumably be most attuned to the needs of workers in the supply chain.129
Notwithstanding the substantive critiques of GFAs as presently formulated,
researchers and experts have found them to play a positive role in global labor
governance. 130 Still, some constraints and gaps should be noted for GFAs to
realize their emancipatory potential.
Despite literature discussing the benefits of GFAs generally,131 in
contrast to other labor governance mechanisms such as codes of conduct,132
there is sparse empirical research that includes the perspectives of workers
and national unions on GFAs’ actual effectiveness and potential
improvements. 133 Though scholars and labor activists have discussed the
need to amplify the voices of workers in the supply chain, the opinions of
workers and national unions on GFAs remain unstudied. 134 Part of the
129.
Rombouts, supra note 62, at 78 (describing a GFA as a transnational collective
bargaining agreement).
130.
Hassel, supra note 2, at 243 (describing the GFAs as the most comprehensive form
of governance establishing labor standards).
131.
See KUMAR, supra note 125, at 78 (explaining that GFAs do provide a platform for
negotiation); Marc Antonin Hennebert, Peter Fairbrother & Chrisitan Leveseque, Mobilization
of International Framework Agreements: A Source of Power for Social Actors? 33 COMP. LAB.
L. & POL’Y J. 691, 693 (2012) (describing the trends of IFAs from extending scope to
subcontractors, including monitoring provisions, inclusion of complaint procedures and
broadening subjects of the agreements to include more issue related to industrial relations);
Rosado C. Marzan, Organizing with International Framework Agreements: An Exploratory
Study, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 725, 728 (2014).
132.
Schömann et al., supra note 36, at 112 (comparing codes and framework
agreements).
133.
Niforou, supra note 4950, at 352 (dividing scholarship on IFA to those discussing its
potential impact on regulating labor standards, its relation to other union strategies, and
internationalizing industrial relations, but only a few studying its actual impact).
134.
Hadwiger reviewed the text of 54 GFAs signed from 2009 to 2015 and evaluated 29
case-studies for a ILO Report. He noted that the review focused on good practices but did not
assess the success of implementation. Hadwiger, supra note 50, at 34. More research is needed
on the local implementation of GFAs at suppliers and subcontractors with an emphasis on
enabling trade unions and organizing. Hadwiger, supra note 50, at 46; see also RodriguezGaravito, supra note 45, at 203, 204 (commenting on the lack of empirical research on the
operation of the codes of conduct related to labor rights despite the proliferation of these codes
of conduct and growing interest in governance issues among corporate, labor and NGOs);
Riisgaard, supra note 100, at 712 (detailing a case study of Chiquita framework covering banana
workers, and noting that empirical research in this area of global framework agreements is
limited). This article seeks to fill this specific research gap, with the caveat that much of the
information needed for a comprehensive review are internal documents of both H&M and GUF.
See E-mail from Mats Svensson, Industrifacket Metall, to Author (Aug. 16, 2021) (on file with
author) (in response to requests by this author on any written evaluation of H&M, Svensson
writes: “When it come[s] sic to evaluation and evolving of the content and implementation of
the GFA there is nothing written” and that what is discussed internally among IndustriALL
family cannot be shared); see also Zoom Interview with Apoorva Kaiwar, supra note 5252.
This author recognizes the need for GUFs to maintain select internal organizing strategy
documents private, however, as GFAs increase in influence in this international law space,
transparency will be key. This is a place where ILO can play a role in terms of monitoring and
reviewing GFAs.
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challenge of conducting studies on GFAs is that they are private agreements
between global unions and MNCs, so an evaluation would involve reviewing
internal corporate and union documents and procedures. 135 Nonetheless,
whether GFAs actually enable workers to organize and build worker power
or produce related benefits is essential to evaluating this field of global labor
governance. 136 Such a review is essential for GFAs’ future direction and
implementation.
Limited empirical studies suggest mixed results and modest successes in
the ability of GFAs to facilitate dialogue among workers and garment factory
owners, as well as to create some improvements in workplace conditions.137
Labor scholar Michael Fichter, who has been part of an interdisciplinary and
international team of researchers assessing GFAs, noted: While “GFAs have
laid the foundation for institutionalizing global labour relations by
establishing an arena and formulating the ‘rules of the game’” their
implementation remains highly problematic.138 He attributes the challenges
to implementation to shortcomings in the negotiation process. 139 Successes
are found where workers are already unified and organized at the national
level, 140 where involvement of local actors in the institutionalization of the
agreement results in a sense of collective ownership,141 or where there exists
a regional collaboration among unions. 142 This author is unaware of any
gender specific study of GFAs, as done here, in industries where women
workers predominate. Uncritically advancing GFAs as a means to address
global labor rights for a predominantly female workforce has also given the

135.
See Zoom Interview with Apoorva Kaiwar, supra note 52 (while internal assessments
of GFA that IndustriALL are involved in take place, unions are not research organizations;
public studies require resources and involve internal documents). There is also tremendous
inertia among global unions in disseminating, implementing, and monitoring agreements. See
Niforou, supra note 49, at 367.
136.
Rodriguez-Garavito, supra note 45, at 205.
137.
Feuerstein & Herrigel, supra note 37, at 8; Fichter & McCallum, supra note 38, at
S71.
138.
Fichter & McCallum, supra note 38, at S81.
139.
Id. at S80.
140.
Wills, supra note 50, at 697 (discussing Acco-IUF Trade Union Rights Agreement
(TURA) and its use in an organizing campaign in New York. The author found that TURA’s
effectiveness depends on the existence of an active local trade union organization, there it was
Local 6 of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees (“HERE”) union); See Robinson,
supra note 50, at 171 (Central American trade union Coordinadora Latinoamericana de
Sindicatos Bananeros (COLSIBA) coordinated other national unions which contributed to the
success of an agreement with Chiquita ); see also Blasi & Bair, supra note 59, at 6 (describing
how agreements successful where buyer source exclusively, prefer suppliers that are unionized
or proven to comply with labor standards).
141.
Niforou, supra note 49, at 370.
142.
Riisgaard, supra note 100, at 722 (discussing how the IFA grew up out of regional
coordination among banana workers in Latin and Central America; a new union that was
organizing before the IFA was signed used the agreement to buttress its organizing).
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illusion of progress for women workers in an industry where gender-based
violence and discrimination remains pervasive.143
While there is a fair amount of scholarship on GFAs, 144 few orient the
inquiry from the vantage of workers in production countries in the Global
South. This is probably because GFAs have mostly been negotiated by
European unions.145 According to Fichter and Mccallum: “[I]n the hands of
the GUFs and their strongest affiliates at European TNC headquarters, GFAs
have largely been a ‘top–down’ instrument, the usefulness of which has
seldom moved beyond the institutionalized oasis in which it has been
negotiated and signed.” 146 Although the proliferation of GFAs constitutes a
global labor movement, the movement remains U.S.-and Europeancentric.147 GFAs can alter this reality but only if their goals are to change the
relationship between the parties and seek to reconstruct new rules between
labor and management that benefit workers and build their power. 148 This
article seeks to shift the inquiry around GFAs away from its Eurocentric focus
by analyzing information and case studies on the implementation of the H&M
GFA in three Asian production countries, with an explicit focus on its impacts
on women workers. Reorienting scholarly focus to the local and regional
implementation of one GFA and its actual impact can provide insights as to
GFAs’ overall effectiveness as a governance strategy to expand global labor
and human rights for workers most marginalized in our global economy.149
Three interdisciplinary social movement perspectives applied to the H&M

143.
Sangeet Chowdhury & Brandee Butler, Ending Gender-Based Violence against
Women Garment Workers, THOMAS REUTERS FOUND. (July 19, 2017), https://news.trust.org
/item/20170719150911-06mzj/ (commenting that the greatest threat to women’s safety is
gender-based violence).
144.
For a helpful collection of essays on GFAs, see Papadakis, supra note 59.
145.
Although beyond the scope of this article, on a comparison of U.S. and European
global trade union role in addressing labor standards in the supply chain, one point emphasized
by trade unionists in Bangladesh and India in interviews is that while there are some challenges
with H&M GFA at least European unions are addressing these issues. See Zoom Interview with
Gautam Mody, supra note 52; Zoom interview with Nazma Akter, supra note 52.
146.
Fichter & Mccallum, supra note 38, at S66.
147.
BROOKS, supra note 26, at 55 (discussing transnational labor organizing as
reproducing U.S.-centric politics); See also ILO IFA Report, supra note 15, at 36 (stating that
of the 5 GFA signed in the garment industry, four were by European countries); see also Zoom
Interview with Gautam Mody, supra note 52; MCCALLUM, supra note 1, at 11, 38 (noting that
effective global unionism requires reciprocity with local actors).
148.
MCCALLUM, supra note 1, at 38 (GFA can construct new rules that order labor and
capital relationship); Smith, supra note 8282, at 879 (discussing how organized labor, especially
in the Global North, must “abandon Westocentric universalism” that has predominated in labor
internationalism).
149.
See, e.g., Markus Kaltenborn, Carina Neset & Johannes Norpoth, Implementation of
the H&M Global Framework Agreement in Cambodia: Producing Outcomes for Industrial
Democracy Despite a Challenging Context? 36 INT’L J. COMPAR. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 169
(2020) (an example of a scholarly focus on the local implementation of H&M GFA in
Cambodia).
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GFA, combined with case studies of their actual impact discussed in section
II, will illuminate some shortcomings of GFAs and ways to increase their
potency as a strategic tool for the global labor movement.150 In doing so, this
article will contribute a new decolonial perspective to the broader discussion
on global labor governance within international labor and human rights law
and move GFAs toward their emancipatory potential.

II. THE H&M GLOBAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT: IMPLEMENTATION
AND IMPACT IN THREE ASIAN PRODUCTION COUNTRIES
An analysis of the H&M GFA will provide insights into GFAs, global
labor governance, the ability of labor governance to address gender, and
GFAs’ potential to actualize international labor and human rights for several
reasons. The H&M GFA reflects an agreement by a GUF and a multinational
company, H&M. H&M is one of the largest fashion retailers in the world,
selling three billion articles of clothing151 and generating $33 billion U.S.
dollars in sales in 2016. 152 As a company, it promotes a worker-friendly
corporate policy with 153,000 employees.153 The H&M GFA agreement
affects 1.6 million workers 154 worldwide in its supply chain. It describes
H&M’s corporate role as leading change in the fashion industry, which it
defines to mean engaging with policy makers on wages, labor law, and
climate change. 155 The agreement covers workers employed in 1,603
factories.156 In Bangladesh alone, the agreement covers 275 factories that
employ half a million workers. 157 It is one of the few GFAs dealing with
fashion retailers and the global garment industry. 158 Because the majority of
workers in garment factories are women, 159 studying this GFA provides some
150.
The GFA has been described as a “living and breathing document, which evolves
over time and needs to be adjusted in accordance with the context.” See ILO IFA Report, supra
note 15, at 39.
151.
Elizabeth Paton & Sapna Maheshwari, H&M’s Different Kind of Clickbait, N.Y.
TIMES, (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/18/fashion/hms-supply-chaintransparency.html.
152.
ILO IFA Report, supra note 15, at 37.
153.
See Menashe, supra note 55, at 29.
154.
IndustriALL Global Union, supra note 99.
155.
H&M Sustainability Performance Report 2020, supra note 11, at 20.
156.
H&M Group Sustainability Performance Report 2020, supra note 12, at 9.
157.
H&M does not have its own production facilities. See ILO IFA Report, supra note
15, at 37. See also Paton & Maheshwari, supra note 151.
158.
Making use of Global Agreements in the Garment Industry, INDUSTRIALL, (Oct. 3,
2019),
http://www.industriall-union.org/making-use-of-global-agreements-in-the-garmentindustry.
159.
Teresa Iglesias, Ellen Haverhals & Tatiana De Wée, The Fashion Industry Needs to Break
FASHION
REVOLUTION,
with
its
Gender
and
Women
Right
Problem,
https://www.fashionrevolution.org/the-fashion-industry-needs-to-break-with-its-gender-and-womensrights-problems/; See also ILO REPORT, PROMOTING DECENT WORK IN GARMENT SECTOR GLOBAL
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insight into whether GFAs effectively account for the gendered nature of a
particular industry. This section will outline the agreement and review
available research on its effectiveness (specifically in Asian production
countries such as Cambodia, India, and Bangladesh). It will also examine the
H&M GFA’s impact on gender. In doing so, this section draws from
interviews of experts knowledgeable about GFAs, especially in Bangladesh,
Cambodia, and India. In the absence of available studies specifically on the
H&M GFA, it draws comparisons to other studies on private regulation in the
region. Ultimately, this section contributes substantially to the sparse
literature on GFAs’ actual impact in production countries and on women
workers. Further, as discussed in section III, this article shifts the attention of
scholarship and advocacy to workers in the Global South who are most
vulnerable in the global supply chain.

A. Overview of the H&M GFA Agreement 160
Sweden-based H&M was among the first multinational brands to sign a
GFA to protect workers’ interests at locations where its garments are
produced. 161 H&M’s GFA dates back to 2004, when the brand caved to public
pressure to improve working conditions at supplier 162 facilities in
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, among other locations. 163 In
2015, H&M signed a framework agreement with IndustriALL Global Union
and Swedish trade union Inudstrifacket Metall (“IF Metall”). This was the
second such agreement — after Inditex’s — in either the garment or textile
sector to cover the entire supply chain. 164 IndustriALL signed the GFA
without the involvement of affiliated national unions or meaningful

SUPPLY CHAINS, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_protect/—-protrav/—-travail
/documents/projectdocumentation/wcms_681644.pdf (reporting that women constitute more than half
of the garment worker force in Asia and disproportionately represented in low waged jobs in the
industry).
160.
For a list of existing GFAs IndustriALL has with MNCs, see Global Framework
Agreements, INDUSTRIALL http://www.industriall-union.org/global-framework-agreements
(last visited Nov. 21, 2021).
161.
See Sherrard & Wisskirchen, supra note 96, at 254.
162.
A supplier is defined as an organization that contributes components or services to
bring a product to the market. A supplier may have multiple sites (or factories) where the
service is provided. A buyer in this context is an intermediary between global brands and
suppliers. For a glossary of terms used in the global supply chain, see Fair Labor Association’s
Supply Chain Mapping and Traceability Glossary (Nov. 2018), https://www.fairlabor.org/sites
/default/files/supply_chain_mapping_glossary_nov2018.pdf.
163.
Id. at 257.
164.
INDUSTRIALL, GLOBAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT (GFA) BETWEEN H&M
HENNES & MAURITZ GBC AB AND INDUSTRIALL GLOBAL UNION AND INDUSTRIFACKET
METALL ON COMPLIANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS
AT THE SUPPLIERS OF H&M HENNES & MAURITZ GBC AB 1 (2015) http://www.industriallunion.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/GFAs/HM/hm_gfa2016_eng.pdf (last visited
March 29, 2021) [hereinafter H&M GFA]; see also KUMAR, supra note 125.
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consultation of national unions in the sector.165 The terms of the GFA apply
to all production units that produce goods for H&M, which means it covers
workers in unions affiliated and unaffiliated with IndustriALL, as well as
workers where no unions exist in the workplace.166 H&M recognizes
IndustriALL as the “legitimate partner for discussions regarding human and
trade union rights in the workplace.”167 It may also interact with
IndustriALL’s affiliates and use its “good offices” to improve labor rights
among its suppliers. 168 Non-affiliated national unions may participate in the
GFA by agreement with IndustriALL. 169 This creates a hierarchical system
of governance, with IndustriALL as the primary partner and national unions
in production countries as subsidiaries. Swedish union (IF Metall) is a
signatory of the GFA as the Swedish national union and affiliate of
IndustriALL because H&M is a Swedish company.170
H&M’s agreement is noteworthy in that it forcefully commits to
“actively use all of its possible leverage to ensure that its direct suppliers and
their subcontractors . . . respect human and trade union rights in the
workplace.” 171 The agreement explicitly states that H&M will work to foster
trade union rights at its suppliers by “promot[ing] signing of collective
agreements.” 172 This language suggests a general commitment to ensuring
freedom of association rights and neutrality for trade unions. Where the
national laws regarding trade unions are restrictive, the employer encourages
165.
An email of the draft may have been sent to the then affiliates. See audio tape: Zoom
Interview with Apoorva Kaiwar, supra note 52; Zoom Interview with Mats Svensson, supra
note 52. But see Zoom Interview with Athit Kong, supra note 52 (not consulted at the formation
of the GFA, but only when the NMC in Cambodia was formed); Zoom Interview with Nazma
Akter, supra note 52 (stating she was aware of the H&M GFA when she joined GFA Working
Group in 2017). IndustriALL has consulted its affiliates on other GFAs, such as Inditex, which
suggests that this arrangement may have been something specific to H&M. See also Zoom
Interview with Gautam Mody, supra note 52; Zoom Interview with Nazma Akter, supra note
52. Some affiliates did respond with two clear demands: access to factories and a legally binding
dispute process, which were not included in the final agreement. They were not identified.
Nonetheless, what is clear is that the involvement of affiliate unions at the outset and in the
negotiation of the GFA was minimal, unclear or even where provisions were strongly
recommended, those were not adopted. Svenson notes: “process could have been more
inclusive.” This is significant for shortcomings in the implementation process. Zoom Interview
with Mats Svensson, supra note 52.
166.
See H&M GFA, supra note 164.
167.
Id.
168.
Id.
169.
Id.
170.
IF Metall “represented no H&M production workers at all” yet is now responsible
for enforcing the GFA “on behalf of more than one million production workers around the
world.” KUMAR, supra note 125, at 75 n. 17.
171.
H&M GFA, supra note 164, at 1; see Zoom Interview with Gautam Mody, supra
note 52 (discussing this provision as a crucial strength of the GFA in spite of weaknesses,
because it is a corporate acknowledgment of trade unions’ freedom of association, and
commitment to ILO standards).
172.
H&M GFA, supra note 164.
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and does not “hinder the development of mechanisms for independent and
free association and bargaining.”173 If enforced, this provision seems to
overcome legal and socio-political contexts in producing countries that are
hostile to unionization. 174 However, the right to trade unions does not
explicitly recognize a right to strike. 175 Moreover, the agreement does not
allow workers to enforce their trade union rights with local suppliers through
the agreement because labor disputes are funneled through a non-binding
dispute process which defers to local law. 176 So, while the GFA encourages
trade union rights, it does not require suppliers to comply with those rights,
leaving workers in production countries with lax labor enforcement and
contexts hostile to unionization.
Other noteworthy provisions include the GFA’s broad definition of an
employee to include any individual who performs work directly for a supplier
or their subcontractor.177 While H&M commits to provide a list of suppliers
and subcontractors to IndustriALL as per the agreement, it does not provide
union access to supplier factories, and therefore deviates from a key criteria
for GFAs set forth in IndustriALL’s own guidelines. 178 Affiliate unions
recommended two crucial amendments to the GFA: access to factories and
binding dispute procedures. Neither criterion was part of the final agreement.
Although a legally binding GFA was strongly demanded by some affiliate
unions, H&M refused. 179 IF Metall, in negotiating the GFA, did not insist on

173.
Id. at 2.
174.
National laws are hostile to unionization for varied reasons including states’
courtship of foreign investment, which opens up their markets for entry of global capital or
hostility to unions by employers. Here, I am not suggesting any inherent hostility to unions but
rather that socio-economic conditions and laws construct that anti-union animus. See Zia
Rahman & Tom Langford, Why Labor Unions Have Failed Bangladesh Garment Workers, in
LABOR IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH: CHALLENGES AND ALTERNATIVE FOR WORKERS 99 (Michelle
Williams & Sarah Geneva Mosoetsa eds., 2012); see also Sherrard & Wisskirchen, supra note
96, 255 (indicating that IFAs are often more onerous than U.S. national laws); Stevis & Fichter,
supra note 64, at 682 (noting that IFAs have limited impact in U.S. right-to-work states that are
hostile to unions or sectors that have an anti-union history).
175.
Menashe, supra note 55, at 26 (explaining that the absence of a right to strike and an
elaborate dispute mechanism suggests a priority to avoid strikes, and that financial interests
were more important than correcting power imbalance between actors).
176.
Industrial disputes and related issues are best resolved through “negotiation, and
when needed with support of appropriate national trade union or dispute procedure provided for
in industry agreement and/or local law.” H&M GFA, supra note 164, at 6.
177.
H&M GFA, supra note 164; see also Zoom Interview with Gautam Mody, supra
note 52.
178.
See INDUSTRIALL, GLOBAL UNION’S CHECKLIST FOR AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS
FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING OF GLOBAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS (GFA)
http://admin.industriall-union.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/2018/industriall_gfa
_checklist_for_affiliates_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2021); see also Zoom Interview with
Victor Garrido, supra note 52 (referencing union’s ability to access factories as a bare minimum
requirement for GFAs).
179.
Zoom Interview with Mats Svensson, supra note 52.
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its inclusion. 180 It is worth noting here that an ILO report found that a cogovernance structure where labor and management disputes are resolved
under a robust dispute resolution system are key to a GFA’s success in
actualizing labor rights.181 IF Metall concluded that the most important goal
is an agreement to work together: Cooperation and social dialogue were
prioritized over demands strongly articulated by some affiliates for a legally
binding process. 182
H&M’s agreement establishes a non-binding, three-tiered structure for
implementation and dispute resolution. 183 Management and worker
representatives are encouraged to cooperate and negotiate disputes, but the
agreement does not provide details on implementation at the factory level.184
While there is a generalized commitment to increase awareness of trade
unions, the agreement stops short of requiring unionization at factories used
by H&M direct suppliers and subcontractors.185 The agreement defers to the
managerial power of suppliers and national laws to address collective
bargaining.186 While H&M pledges to use its leverage as a buyer to ensure its
suppliers respect trade union rights, there is nothing in the GFA that sets forth
any consequences if they or their suppliers do not. 187 As such, it does not alter
the legal relationship between workers, brands, and suppliers at the national
level in any way. It also does not explicitly state a key corollary to workers’
rights to organize and form trade unions, which is the right to strike or
withhold labor when the terms of the agreement are not met.188 The inclusion
of the right to strike would make trade union rights enforceable at the factory
and national level if suppliers or brands did not comply with the terms of the
GFA. 189 The failure to include any means by which workers retain the right

180.
When asked why these were not included, lead negotiator Mats Svensson responded,
“How can we force them?” and that it was a “good enough” agreement, which he later admitted
was naïve but honestly reflects the power of European global unions and the limits of a social
dialogue, non-confrontational process as discussed in the decolonization section. See id. The
omission of these provisions from the GFA severely hindered its impact. See id.
181.
Blasi & Bair, supra note 59, at 6.
182.
Id.
183.
H&M GFA, supra note 164, at 1.
184.
ILO IFA REPORT, supra note 15, at 38.
185.
H&M GFA, supra note 164.
186.
Giving deference and precedence to local laws, especially where labor law
enforcement is difficult, undermines the effectiveness of global agreements. See Niforou, supra
note 49, at 370 (analyzing global agreements by two Spanish MNCs in Latin America).
187.
H&M GFA, supra note 164, at 1.
188.
The right to strike is not explicitly referenced in ILO Conventions, but it has been
accepted as part of the jurisprudence on freedom of association. See Rombouts, supra note 62,
at 125.
189.
The international division of labor and decentralized garment production make global
capitalism vulnerable to disruption along its supply chain, and exercising power or the threat of
it entails disruption. See MCCALLUM, supra note 1, at 11. This is the structural power workers
have.
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to use economic power 190 within the agreement, as is typical in a collective
bargaining agreement, suggests that the agreement incorporates workers into
a bureaucratic servicing agreement intended to maintain industrial peace.191
It does not allow workers to use their key economic power of withholding
labor. 192 These omissions are consistent with H&M’s and IndustriALL’s
vision of industrial relations as primarily maintaining “stable and sustainable
social relations in production.” 193
The H&M GFA prioritizes factory-level solutions to workplace disputes,
such as negotiation or other dispute resolution mechanisms available locally.
If the dispute cannot be resolved satisfactorily, representatives can escalate to
the country’s National Monitoring Committee (“NMC”), composed of two
members each from H&M and IndustriALL. Disputes can be escalated even
further to the multinational Joint Industrial Relations Development
Committee (“JIRDC”), which may provide support and guidance to the
national-level NMC. 194 H&M and IndustriALL determine in which countries
the NMCs will be established.195 H&M and IndustriALL also designate the
members of the NMC, which means they are labor representatives that are
known or already affiliated with IndustriALL and include H&M
representatives. NMCs are tasked with “monitor[ing] and evaluat[ing]
national strategies” for implementation of the GFA and reporting their
activities.196 They are also tasked with collaborating with trade unions and
worker representatives and H&M’s direct suppliers and subcontractors, with
particular attention to dispute resolution and collective bargaining
agreements. The JIRDC is tasked with overseeing the implementation of the
agreement at a global level. Like the NMCs, the final decision-making body,
the JIRDC, is also comprised of members appointed by H&M and
IndustriALL. If the disputes are not resolved at either the NMC or the JIRDC
190.
Workers can use varied sources of power to effectuate change in the global supply,
such as structural, institutional and coalitional. See Marissa Brookes, Varieties of Power in
Transnational Labor Alliances: An Analysis of Workers’ Structural, Institutional and
Coalitional Power in the Global Economy, 38 LAB. STUD. J. 181-–92 (2013).
191.
Where a regulatory or governance mechanism does not allow for countervailing
voices or perspectives, it becomes a form of deregulation. Rodriguez-Garavito, supra note 45,
at 227.
192.
Menashe, supra note 55, at 27 (noting the absence of a right to strike as discouraging
more pluralist forms of governance).
193.
H&M GFA, supra note 164; see THE H&M WAY, H&M https://about.hm.com
/content/dam/hmgroup/groupsite/documents/en/hm-way/HM%20Way_en.pdf (last visited
Nov. 22, 2021) (“Long-term high profitability is essential for H&M and also for our
shareholders. A high level of solvency guarantees long-term stability and security for our
employees. Profits and a strong financial position make it possible for us to fulfil our
responsibilities.”).
194.
H&M GFA, supra note 164.
195.
The criteria have been where H&M has a local office and its top suppliers, which is
why MNCs were started in Cambodia and Bangladesh. See Zoom Interview with Apoorva
Kaiwar, supra note 52.
196.
H&M GFA, supra note 164, at 5.
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levels, H&M and IndustriALL may appoint a mediator to help resolve the
dispute. Mediation, in contrast to arbitration or other binding dispute
resolution processes, does not compel any party to accept the decision of the
neutral decision maker.197 It is ultimately a voluntary dispute resolution
process.
Evaluating the negotiated H&M GFA in comparison to the H&M
corporate Sustainability Compact 198 with the UN, which is self-reporting,
legal scholar Mayaan Menashe found:
Hence, when H&M had the opportunity to decide unilaterally on a
set of commitments without any influence from global union
federations, the result did not deviate much from the agreement with
the global union federations. This indicates that the negotiations with
the global union federations did not manage to gain substantial
changes from the already existing state of affairs within the
company. Owing to the drawbacks observed in these two documents,
more achievements at the bargaining table could have resulted in a
better promotion of international labor rights. 199
In short, the union-negotiated agreement was not substantively different
from H&M’s own corporate one. H&M’s GFA agreement has, however,
resulted in some limited successes for protecting labor rights for individual
workers as discussed in this section.200 Given GFAs’ promise and potential,
and the investment in those agreements, those “episodic” successes 201 are
modest. Applying social movement theories to the GFA, as this article does
in section III, reveals some ways to enhance and strengthen its impact.

B. H&M GFA’s Limited Effectiveness in Three Asian
Production Countries 202
This sub-section summarizes available information on the
implementation of the H&M Agreement in Asian production countries such
as Cambodia, India, and Bangladesh to draw some insights on its actual

197.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mediation, Arbitration, and Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR), in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
(Elsevier Ltd. ed., 2015).
198.
See H&M Group Sustainability Performance Report 2020, U.N. GLOB. COMPACT
(Apr. 4, 2021), https://www.unglobalcompact.org/participation/report/cop/create-and-submit
/advanced/450185.
199.
Menashe, supra note 55, at 29.
200.
See infra Part B.
201.
Stevis & Fichter, supra note 64, at 669.
202.
While this paper focuses on GFA impacting Asian production countries, H&M’s
practice of supporting workers in its retail shops reflect a similar reluctance to support unions.
See, e.g., Stephon Johnson, H&M Workers Push for a New Contract, AMSTERDAM NEWS (July
16, 2018), http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2018/jul/16/hm-workers-push-new-contract/,
(showing an instance of H&M showing similar reluctance to support unions in its retail shops.).
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effectiveness in promoting labor rights, and to theorize some ways to improve
the agreement. This sub-section also draws on expert knowledge gained from
interviews on the H&M GFA and GFAs generally, as well as available case
studies.
The effectiveness and efficacy of the agreement remains underresearched: Only one major case study (published in June 2020), discussed
below, of the implementation of H&M’s agreement exists. 203 IndustriALL
has not done any independent assessment of the GFA since its signing in 2015
except for a “video report”204 produced with H&M 205 and other news-related
announcements.206 The JIRDC meets annually and is responsible for
overseeing the implementation of the agreement, and could conduct a
comprehensive study but has not done so. 207 In the video report,
representatives from production countries provided oral reports to the
JIRDC. 208 None of the reports indicated any significant increase in
unionization, 209 only an increase in awareness of the GFA. Although
Myanmar and Turkey are not a focal point of this article, in these countries
the NMC activities were similarly focused on raising awareness of the
Agreement. 210 This is consistent with the obligations outlined in the
agreement which are only focused on notifying workers of the GFA, not on
how it can be leveraged to expand labor rights. The training in Turkey simply
notified workers of the GFA, and there was no training on how to use the
agreement to mobilize for trade union rights.211 The sparse video report
shows the need for a comprehensive study of the H&M GFA in all production
countries. In other empirical studies of GFAs, the strategic use of the GFA by
national unions as an impetus to facilitating labor bargaining was key to its
effectiveness. 212
While some of the efforts and results discussed in the case studies below
are promising, they reveal how GFAs fail to account for the microeconomic
and political conditions of the national context, including laws on trade

203.
See Kaltenborn, Neset & Norpoth, supra note 149.
204.
Zoom Interview with Apoorva Kaiwar, supra note 52 (video produced under
auspices of GFA’s implementation mechanism for JIDRC).
205.
See IndustriALL, Annual Report of the NMC (H&M GFA), YOUTUBE (Mar. 29,
2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5yWP0YmPaIU.
206.
Zoom Interview with Victor Garrido, supra note 52.
207.
ILO IFA Report, supra note 15, at 38.
208.
See IndustriALL, supra note 204.
209.
See ILO Report, supra note 15, at 28, 40 (reporting successful unions in Bangladesh
and Cambodia); see also Zoom Interview with Athit Kong, supra note 52.
210.
See IndustriALL, supra note 204.
211.
Id.
212.
Wills, supra note 50, at 695 (stating that without an active trade union organization,
the international framework agreement made no difference in improving labor standards).
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unions in countries where the GFAs are implemented. 213 Even where national
unions are involved, the socio-political context can lessen the impact of
GFAs. 214 Rather than being a collective agreement on the global level, the
GFA is described amorphously as a “framework for cooperation” which
creates an “environment conducive to finding solutions and solving
conflicts.” 215 Conflict resolution, rather than the expansion of rights, is the
dominant goal of the GFA. Applying the criteria for an effective agreement
listed by labor scholar Jeremy Blasi and sociologist Jennifer Bair, the GFA
fails, as it is a non-binding agreement.216 Specifically, it does not produce
market consequences for supplier non-compliance. It does not have a robust
arbitration or binding dispute resolution process, 217 whereby whether the
terms of the GFA are being met is determined by a third party. It does not
require H&M to take any steps beyond participation in the NMC and JIRDC
to ensure that freedom of association rights are protected. At best, H&M
remains neutral with respect to trade union organizing. The limits of the GFA
are further elaborated in Section III on interdisciplinary perspectives.

1. Cambodia
The only empirical study done on the H&M GFA was conducted in
Cambodia. The study examines the agreement’s effect on “industrial
democracy” (“the exercise of power by workers or their representatives over
decisions within their workplace”) in Cambodia. 218 The pilot study is limited
to a small sample size of seventeen interviews of workers and union
representatives at factories where labor disputes occurred after the signing of
the GFA. 219 The study highlighted that trade unions have achieved some
freedom of association rights for workers under H&M’s GFA where they
have used it strategically. 220 At the same time, the cases discussed show that
almost all of the agreement’s positive outcomes depended on H&M’s
willingness to enforce the agreement and advocate for workers.221
Furthermore, workers not represented by unions who were part of the NMC
were not aware of the agreement and did not utilize it for dispute
213.
Hadwiger, supra note 50, at 45 (“[I]nvolvement of local actors throughout the GFA
process need to be strengthened from its initiation, through negotiations to implementation”).
214.
See id.; see also MCCALLUM, supra note 1, at 123 (discussing the challenges of the
implementation of the GFA in India due to its unique industrial relations history, politicized
unions and informalization of the workforce).
215.
ILO IFA Report, supra note 15, at 43.
216.
Blasi & Bair, supra note 59, at 6.
217.
See Zoom Interview with Apoorva Kaiwar, supra note 52. (The GFA is “binding” on
H&M in terms of their commitment to uphold labor rights but not in terms of litigating those
rights articulated).
218.
Kaltenborn, Neset & Norpoth, supra note 149, at 172.
219.
See id. at 182.
220.
Id. at 186.
221.
See id. at 183–90 (discussion of main findings from study).
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resolution. 222 As shown by the study, not unlike codes of conduct, the GFA
similarly falls into the trap of being effective only based on the willingness
of the company to act. As such, while the H&M GFA contains language that
appears to compel H&M to act to promote labor rights, in practice it remains
a voluntary obligation. Trade union leader and member of Cambodian NMC,
Athit Kong, aptly described the GFA as the “baby that came out of CSR
[corporate social responsibility].” 223 While it is better than CSR, the
implementation of the GFA at the national and factory level remains a
challenge. 224
As detailed in the study, as of August 2017, H&M’s GFA assisted in
obtaining union recognition on at least three occasions in Cambodia. 225 In
each case, management attempted to block union recognition by claiming that
workers had not filed the proper paperwork. Using the escalation procedures
outlined above, the trade union notified H&M. After H&M’s intervention,
management immediately accepted the paperwork, and unions were
established. The study found that “the GFA provides Cambodian trade unions
with a direct communication channel to H&M, allowing them to inform
H&M about disputes occurring at supplier factories and to involve H&M in
their resolution.”226 This point is echoed below in the Indian context. 227 One
factory union leader reported that union membership increased from fiftythree to 355 members due to the H&M GFA. 228 At times, H&M has shown a
willingness to exercise its leverage over suppliers, as it is required to do per
the GFA. In one case, a factory fired workers for organizing and the union
appealed to H&M to intervene.229 At this particular location, H&M was a
relatively inconsequential buyer. Initially, in response to the union’s appeals,
H&M planned to cut its business relationship with the factory altogether, but
union leaders persuaded H&M to maintain its business in order to uphold the
brand’s influence at the factory; H&M complied. 230
While H&M’s GFA has achieved some freedom of association rights for
workers, researchers noted some negative effects based on local context.231
Pro-government unions and independent unions are unlikely to cooperate

222.
See id. at 189.
223.
Zoom Interview with Athit Kong, supra note 52.
224.
Id.
225.
Kaltenborn, Neset & Norpoth, supra note 149, at 185–86.
226.
See Kaltenborn, Neset & Norpoth, supra note 149, at 189.
227.
Kaltenborn, Neset & Norpoth, supra note 149, at 185; See infra Part II(B)(2).
228.
While this increase of members is commendable, Cambodian workers still face
challenges to unionization. See, e.g., ITUC Calls on Cambodia to Stop Repressing Unions and
Release Detained Union Leaders, INT’L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION (Aug. 25, 2020),
https://www.ituc-csi.org/cambodia-stop-repressing-unions (documenting the false arrest of
Rong Chunn, president of the Cambodia Confederation of Unions).
229.
Kaltenborn, Neset & Norpoth, supra note 149, at 185.
230.
Id. at 187.
231.
Id. at 191.
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easily, and union federations without seats on the NMC are unlikely to trust
the NMC—or even know about it.232 Further, the “entrenchment of the
Cambodian labor movement” hinders effective utilization of the GFA in
Cambodia.233 As of August 2017, the date of the study, no IndustriALL
affiliates without seats on the NMC had approached the committee for help
in resolving a dispute. 234 One union member stated that Cambodian trade
unions “do not yet trust the NMC” because the NMC members act in their
own interest, instead of the interest of the collective. 235 Another
representative from a separate federation said that no NMC member could be
trusted to act independently.236 Yet another interviewed worker expressed a
desire to officially disengage from H&M’s GFA due to general consensus
within his union about the ineffectiveness of the GFA. 237 And their
skepticism is not unfounded: On at least one occasion, H&M refused to pay
severance (despite a provision in the GFA to the contrary) merely because
other buyers238 at a closed factory were also refusing to pay severance.239 As
a result, many workers who are ostensibly protected by the GFA are unable
or reluctant to engage with the NMC. 240 It is a truism that when H&M acts in
support of workers seeking to form a trade union or enforce rights, then the
GFA can be effective. The weakness is that the agreement does not require or
impose any consequences on H&M if it fails to act.
An interview of trade union leader and member of Cambodian NMC,
Athit Kong by the author, confirms some of the challenges of the GFA
detailed above in the study. 241 He notes that the overall political context, with
the biggest opposition party being expelled from parliament, has had a
negative impact on freedom of association. As the democratic space shrinks,
there is increased suppression of all members of civil society, including trade
unionists. Of the GFA’s successes, he noted that eighteen workers who were
dismissed were subsequently reinstated, and three unions formed.242 These
successes were mainly due to the active effort of the national unions in
obtaining favorable arbitration agreements at the national level through the
national legal system. 243 Similar to the Bangladesh example discussed
232.
Id. at 184.
233.
Id. at 182.
234.
Id. at 183.
235.
Id. at 184.
236.
Id.
237.
Id. at 191.
238.
See supra note 162 for definition of buyer and other terms in the global supply chain.
239.
Id. at 184.
240.
Id.
241.
Zoom Interview with Athit Kong, supra note 52.
242.
Id.
243.
The Arbitration Council is a national labor arbitration institution established under
Cambodian law to resolve collective labor disputes between employers and workers or their
unions. The Council is mandated to resolve both ‘rights disputes’ – related to existing rights
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below, 244 the union used the GFA’s dispute resolution process to enforce an
existing right under national law. When asked if unions could obtain these
wins without a GFA in place, Kong said yes; however, the GFA did give the
union a direct communication channel to H&M managers, which they used
as part of their mobilization. The Cambodia case study shows that the
effectiveness of the GFA depends on a strong national union. 245 Given the
enormous investment in GFAs, it is not yet clear whether the benefits are
commensurate. 246 The hope was that factories would form strong collective
agreements, but that has not happened. 247 Of the factories that are H&M
suppliers in Cambodia, surprisingly, none have a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (“CBA”) in place.248 Also, the GFA has had no noticeable impact
on labor standards, such as wages or maternity leave protections. To Kong’s
knowledge, the Cambodian NMC has not addressed any gender-related
complaints even though ninety percent of the workers are women.249 To
strengthen the GFA and NMC, Kong suggests that they focus on collective
bargaining agreements and balancing the agreement between workers and
suppliers. GFAs require a strong monitoring agreement. The NMC should
work with NGOs and other progressive organizations to build coalitional
power. 250 Most importantly, according to Kong, worker consciousness is key
where workers are aware of their rights and view themselves as part of the
union such that they can advocate for change. 251

under the law, employment contracts or collective bargaining agreements, and ‘interests
disputes’ – related to desired future benefits (mostly in the context of collective bargaining).
The Council was established with the cooperation of unions, employers and government, and
with assistance from the International Labour Organization. See About AC, ARBITRATION
COUNCIL, https://www.arbitrationcouncil.org/about-ac/the-arbitration-council/ (last visited
Nov. 6, 2021); see also Hugo van Noord, Hans S. Hwang, & Kate Bugeja. Cambodia’s
Arbitration Council: Institution-building in a Developing Country (ILO Working Paper, Paper
No. 994657983402676, 2011).
244.
See infra Part B(3).
245.
See also Zoom Interview with Gautam Mody, supra note 52 (explaining robust union
power at the national level is essential for GFA); Zoom Interview with Apoorva Kaiwar, supra
note 52 (acknowledging that the GFA is not a substitute for organizing).
246.
Zoom Interview with Athit Kong, supra note 52.
247.
Id.
248.
Id.
249.
Id.
250.
Coalitional power is the ability of workers to expand the scope of their interest and
concerns to nonlabor actors who are willing to influence employer’s actions or responses. See
Brookes, supra note 190, at 192.
251.
Zoom Interview with Athit Kong, supra note 52.

2022]

Interdisciplinary Perspectives

457

2. India
India’s multi-million-dollar garment industry employs at least eight
million workers. 252 While initially India did not have as high a percentage of
women workers in the garment industry as other countries, with forty percent
of the workforce now women, this is changing.253 Women’s employment is
increasing in the industry at a faster rate than men’s. 254 In 2019, four years
after the GFA was signed, and after incidents of workers’ rights violations
were reported in an Indian factory, a NMC was formed. 255 The India NMC is
the first of the NMCs to have all female members. 256 The members are
representatives of local trade unions and H&M. 257 There is no publicly
available data on the NMC. This section relies on several sources: one case
brought to the NMC in Karnataka, a case in Bangalore that was not brought
to the NMC, studies on the impact of private regulations of multinational
companies, and expert interviews.258
H&M failed to act259 when garment workers in Karnataka, a state in south
India, were laid off and not paid their wages. 260 Sixty percent of clothing the

252.
C LEAN C LOTHES C AMPAIGN, FACTS ON INDIA’S GARMENT INDUSTRY https:/
/cleanclothes.org/file-repository/resources-publications-factsheets-india-factsheetfebruary-2015.pdf/view (last visited Nov. 8, 2021).
253.
The percentage of women workers varies by region. See ILO, WORKING
CONDITIONS OF MIGRANT GARMENT WORKERS IN INDIA (2017).
254.
Id. at 5.
255.
IndustriALL and H&M National Monitoring Committee Established in India,
INDUSTRIALL (Apr. 16, 2019), http://www.industriall-union.org/industriall-and-hm-nationalmonitoring-committee-established-in-india; see Giacomo Lee, H&M Sets up National
Monitoring Committee in India, JUST STYLE, (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.just-style.com/news
/hm-sets-up-national-monitoring-committee-in-india.
256.
Id.
257.
What We Do, INDUSTRIALL (last visited Oct. 28, 2021), http://www.industriallunion.org/what-we-do.
258.
While the impact of the pandemic on the garment industry requires its own focus, it
is worth noting that the GFA would not protect workers who were laid off from jobs due to
COVID 19. In India, workers were laid off without any notice. In a labor-oriented agreement,
as in many collective bargaining agreements, workers would be entitled to notice, and unions
would be able to negotiate effects of the order cancellation.
259.
In response to failure to pay wages, due to COVID closure, H&M contended that it
cannot direct suppliers to retain workers or in any way direct facilities. See Secretariat, On
H&M’s Responsibility in the Industrial Dispute at ECC-2 Srirangapatna, Karnatak, India
(Aug. 28, 2020), http://www.ntui.org.in/?p=1778.
260.
See Mahila Karmikara Munnade, Garment Workers, COVID-19 Pandemic and the
Lockdown: A Report from South Karnataka, ALT. L.F. (May 24, 2020) http://altlawforum.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/GMKM_ALF_Garment-workers_final-report_24.5.2020.pdf;
Nikita
Chatterjee, How Women Garment Workers Took on a Global Clothing Giant and Won their Rights,
BEHAN BOX (Feb. 15, 2021), https://behanbox.com/2021/02/15/how-women-garment-workers-tookon-a-global-clothing-giant-and-won-their-rights/.
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factory produced was supplied to H&M. 261 It was one of the four factories
accredited by H&M in India, and the only factory with Karnataka Garment
and Textile Workers Union (“GATWU”) 262 as the majority union.263 After
eight months of protest and organizing by GATWU and the New Trade Union
Initiative (“NTUI”), 264 the workers received their wages and got jobs back in
other factories owned by the Indian supplier.265 IndustriALL and its affiliate
unions, including H&M workers in Germany, provided solidaristic support to
the Indian workers.266 However, the closed factory was not reopened.267
GATWU raised the issue with the NMC, but throughout the process, H&M
maintained a neutral role despite being a signatory to the GFA.268
IndustriALL had to put pressure on H&M to act. 269 Even then, H&M took no
position on the factory closure.270 The dispute resolution mechanism
therefore proved to be ineffective in enforcing labor standards and freedom
of association rights. The eventual resolution of the campaign was not
through the NMC process.271 The closure of the factory, the only one with a
union, also revealed a freedom of association violation. While the workers
were paid their wages and provided jobs, there was a loss of a unionized

261.
See Secretariat, On H&M’s Responsibility in the Industrial Dispute at ECC-2
Srirangapatna, Karnatak, India, NEW TRADE UNION INITIATIVE [“NTUI”] (Aug. 28, 2020),
http://www.ntui.org.in/?p=1778.
262.
Garment and Textile Workers Union (GATWU) is a grassroots union that organizes
and fights for the rights of garment workers in Karnataka, India who are majority women and
sole income earners in their households. For more information on GATWU, see Home,
GARMENT AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION, https://gatwu.wordpress.com/ (last visited Oct. 30,
2021).
263.
Under the India Trade Union Act, 1926, more than one union can register as a trade
union if they have seven or more members. Indian Trade Union Act, 1926 (Nov. 19, 2018); see
also Sean Cooney, Petra Mahy & Richard Mitchell, The Evolution of Labor Law in Three Asian
Nations: An Introductory Comparative Study, 36 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 23, 29 (2014).
Being a majority union means a majority of workers are members of GATWU.
264.
Several independent trade unions convened to form the New Trade Union Initiative
and constituted itself as a trade union federation. See About Us, NTUI (last visited Oct. 30,
2021), http://www.ntui.org.in/?page_id=119.
265.
Secretariat, 1,257 Workers Win Back Jobs in Time of Pandemic, NTUI (Feb. 14,
2021), http://www.ntui.org.in/?p=1862.
266.
Zoom Interview with Gautam Mody, supra note 52 (recounting the support of
IndustriALL and unionized German workers from ver.di, part of German Trade Union
Federation ).
267.
Secretariat, supra note 261.
268.
Id. (commenting that H&M stood apart from the negotiation to reinstate workers).
While they remained neutral in the formal MNC process, H&M representatives are said to exert
outside pressure. See Zoom Interview with Gautam Mody, supra note 52.
269.
Secretariat, supra note 261.
270.
Id.
271.
See Zoom Interview with Gautam Mody, supra note 52; Zoom Interview with
Apoorva Kaiwar, supra note 52.
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factory from where H&M sourced its clothing. 272 The supplier did commit to
recognize GATWU where their individual members worked at other
locations owned by the Indian supplier company. 273 That GATWU was no
longer the majority union in a factory ostensibly weakened their institutional
power to exact changes from the supplier. This case illustrates that the success
of the GATWU and the NTUI was due to their own mobilization 274 and
IndustriALL as a global union using its own network of affiliates. 275 It also
revealed the ineffectiveness of the non-binding dispute process. If H&M were
compelled to act or leverage their power over suppliers, creating market
consequences, the benefits to workers could have been stronger.
A case (which occurred prior to the case described above in Karnataka),
when the H&M GFA was in force but an Indian NMC was not yet constituted,
also provides a helpful opportunity to assess the GFA. A 2018 report on a
factory in Bangalore that produced garments for dozens of retailers, including
H&M, found that the management “engaged in a campaign of vicious
repression and retaliation against workers’ exercise of fundamental labor
rights – which included physical beatings; death threats; gender, caste, and
religion-based abuse; threats of mass termination; and the expulsion from the
factory of 15 worker activists.” 276 As of the date of the report on June 21,
2018, retailers, including H&M, had not required that management remedy
the violations. 277 Specifically, management did not commit to negotiate with
the union, even though it was registered with the state, nor did it provide
union representatives access to the factory to meet with employees on nonwork time in non-work areas.278 When asked to respond to their failure to
remedy the violations, H&M responded by stating they are facilitating
dialogue with management. 279 Their response was only prompted by the
publicity on the working conditions.280

272.
See Secretariat, supra note 261.
273.
Id.
274.
National unions must build their own power and not rely exclusively on the GFA.
Zoom Interview with Gautam Mody, supra note 52.
275.
Id.
276.
WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM ASSESSMENT SHAHI EXPORTS PVT. LTD. (BANGALORE,
INDIA) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, WORKER RTS. CONSORTIUM 1 (2018),
https://www.workersrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/WRC-Assessment-re-Shahi-India6.20.18.pdf; see also Marc Bain, H&M, Columbia, and Others Are Accused of Ignoring Disturbing
Abuses at a Large Indian Supplier, QUARTZ (June 25, 2018), https://qz.com/1313585/hm-gapabercrombie-and-others-are-accused-of-ignoring-disturbing-abuses-at-a-large-indian-supplier
/.
277.
WORKERS RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, supra note 276, at 24.
278.
Id. at 7.
279.
Bain, supra note 276.
280.
WORKERS RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, supra note 276, at 23–24 (discussing how
Consortium engaged with brands including H&M on the violations at the factory that produced
their clothing).
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In both examples, at Gokaldas Exports in Karnataka and Shahi Exports
in Bangalore, H&M’s GFA has not been effective. However, some positive
results can be attributed to the existence of a local mechanism for national
unions to communicate with H&M local managers. 281 Still, it took a robust
national union or a global NGO mobilizing publicly to get some response.
Even then, the GFA could not keep a factory open nor compel a supplier to
respect the freedom of association rights of workers. This context of
unionization and union busting is where GFAs are mainly being tested in
terms of their effectiveness.282 As a buyer, H&M could exercise greater
leverage, but it does not (even though it pledges to do so in its GFA). 283 When
H&M does intervene, there have been some successes, as in Cambodia. This
confirms that strengthening local mechanisms, including the NMCs, and
making the dispute resolution process binding could yield better results for
worker organizations.
Since the formation of NMCs, Indian unions such as NTUI have played
an active role in improving the NMC process. 284 These unions have identified
some specific benefits of the GFA, yet more improvements to the
implementation process are needed. For example, the GFA gives national
unions a direct method to communicate with the global brand H&M.285 It
provides a framework for collective bargaining to take place, where national
unions can “call out” suppliers.286 Because the GFA includes direct suppliers
and subcontractors, the agreement reflects H&M’s acknowledgment of its
responsibility to all workers in the supply chain. 287 It gives trade unions
recognition in a global industry where unionization is difficult.288 These same
benefits of the GFA have been echoed by trade unionists in Cambodia and
Bangladesh and necessitate the existence of strong national unions.
Outside of the H&M GFA, three studies of private regulation in India
have shown some analogous insights into the limits of GFAs in India. A case

281.
Another difference that merits further study between these cases is the difference
between a trade union and an NGO in advancing labor rights. In the Shahi Exports case, the
organization in India was not a union.
282.
See Zoom Interview with Apoorva Kaiwar, supra note 52; see also E-mails from
Apoorva Kaiwar, Regional Secretary, South Asia, IndustriALL to Author (Aug. 18, 2021;
Feb.7, 2022) (on file with author). Kaiwar explains that unions in the garment sector in India
organize an umbrella union (e.g. GATWU supra note 262) where workers from several factories
are members. Unions work on building union density in each workplace. While there may be
only one registered union, it is harder to count factory level unions because they are not required
to register with the state. See Indian Trade Union Act, 1926 (Nov. 19, 2018) (India). This
explains challenges in obtaining an accurate count of unions in India; however, Kaiwar reports
union “membership is increasing.”
283.
H&M GFA, supra note 164.
284.
Zoom Interview with Gautam Mody, supra note 52.
285.
Id.
286.
Indian Trade Union Act, 1926 (Nov. 19, 2018).
287.
Zoom Interview with Gautam Mody, supra note 52.
288.
Id.
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study of a Chinese retailer’s supply chain in India found that a strict policy
on compliance has yielded improvements in labor standards.289 However,
very few global buyers adopt a policy threatening to drop suppliers if they do
not comply with labor standards or provide positive incentives for
compliance. 290 The H&M GFA does not adopt such a policy, leaving its
exercise of buying power as leverage to improve labor conditions
discretionary. 291 A separate study of audits from factories in India showed
“nonsignificant improvements over time, despite multiple audits.” 292 If we
were to give credence to the effectiveness of voluntary private regulation,
then it would seem that repeated audits would improve labor standards;
however, the study showed otherwise. This is probably because brands are
not required to remedy violations. Finally, labor scholar Jamie McCallum’s
study of a G4S/security guard unionization campaign in Bangalore and West
Bengal India showed the unique challenges of GFAs in the Indian sociopolitical context.293 There, the Service Employees International Union
(“SEIU”) and the UNI Global Union (“UNI”) began their campaigns by
identifying partner national unions, which included the Indian National Trade
Union Congress and other Indian trade unions, to form the Indian Security
Workers Organizing Initiative (“ISWOI”). 294 The genesis of their campaign
involved Indian unions, made organizing an explicit goal, and viewed the
GFA as a tool to achieve those organizing goals, not just as an end to itself.295
At the outset, SEIU identified some of the national challenges with partner
Indian trade unions; although many issues remained due to entrenched,
historical patterns of labor mobilization. 296 Given that the H&M GFA began
with no involvement of Indian national unions, it fared worse, and the reports
of labor violations in the Bangalore case demonstrate that. However, there
were positive steps once an NMC297 was formed, and more positive steps

289.
Bae, supra note 60, at 108–09 (evidencing clear and definite improvement of a home
products retailer based on strict compliance policies implemented by retailer); see also Blasi &
Bair, supra note 59, at 6 (explaining that incentives for unionized factories or market
consequences for suppliers who do not meet labor standards are factors that enhance a GFA).
290.
Bae, supra note 60, at 110.
291.
See H&M GFA, supra note 164.
292.
Bae, supra note 60, at 99.
293.
MCCALLUM, supra note 2, at 123-27 (noting the Indian context posed more obstacles
to transnational collaboration); see also Coony, Mahy, & Gahan, supra note 253, at 32–33
(while Indian labor law has colonial origins, the development of the law post-independence
took a different path because the Indian state took a dominant and central role in labor law such
that there was little legal support for collective bargaining and a regulatory style of bargaining
did not develop); see also Zoom Interview with Apoorva Kaiwar, supra note 52
294.
MCCALLUM, supra note 1, at 130–31.
295.
Id.
296.
See id. at 139–42 (discussing differences in historical labor mobilization and
receptivity to unionists from global unions in Bangalore and Kolkata).
297.
NMC representatives provide input on the dispute resolution procedures of the GFA.
IndustriALL Unions Negotiate Global Dispute Resolution Mechanism with H&M,
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with the greater involvement of a more militant union with an explicit
organizing focus that was able to strategically utilize the GFA.

3. Bangladesh and Lessons from the Accord
There is no known study of the implementation of the H&M GFA in
Bangladesh, or even its relationship to the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and
Building Safety in Bangladesh, 298 another global labor governance agreement
to which H&M is a signatory. This sub-section draws from the author’s own
research and study on Bangladesh, including an analysis of the Accord on
Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, 299 interviews of experts
knowledgeable about the implementation of the H&M GFA in Bangladesh,300
as well as publicly available information on Bangladesh NMCs.
The Bangladesh NMC had its first meeting on April 22, 2016.301 Despite
the existence of H&M’s GFA since 2015 and a NMC in Bangladesh from
2016, garment factory owners/suppliers repeatedly felt emboldened to take
actions that clearly violate workers’ fundamental rights. As of 2015, 79,000
workers produce garments for H&M in Bangladesh, and 2016 reports indicate
that H&M fell short of its pledges to protect the safety of workers.302
Unrelated to H&M, mass labor protests occurred in December 2016 when
workers demanded higher wages.303 In response, suppliers terminated 1,600

INDUSTRIALL (Dec. 20, 2018), http://www.industriall-union.org/industriall-unions-negotiateglobal-dispute-resolution-mechanism-with-hm.
298.
The Accord is an agreement between brands, trade unions and NGOs where signatory
global brands fund a factory inspection program specific to fire and building safety. See BANGL.
ACCORD, supra note 48.
299.
Chaumtoli Huq, Opportunities and Limitations of the Accord: Need for a Worker
Organizing Model, in Labor, Global Supply Chains and the Garment Industry in South, in
LABOR, GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS, AND THE GARMENT INDUSTRY IN SOUTH ASIA (Sanchita
Saxena ed., 2019).
300.
E.g., Zoom Interview with Nazma Akter, supra note 52; Zoom Interview with
Apoorva Kaiwar, supra note 52.
301.
Ensuring that the Global Framework Agreement with H&M is Effective,
INDUSTRIALL (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.industriall-union.org/ensuring-that-the-globalframework-agreement-with-hm-is-effective.
302.
See Rachel Abrams, Retailers Like H&M and Walmart Fall Short of Pledges to Overseas
Workers, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/31/business
/international/top-retailers-fall-short-of-commitments-to-overseasworkers.html#:~:text=Retailers%20Like%20H%26M%20and%20Walmart%20Fall%
20Short%20of%20Pledges%20to%20Overseas%20Workers,-Read%20in%
20app&text=After%20more%20than%201%2C100%20deaths,of%20the%20country’s%
20poorest%20workers.
303.
Hasan Ashraf & Rebecca Prentice, Beyond Factory Safety: Labor Unions, Militant
Protest, and the Accelerated Ambitions of the Bangladesh’s Export Garment Industry, 43
DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 93, 94 (2019) (describing protest for wages and organizing in
advance of the Dhaka Apparel Summit organized by garment owners, foreign dignitaries, and
high ranking government officials to spotlight the poor wages in the industry).
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workers, 800 of whom worked in H&M supplier factories. 304 Under
Bangladeshi law, termination benefits are provided to workers.305 National
unions were able to obtain termination benefits for workers in 2016 by
leveraging the H&M GFA. 306 Nazma Akter, the President of Sommilito
Garments Sramik Federation, one of the largest union federations in
Bangladesh and founder of Awaj Foundation, said the NMC communicated
with local H&M managers to address the dispute.307 They demanded that all
the workers be reinstated and be paid any wages due. While only two workers
were reinstated, the 800 workers who worked for H&M suppliers were only
able to get termination benefits.308 Still, for Akter, this set a precedent and put
garment employers on notice that they were not able to escape their
obligations under Bangladesh law. 309 The NMC process seemed to accelerate
the resolution of those claims which often languish in Bangladesh labor
courts. 310
From December 2018 to early 2019, thousands of garment workers
protested the inadequate wage increases across Bangladesh. 311 These protests
were met with force by the Industrial Police and the mass dismissal of close
to 12,000 workers. 312 Brands including H&M had suppliers who dismissed
workers despite the existence of the GFA.313 Four of H&M’s suppliers laid
304.
Star Business Report, 1,600 Garment Workers in Ashulia Sacked due to Unrest, THE
DAILY STAR (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.thedailystar.net/business/1600-garment-workersashulia-sacked-over-unrest-1336531; ILO IFA Report, supra note 15, at 40.
305.
Bangl. Lab. Act of 2006, Section 27.
306.
Zoom Interview with Nazma Akter, supra note 52.
307.
Id. Founded by former child worker and labor organizer Nazma Akter, Awaj
Foundation is committed to protecting the rights of workers in the garment sector of Bangladesh
and gender equity, see Our Story, AWAJ FOUND., http://awajfoundation.org/about-us/our-story
/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2021).
308.
See ILO IFA Report, supra note 15, at 40 (discussing how the Bangladesh NMC
settled employment disputes by 984 workers); see also Zoom Interview with Nazma Akter,
supra note 52.
309.
Zoom Interview with Nazma Akter, supra note 52.
310.
Resolution of claims in Bangladesh court is extremely slow, see Md. Sanaul Islam
Tipu, Labour Court: Over 17,000 Cases Pending in Seven Tribunals, DHAKA TRIB. (May 1,
2019),
https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/court/2019/05/01/labour-court-over-17000-cases-pending-in-seven-tribunals. For rules on Labor Courts, see Bangl. Lab. Act, 2006,
ch. XIV.
311.
Serajul Quadir & Ruma Paul, Bangladesh Suppliers to H&M, Next Layoff Workers
After Wage Protests, REUTERS (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladeshgarments-idUSKCN1PU1IE; Bangladesh: Widespread Garment Worker Protests over
Minimum Wage Increase; Leads to Mass Dismissals, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR. (Sept. 27,
2018),
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/bangladesh-widespreadgarment-worker-protests-over-minimum-wage-increase-leads-to-mass-dismissals/.
312.
WORKERS RTS. CONSORTIUM, BANNING HOPE: BANGLADESH GARMENT WORKERS
SEEKING A DOLLAR AN HOUR FACE MASS FIRING, VIOLENCE AND FALSE ARRESTS 3 (Apr.
2019) [hereinafter “WRC 2019 Report”].
313.
See Bangladesh: Brands Respond to Mass Dismissals of Garment Workers Following
Minimum Wage Protests, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR. (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.business-
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off employees and two of the factories filed lawsuits against workers.314 It is
not clear if there were unions at those supplier factories. Mass layoffs are a
way suppliers can thwart unionization efforts. Again, national unions,
including Akter’s, contacted H&M managers and negotiated a resolution of
these mass layoffs with suppliers. 315 The suppliers agreed not to follow up on
the criminal cases and a settlement was reached. Similar to mass layoffs in
2016, not all workers were reinstated. Mainly, they were only able to
negotiate termination benefits, which was an inadequate remedy in
comparison to the severity of labor rights violations.316 In August 2019, H&M
suppliers at one factory again laid off 700 workers.317 Unions said workers
were fired due to union activities. 318 H&M’s response was:
In this case, we are in dialogue with local partners through our
National Monitoring Committee in Bangladesh which consists of
H&M Group colleagues and trade union representatives that are
affiliated with IndustriALL. We have confirmed that the maternity
benefits as well as termination benefits have been paid. We are still
investigating the specifics of this incident in dialogue with
IndustriALL. 319
In each of these examples, H&M GFA’s success was limited. H&M’s
response was passive, neutral, and lukewarm at best. Layoffs have continued
and are worsened by COVID-19. 320

humanrights.org/en/latest-news/bangladesh-brands-respond-to-mass-dismissals-of-garmentworkers-following-minimum-wage-protests/.
314.
Response, H&M’s Response to Bangladesh: Brands Respond to Mass Dismissals of
Garment Workers Following Minimum Wage Protests, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR. (Mar. 29,
2019), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/hms-response-2/.
315.
Zoom Interview with Nazma Akter, supra note 52.
316.
See WRC 2019 Report, supra note 312, at 27–28.
317.
Bangladesh: Union Alleges 700+ Garment Workers Dismissed from Factory
Producing for C&A, H&M & Benetton Were Targeted for Union Activities, BUS. & HUM. RTS.
RES. CTR. (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/bangladeshunion-alleges-700-garment-workers-dismissed-from-factory-producing-for-ca-hm-benettonwere-targeted-for-union-activities-incl-co-responses/.
318.
Id.
319.
H&M’s Response to August 2019 layoffs, Response to Bangladesh: Union Alleges
700+ Garment Workers Dismissed from Factory Producing for C&A, H&M & Benetton Were
Targeted for Union Activities, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR. (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/hms-response-4/.
320.
See Elizabeth Paton, “Our Situation Is Apocalyptic”: Bangladesh Garment Workers
Face Ruin, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2020) (discussing how millions of workers, mostly women
from rural areas, have not been paid owed wages or severance pay; Western buyers refuse to
pay wages of laid off workers). After postponing or cancelling orders totaling $170 million U.S.
dollars, H&M agreed to pay for orders completed or processed in time before the pandemic, see
A Movement to Reform Fashion, PAY UP FASHION, https://payupfashion.com/project/hm/ (last
accessed Nov. 6, 2021).
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However, IndustriALL reports that from “2017 till June 2021, unions
were organized and registered in about 18 manufacturers that supplied to
H&M (and other brands, as there are no factories that supply exclusively to
H&M).” 321 In the same period, the newly registered unions signed four new
collective bargaining agreements.322 Akter notes that her federation was able
to organize unions in ten factories and obtain collective bargaining
agreements in two H&M supplier factories. 323 Akter likes the GFA as a
communication tool with H&M to put brand pressure on suppliers. 324 She
said, “I am not saying GFAs are everything, but at least brands are listening,”
speaking both about H&M’s GFA and Inditex. 325 She also commented:
“sometimes it works and other times it doesn’t, especially where H&M is not
the main brand the supplier sources to.” 326 She suggests that GFAs would be
more effective if made legally binding on brands and suppliers. 327 As a
member of the NMC, she noted that there are new efforts to better evaluate
the GFA, such as a collective bargaining evaluation tool to assess the strength
of agreements and set standards in the industry. As it stands, for Akter, the
GFA is helpful to raise awareness on freedom of association and unions.
Akter’s main emphasis and focus was on strengthening national unions
and building women’s leadership within them. “I need to build our own
capacity. We [referring to unions] need to make ourselves strong.”328 She
highlights that in H&M supplier factories where a collective bargaining
agreement was formed, the elected presidents of the unions are women.329
Akter states that “creating a culture where women workers at the factory level
can negotiate with suppliers is good for both labor and women’s rights.”330
321.
E-mail from Apoorva Kaiwar, Reg’l Sec’y, S. Asia, IndustriALL to Author (Aug.
17, 2021) (on file with author).
322.
Id. This data is being collected as part of the GFA Implementation Project. Id. The
number should be placed in the context of Bangladesh law which allows any trade union to
register in each workplace, see Bangl. Lab. Act, 2006, § 177 (“Any trade union may, under the
signature of its president and secretary, apply for registration of the trade union.”). Given this
liberal registration of unions, the quality and independence of these unions is not known. As
discussed in the organizing section, the evaluative criteria is whether these new unions are
independent, and build worker power.
323.
Zoom Interview with Nazma Akter, supra note 52.
324.
Id.
325.
Id. For information on the Inditex GFA, see Inditex, INDUSTRIALL (July 11, 2014),
http://www.industriall-union.org/inditex.
326.
Zoom Interview with Nazma Akter, supra note 52. Most suppliers in Bangladesh
source to multiple brands. See KELSEY TIMMERMAN, WHERE AM I WEARING? 46 (2012)
(“There are over 3,000 factories in Bangladesh, and twice that many middlemen. The factories
are privately owned and work with multiple brands.”).
327.
Zoom Interview with Nazma Akter, supra note 52.
328.
Zoom Interview with Nazma Akter, supra note 52; see also Zoom Interview with
Gautam Mody, supra note 52 (also commenting on the need for national unions to take
responsibility and not rely on GFAs or other international mechanisms).
329.
Id.
330.
Id.
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Akter’s comment on women workers underscores how supporting trade
unions also enhances women’s empowerment as discussed below. Apparent
from the interview with Akter is that a strong national union, committed to
organizing from the factory level, and knowledgeable about the GFA, is
essential to GFA’s effectiveness. Involving national unions with long
histories in the local context of production countries improves GFAs. Akter’s
federation, being on the NMC, and connected to affiliate unions in other
production countries, can strategically use the GFA. However, similar to the
distrust of non-affiliated unions in Cambodia or unions not on MNCs, it is
not clear if those unions will use the GFA at all.
The details and context of the Bangladesh cases as well as the case
discussed in Karnataka, India are important for understanding what might
make a GFA effective. Here, success can be attributed to the following facts:
Workers protested, H&M threatened to terminate supplier contracts if
workers were not provided with termination benefits or reinstated, and strong
national unions and national legislation that provided workers termination
benefits existed. Without the involvement of a conscientious and militant
workforce, national unions, national legislation, and H&M using its leverage
as a buyer, it is unlikely that there would be success in the provision of
termination benefits. Even with those factors, GFAs have not been successful
at reinstating workers or combatting efforts by suppliers to quash
unionization. 331 Unionization under national law, given socio-economic
factors, remains a challenge in Bangladesh.332 At most, the GFA acts as
leverage in the global supply chain to enforce rights that workers are already
entitled to under national law. It provides national unions a direct link to
H&M. 333 Results could also have been achieved by global unions acting in
solidarity with national unions. Global labor solidarity campaigns utilizing
direct action and other organizing strategies have been equally successful in
addressing these factory level disputes. 334 This is not to suggest a unitary

331.
See Mark Anner, Monitoring Workers’ Rights: The Limits of Voluntary Social
Compliance Initiative in Labor Repressive Regimes, 8 GLOB. POL’Y 56, 64 (2017) (noting that
successful efforts to address workers’ rights have not been due to compliance programs or state
action, but trade union and activist campaigns).
332.
See Tula Connell, Bangladesh Garment Workers: New Blocks to Form Unions,
SOLIDARITY CTR. (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.solidaritycenter.org/bangladesh-garmentworkers-new-blocks-to-form-unions/ (reporting that of the 1,021 union registration applications
from 2010 to 2018, the government rejected forty-six percent).
333.
See, e.g., Riisgaard, supra note 100, at 730 (stating that the Chiquita framework gave
Honduran organizers access to corporate leadership); see also Zoom Interview with Athit Kong,
supra note 52; Zoom Interview with Gautam Mody, supra note 52.
334.
In Pakistan, for example, before an NMC was formed, National Trade Union
Federation (“NTUF”) sought the assistance of IndustriALL’s affiliate to seek benefits for the
dismissed workers. They were successfully reinstated, just as in Bangladesh. It is unknown if
this result led to the increased strength for the Pakistani union involved, in terms of members
or greater freedom of association rights. Agreement with H&M Proves Instrumental in
Resolving Conflicts, INDUSTRIALL (Jan 7, 2016), http://www.industriall-union.org/agreement-
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strategy. Local level mechanisms that enlarge space for worker and trade
union agency need to be strengthened for the GFA to be effective at the
production level.335 In assessing the GFA, it is important to highlight what it
adds to increase worker power and freedom of association rights and what is
lost by channeling labor management into a bureaucratized global agreement
which risks muting local labor militancy. This point is further elaborated in
section III.
For some additional insight on the impact of the H&M GFA in
Bangladesh, one may also look at the fate of the Bangladesh Accord,
specifically the backlash it provoked.336 The Accord was formed to make
factories safer for workers after the catastrophic Rana Plaza building
collapse. 337 It contains a binding arbitration provision. H&M was one of the
early brand signatories to the Accord. 338 Since the Accord’s formation in
2013, and its three-year extension in 2018 339 with some new provisions such
as a provision on freedom of association, its functions were transferred to the
RMG Sustainability Council (“RSC”), a regulatory body composed of
unions, brands, and a trade association representing garment owners called
the Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and Exporters Association.
(“BGMEA”). 340 H&M’s representative serves on the Board of Directors of
the RSC. 341 The 2018 Transition Accord was renewed and renamed as the
International Accord for Health and Safety in the Textile and Garment
Industry (“2018 Accord”).342 However, H&M did not immediately sign the

with-hm-proves-instrumental-in-resolving-conflicts-0; see also ILO IFA Report, supra note 15,
at 41.
335.
See Trubek et al., supra note 43, at 1193 (central to transnationalism is that multiple
actors can mobilize labor rights norms different areas).
336.
See Michael Safi, Bangladesh to Eject Safety Inspectors in after Rana Plaza Disaster,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/28
/international-inspectors-to-leave-bangladesh-after-factory-fire.
337.
See BANGL. ACCORD, supra note 48; see also Benjamin Evans, Accord on Fire and
Building Safety in Bangladesh: An International Response to Bangladesh Labor Conditions, 40
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 597, 606 (2015).
338.
Working Conditions, H&M GROUP, https://hmgroup.com/sustainability/fair-andequal/working-conditions/, (last visited Nov. 22, 2021).
339.
More than 100 Brands Sign 2018 Transition Accord, INDUSTRIALL (Feb. 14, 2018),
http://www.industriall-union.org/more-than-100-brands-sign-2018-transition-accord-inbangladesh.
340.
Jenny Lam, Mending Violence Against Workers in the Bangladesh Garment
Industry: An Anti-Capitalist Perspective on Fabrications of “Improving Labor Conditions”, 26
CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 577, 588 (2020); see also Home, RMG Sustainability
Council, https://www.rsc-bd.org/en (last visited Nov. 22, 2021).
341.
RMG Sustainability Council (RSC), A New Organized Body to Ensure Workplace
Safety in Bangladesh, TEXTILE FOCUS (June 2, 2020), https://textilefocus.com/rmgsustainability-council-rsc-new-organized-body-ensure-workplace-safety-bangladesh/.
342.
International Accord for Health and Safety in the Textile and Garment Industry (Sept.
1, 2021), https://internationalaccord.org/updates.
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recently renewed Accord 343 because it prefers non-binding tripartite
structures with trade unions, employers, and the government. 344 Eventually,
H&M signed the Accord. 345 The original Accord was limited in its
effectiveness in improving the working conditions of garment workers
because it failed to build local organizing capacity, disregarded how the
agreement would interact with local laws, and lacked any engagement with
workers. 346 Not surprisingly, the Accord become susceptible to reactionary
critique by politically influential suppliers347 and the government of
Bangladesh claimed that the Accord was impeding on its sovereignty, which
led to a legal battle. 348 The Accord also faced genuine critiques from worker
groups not affiliated with international unions. 349 The 2018 Accord seems to
take some of these critiques in mind as it expands the scope of the
agreement.350

343.
Alison Morse, ASOS Supports the Accord Extension - Why Won’t H&M?, REMAKE
(May 13, 2021), https://remake.world/stories/news/asos-supports-the-accord-extension-whywont-hm/.
344.
Debunked: 5 Excuses H&M is Using to Avoid Signing the Accord
https://payupfashion.com/debunked-5-excuses-hm-is-using-to-avoid-signing-the-accord/ (Jun. 17,
2021) (PayUp Fashion, a campaign to advocate for garment workers with fashion brands, led by
nonprofit organization Remake contacted H&M and reported their response).
345.
H&M Group Signs New International Accord for Health and Safety in the Textile
and Garment Industry, H&M GRP. (Aug. 25, 2021), https://hmgroup.com/news/hm-groupsigns-new-agreement-on-bangladesh-fire-and-building-safety/.
346.
Huq, supra note 299; See also Lam, supra note 340, at 590 (discussing how the
Accord fails to address systemic problems in the garment industry).
347.
Jim Yardley, Garment Trade Wields Power in Bangladesh, N. Y. TIMES (July 24,
2013) (stating that “analysts say 31 members, or 10 percent of the country’s national legislators,
directly own garment factories, while others have indirect financial interests in the industry.”).
348.
Michael Safi, Bangladesh to Eject Safety Inspectors in after Rana Plaza Disaster,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/28
/international-inspectors-to-leave-bangladesh-after-factory-fire; see also Marc Bain, The
International Project to Fix Bangladesh’s Garment Industry May End in a Whimper, QUARTZ
(Dec. 6, 2018), https://qz.com/1483772/bangladeshs-accord-formed-after-the-rana-plazafactory-collapse-is-being-pushed-out/.
349.
See Huq, supra note 299; see also Saurav Sarkar, Bangladesh Accord Gets a Lifeline
While Workers Organize Wildcat Strikes, LAB. NOTES (Aug. 6, 2019), https://labornotes.org
/2019/08/bangladesh-accord-gets-lifeline-while-workers-organize-wildcat-strikes;
Saurav Sarkar, Never Forget the Rana Plaza Massacre, JACOBIN (AUG. 11, 2019)
https://jacobinmag.com/2019/08/bangladesh-accord-garment-industry-strikes-rana-plaza;
Nafisa Tanjeem, NGOisation of Labor Movement, NEW AGE (Mar. 26, 2021),
https://www.newagebd.net/article/133695/ngoisation-of-labourmovement?fbclid=IwAR24QDQWB56a0GJ1xYapQg5JFzEKW
_cHXnjcnv8kGWZYP6bJjFb385O9_-U (discussing US trade union imperialism); Ashraf &
Prentice, supra note 303, at 97 (commenting on how international initiative entrench existing
divides in labor movement, delegitimizing more militant unions).
350.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to do a comparative analysis of the International
Accord. It is worth noting that the original Accord began with over 200 signatories, and this
new Accord has 77. For general information, see Home, INT’L ACCORD,
https://internationalaccord.org/home (last visited Nov. 22, 2021).
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Similar critiques of the Accord apply to the H&M GFA. These hard
lessons from the Accord could have informed the negotiations and text of the
GFA, which at the very least could have included a binding dispute resolution
process similar to what exists in the Accord. The retreat from the binding
provisions in the H&M GFA, such as one that exists in the Accord, reveals
the GFA’s limits and undermines its effectiveness. If H&M agreed to an
arbitration provision in the Accord for building safety in 2013, it should have
agreed to a binding dispute process for freedom of association and other labor
rights for workers enumerated in the GFA. 351 Union signatories commenting
on the Accord noted it would have “been good” if it included freedom of
association rights. 352 The GFA offered that opportunity but it was not made
legally enforceable.
Other lessons learned from the Accord, such as to include a wide cross
section of national unions in the GFA, to involve national unions in the
negotiation of the terms of GFA, and to proactively address the socio-political
contexts where the GFA would operate may have strengthened the H&M
GFA. Unions in Bangladesh are polarized and divided by affiliations to
political parties. 353 Only eight national unions were incorporated into the
Accord, and the Accord only covered a small fraction of garment workers.
This generated a distrust of the Accord similar to the distrust of the H&M
GFA expressed by unaffiliated unions in Cambodia. 354 In the negotiations of
the 2018 extensions to the Accord, labor leader Babul Akter noted that “local
unions were iced out of negotiations, which were between the Accord and the
BGMEA and sanctioned by the government of Bangladesh.” 355 This
underscores the importance of engaging national unions in the negotiation of
any global governance agreement. Finally, on concerns related to national
sovereignty, some of the challenges raised by McCallum in discussing the
corporate governance campaign and implementation of the framework
agreement in West Bengal would also apply to Bangladesh, where some
unions are skeptical of global unions due to a history of “imperialistic union
activism.” 356
In short, the local lessons from the Accord in Bangladesh were crucial to
a stronger H&M GFA. Just as collective agreements should build on past
movement gains, international global governance agreements should do the
same.

351.
A demand for a legally binding dispute process was raised but refused by H&M. See
Zoom Interview with Mats Svensson, supra note 52.
352.
See Saurav Sarkar, Bangladesh Accord Gets a Lifeline While Workers Organize
Wildcat Strikes, LAB. NOTES (Aug. 6, 2019).
353.
Ashraf & Prentice, supra note 303, at 105 (describing how the division between
politically connected national union federations and radical unions).
354.
Kaltenborn et al., supra note 149.
355.
Id.
356.
MCCALLUM, supra note 1, at 142.
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One narrative that is used to justify GFAs’ limited effectiveness is the
nation-state’s hostility to union organizing. This can be addressed by
structuring the GFA to empower the capacity of worker-led organizations and
national unions. The H&M GFA notes that where freedom of association and
collective bargaining is restricted under national law, employers should
encourage freedom of association. 357 Private agreements can provide greater
rights to workers than national laws can. However, this provision is not made
enforceable on employers through the dispute resolution process or by any
consequences for suppliers who do not abide by the agreement. As discussed
below, these GFAs fail to empower national unions in the interests of
maintaining industrial peace with H&M.358 If private global agreements like
the Accord and H&M’s GFA are promoted as the best examples of global
governance, expansive content, and robust enforcement mechanisms are
needed. Moreover, as discussed in each of these country-specific studies, the
involvement and support of politically independent national unions 359 has
been consistently found to increase GFA effectiveness. As such, GFAs must
be implemented cognizant of the local context and laws of the production
countries. 360

C. Gender and H&M’s GFA Agreement
Even though the vast majority of workers in the garment industry are
women,361 and the GFA uses anti-discrimination language, the GFA has not
been successful in addressing the gendered concerns of workers. Not
surprisingly, international law generally has been inadequate at addressing
gender-based violence and other gender issues. 362 Labor unions have also

357.
H&M GFA, supra note 164, at 2.
358.
See infra Part III(C)(3).
359.
The landscape and laws of trade unions vary from country to country. I do not intend
to cast all unions as the same. Here, I am only referring to strong militant unions that have an
active presence organizing at the factory floor and are independent from state and employer;
see also Zoom Interview with Apoorva Kaiwar, supra note 52.
360.
See Hadwiger, supra note 50, at 45 (noting that GFAs work best when integrated into
local labor relations).
361.
ILO Report, supra note 23, at 8; Barrientos & Evers, supra note 16, at 8; Gender:
Women Workers Mistreated, CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN, https://cleanclothes.org/issues
/gender (last visited Nov. 23, 2021) (finding that eighty percent of garment workers are women).
362.
See generally Diane Otto, The Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on Gender Issues in
International Law Over the Last Decade, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 11 (2009) (discussing that while
feminist ideas have spread through the UN system, it has been at the cost of emancipatory
aspirations of feminism); Jennifer L. Ulrich, Confronting Gender Based Violence with
International Instruments: Is a Solution to the Pandemic Within Reach, 7 IND. J. GLOB. L. STUD.
629 (2000); Margareth Etienne, Addressing Gender-Based Violence in an International
Context, 18 HARV. WOMEN’S L J. 139 (1995).
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ignored the experiences of working-class women.363 The H&M GFA
explicitly affirms a commitment to gender equality, 364 states a prohibition
against sexual harassment, and cites to the Maternity Protection
Convention, 365 but does not provide a gender-conscious366 dispute resolution
procedure for labor disputes. 367 It is not attuned to the gendered social
relations at the factory and national level. This silence is surprising given the
fact that women predominate this industry and are concentrated in the lowerwage jobs of the sector. Only one gender-specific case is known to have been
brought through the GFA. 368 Given the millions of women workers in the
global garment supply chain, the GFA seems to have failed women workers.
Reports at H&M factories indicate wide-spread sexual violence. 369 A
2018 report by Global Labor Justice-International Labor Rights Forum

363.
Marion Crain, Between Feminism and Unionism: Working Class Women, Sex
Equality and Labor Speech, 82 GEO. L.J. 1903, 1907–08 (1994) (explaining how the economic
concerns of unions have focused more on white male workers, reflecting labor’s masculine
culture and privileging its gender interests, over class interests of women workers; further,
discussing how law reinforces silences of working class women by reinforcing “gendered nature
of unionism and the classed character of feminism.”).
364.
See H&M GFA, supra note 164, at 2. Outside of the GFA, H&M has a set of
Women’s Empowerment Principles to promote gender equity, suggesting that H&M prefers
policy statements of gender equity without committing itself to actualizing those rights at the
factory floor. See About, H&M’S WOMEN EMPOWERMENT PRINCIPLES, https://www.weps.org
/about (last visited Nov. 23, 2021); Gender Equality in Our Supply Chain, H&M GRP.,
https://hmgroup.com/sustainability/fair-and-equal/gender-equality-in-our-supply-chain/ (last
visited Nov. 1, 2021).
365.
See C-183: Maternity Protection Convention, ILO (2000), https://www.ilo.org/dyn
/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODC:C183; H&M GFA,
supra note 164.
366.
Crain, supra note 363, at 1965 (describing gender consciousness in the US union
context as requiring organizers to focus on women workers, encouraging them to reevaluate
their work, values attached to that work, such that women see themselves as economically selfsufficient, and are able participate in activism or organizing).
367.
Combatting Sexual Harassment in the Garment Industry, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb.
12, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/02/12/combating-sexual-harassment-garmentindustry
368.
A violation of a maternity leave case was brought in Bangladesh. See Zoom Interview
with Nazma Akter, supra note 52 Paid maternity leave is available under Bangladesh law. See
Bangl. Labor Act, 2006, ch. IV. however, garment suppliers routinely violate this law. Editorial,
Maternity Leave and Pay, DAILY STAR (Sept. 15, 2018), https://www.thedailystar.net/editorial
/news/maternity-leave-and-pay-1633960 (reporting 28.7% of the workers get maternity leave
for four months); Awaj FOUND. & FAIR LAB. ASS’N, Maternity and Childcare in Bangladesh
(Sept. 2019), https://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/genderresearchstudy_final.pdf (data
suggest that workers do not know about law or factories are not abiding by it). One case was
brought to the attention of affiliates in India, but they did not follow through. See Zoom
Interview with Apoorva Kaiwar, supra note 52; No known cases have been brought in
Cambodia. See Zoom Interview with Athit Kong, supra note 52.
369.
Annie Kelly, Female Workers at H&M Supplier in India Allege Widespread Sexual
Violence, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development
/2021/mar/09/female-workers-at-hm-supplier-in-india-allege-widespread-sexual-violence.
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(“GLJ-ILRF”) uncovered multiple cases of gender-based violence across
H&M’s supply chains.370 The report concluded that current mechanisms put
in place by H&M and other brands were not protecting garment workers from
harassment. 371 Additionally, garment workers in India also reported instances
of sexual harassment. 372 One worker described being stalked by her
supervisor, who called after work hours asking for sexual favors in exchange
for a lighter workload. 373 In 2021, other garment workers in Southern India
complained of sexual harassment at a factory supplying to H&M.374
Similarly, an Action Aid report found that eighty percent of all Bangladeshi
garment workers faced sexual violence or harassment in the workplace.375
They also face other forms of gender-based discrimination such as being
asked to resign if they are pregnant. 376 An ILO report on Bangladesh found
numerous gender-based challenges including risks of miscarriages for
pregnant workers. 377 Forty-two percent of factories in Bangladesh do not
offer paid leave, sick leave, or maternity leave even though doing so is
required by law.378 Women workers also face discrimination in seeking
promotions. 379 Because women workers are segregated in low-paid jobs
within the industry, they are not able to realize gender equity in pay. The ILO
report concludes that “despite rising economic growth underpinned by
women workers’ contributions, the RMG sector has not yet evolved to
advance gender equality or decent work for both women and men.” 380 Even
though the H&M GFA was in place, and it contained enumerated rights
against harassment, for maternity leave protection, and for equality in pay, it
was unable to prevent these specific and pervasive types of gender-based
harassment and discrimination. While theoretically workers can raise these

370.
See H&M: GENDER BASED VIOLENCE IN GARMENT SUPPLY CHAINS, GLOB. LAB. JUST.
(2018), https://globallaborjustice.org/hm-gender-based-violence-in-garment-supply-chains/.
371.
Id. at 4–5.
372.
HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 367.
373.
Id.
374.
Thomas Reuters Found., H&M Probes Harassment at Indian Factory After Female
Worker’s Killing, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/india-workerscrime-idUSL4N2K830P; see also Kelly, supra note 369.
375.
80% of Garment Workers in Bangladesh Have Experienced or Witnessed Sexual
Violence and Harassment at Work, ACTIONAID (June 10, 2019), https://actionaid.org/news
/2019/80-garment-workers-bangladesh-have-experienced-or-witnessed-sexual-violence-and.
376.
ACTIONAID, ACTIONAID BRIEFING PAPER: SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE
AGAINST GARMENT WORKERS IN BANGLADESH 11 (2019).
377.
Aya Matsuura & Carly Teng, Understanding the Gender Composition and
Experience of Ready-Made Garment (RMG) Workers In Bangladesh, ILO REP. 30 (2020)
(detailing how garment industry relies on low paid female labor to compete and maximize
profits; women are concentrated in low paid jobs in the RMG sector).
378.
Id. at 37; See also Bangl. Labor Act, ch, IV (providing expressly for a maternity
benefit of eight weeks following delivery).
379.
Matsuura & Teng, supra note 377, at 17.
380.
Id. at 35.
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issues to the NMCs, in this author’s view, unless there is a confidential
reporting process or gender-conscious complaint process, it is unlikely that
workers who are sexually harassed or discriminated against would bring these
issues forward. 381 A gender-neutral implementation policy within the GFA
has failed to create a mechanism for women workers to bring these issues
forward.
Moreover, the failure to proactively support trade unions at the factory or
national level also has an impact on women workers. Trade union space,
despite its shortcomings, has allowed women to assert their agency as
workers in the workplace and to address gender-based violence at home.382
Thus, building the capacity of trade unions and proactively addressing
women’s leadership has led to positive outcomes for women workers and
their ability to raise gender-specific concerns to employers. For example,
elected women union leaders in factories in Bangladesh were able to negotiate
collective bargaining agreements with “ground-breaking provisions such as
free ultra-sound checkups for pregnant workers, relief from physically
demanding work in late months of pregnancy and annual wage increases and
number of paid holidays higher than the legally required amount.”383 A recent
ILO report encouraged increasing worker participation in trade unions,
especially for women. 384 The writers found that “[t]o create decent
workplaces for all, both women and men should be represented in trade
unions and other organizational structures.” 385 Further, when men dominate
unions, “issues that matter for women tend to be overlooked or ignored.”386
This is certainly true for the H&M GFA, which was negotiated by male trade
unionists.387 Without a mechanism within the H&M GFA for women to

381.
Human Rights Watch reports that women are scared to file formal complaints of sexual
harassment, and fear retaliation. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 367. In the US context, even among
professional women, eighty percent of sexual assaults are unreported. See Cameron Kimble & Inimai M.
Chettiar, Sexual Assault Remains Dramatically Underreported, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/sexual-assault-remains-dramaticallyunderreported#:~:text=%28A%20history%20of%20low%20reporting%20rates%20is%
20one,low.%29%20Rape%20and%20sexual%20assault%20are%20serious%20offenses.
382.
Chaumtoli Huq, Women’s “Empowerment” in the Bangladesh Garment Industry
through Labor Organizing, 20 WAGADU: AM. J. TRANSNAT’L WOMEN’S & GENDER STUD, Fall
2019, at 130, 154; see also Zoom Interview with Nazma Akter, supra note 52; Crain, supra note
363, at 1960 (despite’s labor unions shortcoming, discusses how the labor movement in the US
has done more to improve the economic situation of women workers).
383.
Increasing Women’s Leadership, AWAJ FOUNDATION http://awajfoundation.org
/our-work/increasing-womens-leadership/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2021).
384.
Matsuura & Teng, supra note 377, at 38.
385.
Id.
386.
Id.
387.
While women are at the forefront of labor organizing at the grassroots level, labor
leadership remains dominated by white men. See BROOKS, supra note 26, at 118.
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address harassment and concerns such as parental leave, it is not surprising
that these issues are not addressed. 388
The Lesotho Garment Industry Agreement, a collaboration with
women’s rights organizations and unions, focuses on addressing genderbased harassment with one supplier that sourced Levi Strauss, Children’s
Place, and Wrangler and Lee. 389 It has more effectively addressed genderbased violence. 390 For example, the agreement conditioned continued
business with one supplier on its cooperation with a worker-led program to
eliminate gender-based violence. 391 Suppliers agreed to establish an
independent organization responsible for investigating allegations of genderbased violence. 392 If violations were found, the organization could direct
specific remedies. The program also created an information and complaint
line run by the women’s rights organizations in Lesotho to provide legal and
other services to workers and organize related awareness activities. 393 While
still a relatively new program, the collaboration with women’s organizations,
training on gender-based violence, and creating a specific channel by which
these grievances can be raised increases the likelihood that women will come
forward. With the vibrancy of social movements, including women’s
movements, a labor unions’ alliance with women’s rights NGOs can be

388.
See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 367, at 14 (recommending that “women and
union leaders [should be able] to give confidential feedback about any complaints systems at
work, ease of access and use of such mechanisms, and anti-retaliation protection measures.”).
389.
Press Release: Leading Apparel Brands, Trade Unionists, and Women’s Rights
Organizations Sign Binding Agreements to Combat Gender-Based Violence and Harassment at
Key Supplier’s Factory in Lesotho, WORKER’S RTS. CONSORTIUM (Aug. 15, 2019),
https://www.workersrights.org/press-release/leading-apparel-brands-trade-unions-andwomens-rights-organizations-sign-binding-agreements-to-combat-gender-based-violence-andharassment-at-key-suppliers-factories-in-lesotho/; Initial Fact Sheet: Agreements to Combat
Gender-Based Violence in Lesotho’s Garment Industry, WORKER’S RTS. CONSORTIUM,
https://www.workersrights.org/initial-fact-sheet-agreements-to-combat-gender-basedviolence-in-lesothos-garment-industry-2/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2021) [hereinafter WORKER’S
RTS. CONSORTIUM, Initial Fact Sheet].
390.
See Matt Fischer-Daly & Christopher Raymond, Freedom of Association and
Collective Bargaining in Global Supply Chains, in PRIVATE REGULATION OF LABOR
STANDARDS IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 155 (Sarosh Kuruvilla ed., 2021) (discussing the
Lesotho agreement as an example of a successful triangular governance model with unions,
women’s rights NGOs and brands); see also Barrientos & Evers, supra note 16, at 53
(discussing that Uganda Workers Education Association project conducting training on sexual
harassment and trade union rights reflects a good model of combining workers and women
rights).
391.
WORKER’S RTS. CONSORTIUM, Initial Fact Sheet, supra note 389.
392.
Rola Abirmourched, Libakiso Matlho, Thusoana Ntlama & Robin Runge, Lesotho
Garment Workers Struck Landmark Deals to Tackle Gender-Based Violence. Here’s How it
Happened, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR. (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en
/blog/lesotho-garment-workers-struck-landmark-deals-to-tackle-gender-based-violence-heres-how-ithappened/.
393.
Id.
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beneficial to promoting global labor rights. 394 GFAs that engage women’s
rights organizations can lead to better agreements that integrate gender
concerns into the agreements instead of viewing those issues as separate and
outside of global labor governance.
Moreover, the fact that women workers have had to organize for separate
protections against gender-based violence through ILO Convention 190395
reveals the inadequacies of the H&M GFA for women workers in the supply
chain. This is not to suggest a sole governance structure for addressing
gendered concerns. Consensus is that successful global labor governance is
one that is multi-level with several entry points for workers.396 The ILO
Convention obligates states to act to address gender-based violence;397 but it
does not apply to MNCs. However, it is also possible to have a complaint
process within the GFA which empowers women workers themselves to
bring gender-related complaints.
In the absence of a mechanism for women garment workers to raise
gender-related issues or to generally improve their trade union rights through
the GFA, women workers remain vulnerable to existing social and economic
relations of the global garment industry. The predominance of women
workers in the garment industry in Bangladesh and other production countries
was not by accident, but through deliberate global economic policies to
promote cheap labor.398 Race and gender subordination and exploitation were
key to the development of the garment industry. Making gender and race
identity formations visible through a transnational feminist praxis illuminates
how exploitation of women workers occurs under capitalism. 399 A

394.
Riisgaard, supra note 100, at 712; Etienne, supra note 362, at 161 (describing the
importance of connecting with grassroots feminist organizations); Chimni, supra note 121, at
36 (urging left and trade unions to strike alliances with new social movements); Barrientos &
Evers, supra note 16, at 50 (organizing by women workers with feminist advocacy and
campaigns by trade unions has improved rights in global production).
395.
C190–Violence and Harassment Convention, ILO (June 21, 2019),
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO
_CODE:C190.
396.
See generally Christina Niforou, Labour Leverage in Global Value Chains: The Role
of Interdependencies and Multi-level Dynamics, 130 J. BUS. ETHICS 301 (2015) (explaining that
“the high complexity of GVCs and the absence of a global overarching authority have been
balanced by the emergence of governance mechanisms of different forms and at different
levels.”); see Brookes, supra note 190, at 186 (discussing how workers can act in a range of
levels through interlocking and interdependent networks and by shifting their locus of
engagement and working on different levels simultaneously).
397.
ILO, supra note 395, art 4(2).
398.
Niforou, supra note 49, at 3 (detailing how garment industry relies on low paid
female labor to compete and maximize profits; women are concentrated in low paid jobs in the
RMG sector); See also ILO Report, supra note 23, at 30 (describing the development of the
garment industry as feminization of employment).
399.
Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Women Workers and Capitalist Scripts: Ideologies of
Domination, Common Interest, and Politics of Solidarity, in FEMINIST GENEALOGIES,
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transnational feminist praxis helps explain how GFAs that fail to
affirmatively address issues specific to women workers reinforce the capture
of their labor for transnational companies. 400 While progress is praised for
workers through the GFA, in fact, the disciplining of this workforce along
gender lines, through workplace abuse and other workplace violations,
remains unchanged.401
Advocacy on behalf of women workers is difficult because the H&M
GFA is presented as favorable to all workers, including women. The social
identities of women workers remain gender- and race-neutral. Part of this
conception of women workers has to do with the fact that the leadership of
national and global unions is still male-dominated. 402 This gender-neutral
conception of workers also serves the interests of companies like H&M,
which aim to promote an image that protects women’s and labor rights while
maintaining subordinated workplace conditions for women. Scholar Ethel
Brooks, in detailing women’s work in the garment industries in New York,
Bangladesh, and El Salvador, remarks that while transnational labor
organizers may visibly involve women workers in their mobilization through
testimonies and stories,403 ultimately, the movements do not provide a
nuanced understanding of worker agency based on race, gender, and other
social identities. She writes: “[t]ransnational labor organizers take up
categories of gender, race, class and nation in ways that are monolithic,
misogynist, and difficult to contest.” 404 She argues further that transnational
labor organizing has relied on the maintenance of these categories to
succeed. 405 Women are included in performative ways for image-making and
marketing. Part of the challenge is advocating for universal labor rights while
also advocating for specificity of rights as it relates to women workers and
the local impact of those rights.406 Transnational feminist praxis would link
transnational labor organizers to grassroots mobilization led by local
feminists groups who determine the agenda.407 The success of GATWU in
India, as both a women’s and labor organization, is an example of where
IndustriALL’s support of their mobilization led to a settlement where their

COLONIAL LEGACIES, DEMOCRATIC FUTURES 3, 27 (Chandra Talpade Mohanty & M. Jacqui
Alexander eds., 1997).
400.
Id. at iv (discussing how globalization has brought a new visibility to new women’s
issues).
401.
BROOKS, supra note 26, at 165.
402.
See also Mohanty, supra note 399, at 6 (discussing how traditional union methods of
organizing around class interests as workers is based on patriarchal notions of who is a worker).
403.
BROOKS, supra note 26, at 132.
404.
Id. at 127.
405.
Id. at 136.
406.
Id. at 134.
407.
See Etienne, supra note 362, at 161–62 (stating that “best way to reach disempowered
women is at the grassroots level – in the trenches where women fight and endure the battles of
sexist oppression” who are better equipped to provide a contextual analysis of their situation).
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members were reinstated.408 Awaj Foundation’s intentional goals to build
women’s leadership in trade unions in the garment industry is another
example of local efforts to address gender. 409 The Lesotho Agreement is an
institutional example of the success of such a gender-conscious approach.410
Here, the H&M GFA came about through a top-down process without any
scope for national unions or women’s rights groups to comment on the
agreement. The GFA itself reflects the lack of attention to gendered concerns
in its neutral implementation procedures. Even in India, where there is an allwomen NMC, it functions in the symbolic, performative ways that Ethel
Brooks discusses. 411

III. INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE H&M GFA:
ORGANIZING, LEGAL MOBILIZATION, AND DECOLONIZATION THEORY
GFAs are informed by varied interrelated social movements and
theoretical perspectives on social movements: labor movements, legal
activism, and international law from below. Critical perspectives on those
social movements and in those theoretical disciplines provide essential
criteria to assess the effectiveness of GFAs and international law more
broadly. 412 Incorporating social movement perspectives into labor rights and
international law, as this article seeks to do, has the potential to contribute to
a new understanding of law. 413 Each discipline provides a crucial lens to
evaluate the GFA in context, and combined, they provide a fuller and
necessary assessment of the effectiveness of GFAs. Further, these
perspectives ground any evaluation of a GFA’s potential as a strategy to hold
MNCs accountable to international labor and human rights law. For example,
an organizing model assesses whether the GFA builds worker power through
the formation of independent unions or expands worker organizations’
institutional power to compel suppliers and global brands to act to enforce

408.
Union wins Reinstatement of 1257 Workers in India, INDUSTRIALL (Feb. 8, 2021),
http://www.industriall-union.org/union-wins-reinstatement-of-1257-workers-in-india.
409.
See AWAJ FOUND., supra note 383.
410.
Landmark Agreements to Combat Gender-based Violence and Harassment in
Lesotho’s Garment Industry, WORKER’S RTS. CONSORTIUM, (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.workersrights.org/commentary/landmark-agreements-to-combat-gender-basedviolence-and-harassment-in-lesothos-garment-industry/; see WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM,
Fact Sheet, supra note 389.
411.
The resolution by GATWU was not through the MNC process. See Zoom Interview
with Gautam Mody, supra note 52.
412.
See Rajagopal, supra note 17, at 428, 430 (explaining how international lawyers have
not sufficiently engaged with the vast social movement literature, and encouraging a
fundamental rethinking of international law through social movements).
413.
See id. at 433.
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labor and human rights. 414 Legal mobilization theory examines if the
agreement expands workers’ institutional power or provides leverage to
workers to expand their power to negotiate with suppliers and brands.415
Whereas organizing theory focuses on worker power, legal mobilization
theory looks at whether the agreement facilitates the activation of that power.
Decolonization theory, on the other hand, reevaluates governance as a labor
strategy within international law given its colonial and imperial roots.416 It
reveals the challenges of a GFA operating in formerly colonized countries
that are now major production countries for the global garment industry. It
also links any future effort to use GFAs to promote labor rights to a
framework that seeks to disentangle international law’s colonial roots.
Related to the organizing and legal mobilization theories, decolonization
theory provides a framework for garment workers in the Global South to
utilize to build power, to have greater agency and to self-determine the rules
and laws that impact their lives. It allows workers in the Global South to
construct international law, especially human rights and labor rights, in a way
that is responsive to their needs rather than the interests of capitalist
expansion. 417 All three perspectives involve a power analysis, with different
emphases; this power analysis is absent from traditional theories of
international law and contributes to a rich understanding of it. 418 While I
address all three perspectives, this article pays particular attention to the
theoretical framework of decolonization because it has not been fully
addressed in the literature on global labor governance. Labor scholars have
critiqued GFAs for not delivering on their promises to build worker power
and have noted to some limited extent the formalist approach of GFAs as
discussed in section I. GFAs have not been evaluated through a decolonial
lens. This section is supported by the case studies and interviews in section
II.

414.
See e.g., De Turberville, supra note 28, at 777 (for overview of organizing model
described where members use innovative techniques to empower themselves within their
employment and broader social relationships).
415.
See e.g., Emilio Lehoucq & Whitney K. Taylor, Conceptualizing Legal Mobilization:
How Should We Understand the Deployment of Legal Strategies?, 45 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
166 (2020); see also Filiz Kahraman, A New Era for Labor Activism? Strategic Mobilization of
Human Rights Against Blacklisting, 43 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1279 (2018).
416.
See ANTONY ANGHIE, Governance and Globalization, Civilization and Commerce,
in IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 245–72
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2004).
417.
ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004) (inquiring whether it is possible to
“construct an international law that is responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people of
the Third World?”).
418.
See Rajagopal, supra note 17, at 423, 428 (referencing Foucault and noting how the
focus on the micropolitics of power relations, how individuals and groups experience power
relations offers a rich understanding of international law).
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A. Organizing Model
In the labor movement context, the organizing model 419 is a broad
concept that refers to how organizations should prioritize and configure their
work centered on building power 420 for workers. Features of the organizing
model include: involving members in problem solving and collective actions
not limited to bargaining; a commitment to education; development of
members’ skills; a decentralized organizational structure; and no
distinguishment between internal and external organizing. 421 This is in
contrast to a business/service model, which is based on delivery of services
to members and reinforces member reliance on the formal organization of
unions. 422 The purpose of labor law is to promote worker protection and
worker agency through democratic participation.423 Under an organizing
model, then, globalizing labor law through GFAs should build workers’
power and their agency. Worker agency is essential to achieving global labor
standards that protect workers’ rights.424 In analyzing H&M’s GFA, it is
important to examine if in fact the agreement has increased worker power425

419.
See KUMAR, supra note 125, at 59 (describing how the organizing model shifts
decision-making to the rank and file versus the service model shifts power to staff); see also
Ann Cecillie Bergene, Creative Destructor / Destructive Creator: Agency Workers as
Threatening Moles Undermining Unionism or Welcome Agents Of Change In Irish And
Norwegian Unions? 38 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL’Y J.123, 134–36 (2016).
420.
Mark Anner, Workers Power in Global Value Chain, in Transnational Trade
Unionism, in TRANSNATIONAL TRADE UNIONISM 24, 24–41 (Peter Fairbrother, Marc-Antonin
Hennenbert & Christian Levesque eds., 2013) (discussing different forms of power workers can
use to leverage rights: structural, associational, normative and political. Structural power looks
at workers’ location within the economy. Workers who are structurally vulnerable can use their
associational power, the strength of their organizations, to achieve their goals. Normative power
is exposing wrongs and using established norms to compel wrongdoers to change behavior.
Political power involves the use of electoral and governmental space to make demands); see
also Kaltenborn, Neset & Norpoth, supra note 149, at 177 (associational power stems from
strengths of organizations; institutional power is whether employee can influence employer
behavior by using formal and informal rules that structure their relationship; coalitional power
involves extending the dispute to bring in other actors).
421.
See De Turberville, supra note 28, at 777.
422.
See Bergene, supra note 419, at 134 (describing unions’ role as transactional in that
workers get something in exchange for dues); see also De Turberville, supra note 28, at 777
(listing the following features of a servicing model: Union leadership solves problem on basis
of complaints; unions rely on formal grievance procedures, passive membership, specialists,
and a top down organizational structure).
423.
Adelle Blackett, Global Governance: Legal Pluralism and Decentered State, 8 IND.
J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 401, 418 (2001).
424.
See Fischer-Daly & Raymond, supra note 390, at 155.
425.
Workers derive their power from structures if they obtain an advantageous position
in a socio-economic or legal system, or associational power which is derived from selforganization, unions, or other collective organization like worker centers. See MCCALLUM,
supra note 1, at 10.
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and agency. 426 The organizing model illuminates whether, as a global labor
law instrument, it effectively promotes the rights of workers protected under
international labor law.
Global agreements that protect rights versus those that enable rights are
also helpful in evaluating GFAs’ relation to worker power. 427 Enabling rights
are essential to protecting and enforcing labor standards because they allow
workers to decide the “content and the pace of their struggles.” 428 Freedom
of association and the existence of a collective bargaining agreement are
examples of enabling rights.429 Research shows that coupling unionization
and collective bargaining with private regulation (including in GFAs) leads
to positive outcomes for workers, especially in terms of labor standards.430
The extent to which the H&M GFA increases unionization and collective
agreements is therefore a good test for whether it builds worker power and
agency. The inquiry is not simply quantitative (that is, the number of unions
and agreements), but also whether the unions and agreements formed allow
workers to exercise their agency and put forth their demands.
In evaluating the GFA under an organizing model, with these
considerations in mind, several limits of the H&M agreement emerge. It has
not served as a catalyst for the increase of national unions or collective
agreements in production countries, especially where governments have
passed laws to curtail freedom of association. 431 The agreement relies on a
non-binding complaint process to resolve disputes, making it more akin to a
service contract rather than an organizing instrument that builds worker
power. 432 It fails to provide an effective mechanism 433 for workers to compel
H&M to act to redress violations of labor rights, which would make it a useful
agreement to engage with. As discussed above, for women workers, it does
426.
Agency is the ability to activate worker power. See generally FRANCES FOX PIVEN,
The Nature of Disruptive Power, in CHALLENGING AUTHORITY: HOW ORDINARY PEOPLE
CHANGE AMERICA 21 (2008) (describing the “wealth and force and the ideologies, rules, and
coercive threats” employed by occupying institutional power against workers at the bottom of
economic hierarchy; but also describing workers’ power to withdraw their cooperation with the
system which Piven calls disruption.).
427.
Rodríguez-Garavito, supra note 45, at 205 (discussing the difference between
protective rights and enabling rights).
428.
Id. at 211.
429.
See Fisher-Daly & Raymond, supra note 390, at 176.
430.
See id. at 178.
431.
See, e.g., Cambodia: Events of 2020, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org
/world-report/2021/country-chapters/cambodia (explaining that the Cambodian government
adopted new laws in Cambodia that curtail freedom of association); Zoom Interview with Athit
Kong, supra note 52.
432.
H&M GFA, supra note 164, at 5.
433.
An effective mechanism for operationalizing freedom of association and collective
bargaining rights would involve ensuring that workers can elect their union representatives,
those representatives can carry out their roles without hindrance from employers, workers must
be protected from retaliation, and they must have some leverage from brands to sanction
suppliers when they prohibit the exercise of rights.
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not provide a meaningful process to address sexual harassment and other
forms of gender-based violence. 434 Relatedly, the GFA does not limit in any
way H&M’s or the supply factories’ managerial power.
On the other hand, H&M’s GFA has contributed to some positive
outcomes for workplace industrial democracy. 435 This has been possible only
when unions strategically used the GFA for this purpose.436 However, it is
not clear if the GFA helped to increase the number of collective agreements.
The increase of unions has been small—two or at most three in Cambodia,
none in India, and eighteen of varying quality in Bangladesh. However, those
gains have often been undermined due to termination of workers in unionized
factories.437 Four collective agreements 438 were formed, and if that is an
indicator of exercise of worker power, at the minimum the GFA has had some
success in Bangladesh. These results show GFAs as a promising strategy for
building worker power. However, there are hindrances to its effectiveness, as
discussed below.
The NMC in each of the production countries is composed of
representatives from national affiliate unions designated by H&M and GUF
and function more like a labor management committee than an entity that can
be leveraged to change the conditions at the factory level.439 Further, each
NMC is not independent from management influence. 440 The NMC acts as a
mediator resolving factory-level disputes. 441 Any potential benefits of
resolving disputes rely almost entirely on H&M’s willingness to proactively
use its leverage as a buyer to influence outcomes.442 Even though the GFA
states a policy goal to support freedom of association, workers are unable to
use the GFA to require H&M to act, and it does not allow for the enforcement

434.
See supra Part II(C).
435.
See Bangladesh: Workers Win Termination Benefits, INDUSTRIALL (July 20, 2017),
http://www.industriall-union.org/bangladesh-workers-win-termination-benefits (last visited
Mar. 29, 2021); see also Zoom Interview with Athit Kong, supra note 52.
436.
See Fischer-Daly & Raymond, supra note 390, at 154 (finding that compliance with
Freedom of Association rights occurred when workers directly pressure companies).
437.
See Zoom Interview with Athit Kong, supra note 52.
438.
See E-mail from Apoorva Kaiwar, Regional Secretary, South Asia, IndustriALL to
Author (Aug. 18, 2021) (on file with author).
439.
See Fisher-Daly & Raymond, supra note 390, at 156 (finding that nonunion worker
committees do not empower worker voices).
440.
Id. at 171 (analyzing data from third party auditors in the apparel industry found that
the most common freedom of association violation was that workers lack independent
representation; management interfered in union elections, and workers were not informed of
their union rights).
441.
H&M GFA, supra note 164, at 5.
442.
Fisher-Daly & Raymond, supra note 390, at 178 (explaining that brands do not hold
suppliers accountable to comply with FOA and CB standards).
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of these rights.443 The GFA provides a platform to resolve disputes but does
not build or expand worker power at the national level.444 In this regard, the
H&M GFA is premised on the protection of existing rights rather than
enabling workers to enforce their rights or exert agency. Even with the GFA
in place in India and Bangladesh, as discussed above, it required international
NGOs to direct H&M’s attention to labor violations among its suppliers.445
Poor working conditions and distrust or lack of knowledge of the GFA’s
dispute-resolution mechanisms persist at H&M supplier factories. It is not
surprising, then, that the fundamental right of freedom of association remains
the least complied with in private regulation of GFAs, despite empirical
evidence that it improves labor conditions. 446
Trade union members and representatives have also expressed skepticism
as to whether H&M’s GFA—and GFAs more broadly—do anything at all, or
if they merely exist as a public relations stunt for the global brand. As one
international trade union representative put it:
GFAs are so toothless, brands themselves approach IndustriALL to
sign them, and brands write the initial draft. This was the case with
the H&M GFA, which some North and South American unionists
[came together] to prevent IndustriALL from signing, trying to use
the resolution the IndustriALL Executive Committee had passed
requiring GFAs to have ‘a binding dispute resolution mechanism,’
which the H&M GFA lacked; but to no avail, they signed it
anyway. 447
Even the strongest GFA does little to hold companies legally accountable.448
Further, an organizing lens demonstrates how labor organizations are
unable to leverage their power within the GFA and serve as a counterbalance
to require suppliers and H&M to act. The GFA ignores the power
asymmetries between workers, national unions, global unions, and H&M.
The GFA treats all actors as equals. These asymmetries are further
pronounced when we consider gender, race, and other social identities. In the
absence of this recognition of unequal power, 449 the GFA relies on the

443.
See Fisher-Daly & Raymond, supra note 390, at 171 (in reviewing freedom of
association violations from auditors’ researchers noted a “chasm between policies supporting
FOA and CB rights” and “exercise of these enabling rights.”).
444.
See KUMAR, supra note 125, at 78.
445.
See supra Part II(B)(2) & (3).
446.
See Fischer-Daly & Raymond, supra note 390, at 148.
447.
KUMAR, supra note 125, at 72 n.15.
448.
Id. at 75 (citing McCallum, supra note 1).
449.
Kong describes the relationship between national unions and brands in the GFA as
unbalanced. See Zoom Interview with Athit Kong, supra note 52.
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benevolence of H&M to protect labor rights. 450 Workers are not provided any
institutional lever in the GFA to negotiate with suppliers because H&M is not
mandated to intervene. 451 Disputes are resolved through voluntary mediation
instead of arbitration, and there is no legal leverage to require a supplier to
resolve a dispute if they refuse to do so. This suggests that the GFAs require
provisions mandating brands, suppliers, and subcontractors to act, and to set
consequences if they fail to do so. In the absence of the government protecting
workers’ rights and the lack of any mechanism for workers to exert power
within the GFA (as they would do in a collective agreement with suppliers),
workers remain vulnerable to existing power dynamics of the market.
A final way to evaluate if a governance mechanism increases worker
power is whether it challenges and places some restrictions on management
power or whether it extends managerial power to the global supply chain.452
This evaluation also asks whether it manages labor-management conflict
without sharing or ceding any power. 453 A key part of industrial relations is
being able to negotiate and place some limits on management power: e.g.,
over hiring and firing, or workplace conditions. This is achieved through the
negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement. Without any limits on
managerial power, companies can extend norms and laws that benefit their
interests while disregarding local efforts. 454 Here, the GFA globalizes and
institutionalizes management power because it simply restates international
norms, does not mandate trade unions at their supplier factory, does not
require suppliers to act, and bases its enforcement on H&M’s willingness to
intervene (that is, the GFAs do not have remedies if H&M fails to act). The
GFA gives the appearance that it is concerned with freedom of association
rights without any means to enforce those rights at the local level. In the
Indian cases discussed above, 455 H&M remained neutral and passive during
a campaign where workers were dismissed. These NMCs are composed of
both workers and H&M representatives, and so they do not function at all to
allow workers to negotiate on equal footing with the supplier. At most, H&M
encourages its suppliers to negotiate with workers but stops short of
mandating it or imposing any consequences for their failure to abide by the
GFA.
450.
See Rodriguez-Garavito, supra note 45, at 223 (while evaluating codes of conduct,
discussing the need for a countervailing mechanism to close the gap between the discourse of
rights and practice).
451.
Institutional power is defined as the ability of workers to influence the behavior of
an employer by invoking formal or informal rules that structure their relations. BROOKS, supra
note 26, at 188.
452.
See Blackett, supra note 423, at 422.; see also JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATORY
CAPITALISM: HOW IT WORKS, IDEAS FOR MAKING IT WORK BETTER (Edward Elgar Publ’g
Ltd., 2008) (describing the globalization of corporation regulatory power as regulatory
capitalism).
453.
MCCALLUM, supra note 1, at 36.
454.
Blackett, Global Governance, supra note 423, at 423.
455.
See supra Part II(B)(2).
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Additionally, notwithstanding H&M’s GFA and its advertised
commitment to cooperating with unions, H&M continues to face scandals
over treatment of workers along its supply chain. 456 In 2018, more than 540
workers described incidents of sometimes daily gender-based abuse and
violence at a factory that supplies H&M garments.457 That same year, the
Clean Clothes Campaign released a report that H&M 458 was failing its GFA
pledge to provide workers a living wage, forcing workers to work extended
hours to survive. In sum, the organizing model emanating from the labor
movement reveals deficiencies in the GFA in enabling the formation of
national unions, providing workers legal leverage over H&M to act and
remedy workers’ rights violations, and placing limits on its managerial
power, all of which are essential to protecting workers in the global supply
chain.

B. Legal Mobilization Theory
Legal mobilization theory describes any process by which an individual
or collective actor invokes legal norms, institutions, or discourse to influence
policy and create rights.459 Legal mobilization theory holds that there are
varied legal and extra-legal sites for legal activists to seek reform. 460 While
this theory emerged primarily in the United States, it has also been applied at
the international level (though such studies are sparse). 461 The scholarship on
legal mobilization is wide-ranging, from analyzing law and institutions in
their more formal form as well as definitions of legal mobilization that
comprise an “interpretative, process oriented” form of law. 462 In the process-

456.
See Kate Hodal, Abuse is Daily Reality for Female Garment Workers for Gap and
H&M, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018
/jun/05/female-garment-workers-gap-hm-south-asia (last visited Mar. 29, 2021).
457.
Worker RTS. CONSORTIUM, supra note 276, at 1–3.
458.
Campaign launch: Turn around, H&M!, CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN (Dec. 10,
2018), https://cleanclothes.org/news/2018/04/30/campaign-launch-turn-around-h-m.
459.
See Michael McCann, Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives, 2
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 17 (2006) (providing an overview of legal mobilization theory).
460.
For a general theory on legal mobilization for social movements, see Michael
McCann, Legal Mobilization and Political Struggle, in RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY AND
THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 9, 11 (Michael McCann ed., 1994) (“the pluralistic
character of law provides reform activists with some measure of choice regarding both the
general institutional sites and the particular substantive legal resources that might be mobilized
to fight policy battles and advance movement goals.”) (“[A] useful theory of legal mobilization
should give considerable attention to the interaction and interdependence among these various
tactical dimensions of movement activity.”).
461.
See, e.g., Kahraman, supra note 415, at 1279–80, 1283–86 (discussing massive
blacklisting of construction workers by MNCs, where data on workers were collected and used
in hiring and firing decisions, and campaign by Blacklist Support Group to launch a human
rights campaign).
462.
McCann, supra note 460, at 5–9 (surveying the field of legal mobilization theory and
noting formalistic trends, while advocating for an interpretive approach); see also Kahraman,
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oriented view in legal mobilization theory, which this article adopts, law is
conceptualized expansively and is not limited to discrete acts or policies but
also includes ones’ ability to construct meaning. 463 In assessing any strategy
using the legal mobilization approach, the following quote by scholar
Michael McCann is instructive:
Legal mobilization tactics do not inherently empower or disempower
citizens. Legal institutions and norms tend to be Janus-faced, at once
securing the status quo of hierarchical power while sometimes
providing limited opportunities for episodic challenges to and
transformation in that reigning order. How law matters depends on
the complex, often changing dynamics of the context in which the
struggles occur. 464
Legal mobilization theory also examines how legal discourses intersect
and interact with broader ideological formations in society.465 Further, “any
assessment of specific legal mobilization practices by social movement must
be undertaken with reference to the larger context of multiple legal and
extralegal norms or discourses that structure social relations.”466 In this
regard, legal mobilization theory should be analyzed, as this article does, in
tandem with the organizing model discussed above as well as with the theory
of decolonization.
Under legal mobilization theory, when law or legal action is used for
mobilization, which is called “rights consciousness,” or to create
opportunities from which movements can develop, it is deemed
empowering. 467 Here, the GFA as a private agreement is viewed as a “law”
in the more expansive sense in that it communicates, at the bare minimum, a
commitment to abide by its terms even if it does not have a process to enforce
those terms.468 IndustriALL describes the content of the GFA as being
binding on H&M 469 because they agreed to abide by international labor
rights, but the agreement is not legally enforceable in court. Regarding rights
consciousness, the GFA does not create any new rights for workers. These

supra note 415, at 1283 (employing an interpretative approach to law and social change,
referencing legal mobilization theory, and applying to an international labor context).
463.
McCann, supra note 460, at 7–9.
464.
McCann, supra note 459, at 35.
465.
McCann, supra note 460, at 11.
466.
McCann, supra note 459, at 22–23.
467.
Id. at 25.
468.
GFAs have been referred to as “soft” law but MNCs fear of adverse publicity and
damaged business reputation from public campaigns by global unions can harden this “soft law”
See Goldman, supra note 110, at 606.
469.
See Zoom Interview with Apoorva Kaiwar, supra note 52.
(drawing a distinction that the content in the GFA is binding on the parties, but that it cannot be
litigated in court; so GFA is viewed as having a legal character); see also Zoom Interview with
Mats Svensson, supra note 52.
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labor rights need not be substantive to be effective, as collective bargaining
usually occurs locally, but can be procedural by creating mechanisms for
bargaining to take place. Although it has had some limited success raising
awareness of freedom of association and solving some individual disputes,
the H&M GFA primarily reaffirms existing labor rights and provides a nonbinding mediation process to resolve disputes. Depending on the strength of
the NMC, for the most part, workers and unions have not been trained on how
to leverage the agreement to mobilize for greater protection. 470 When national
unions have done so, in Bangladesh, Cambodia, and India, they have been
successful in using the rhetorical power of the agreement to mobilize workers
and demand accountability from H&M. 471 As discussed in the organizing
section,472 the ways trade union rights are supported are more policy-oriented
than operationalized at the factory level. Local mechanisms (including the
NMCs) that are cognizant of the local realities and are linked to workers on
the factory floor need to be strengthened. 473 Most of the work of the NMC is
informing the workers about its existence and gathering some information on
existing unions.474 It is empowered to resolve disputes, but the resolution is
non-binding, which undermines the authority of workers and unions to obtain
a favorable result. As such, unions do not trust the process. 475 In this regard,
applying the legal mobilization theory, the H&M GFA as a legal agreement
is disempowering for workers. 476
With respect to using law or legal structures to create opportunities for
movements to develop, the H&M GFA has also been limited. When a GFA
creates space that can be utilized by militant national unions, they have been

470.
In Bangladesh, the NMC seems to actively educate affiliate unions on the GFA. See
Zoom Interview with Nazma Akter, supra note 52.
471.
See Zoom Interview with Gautam Mody, supra note 52.
(discussing how the GFA gave unions the power to call out H&M on their obligations to protect
labor rights).
472.
See supra Part III(A).
473.
Zoom Interview with Apoorva Kaiwar, supra note 52.(discussing the need to
enhance local mechanisms).
474.
See INDUSTRIALL, supra note 168, ¶¶ 2, 6.
475.
See, e.g., Kumar supra note 125, at 72 n.15 (discussing trade union members’
skepticism of GFAs).
476.
H&M’s GFA was agreed to as being a “good enough” agreement. See Zoom
Interview with Mats Svensson, supra note 52. This presumes having an agreement is more
desirable than not having one. To whom is it “good enough” and based on which values is
discussed below in the decolonization section. See discussion infra Part III(C). Here, it was not
considered whether rejecting the GFA as written was a choice that also could have been made.
Could affiliate unions and the public be mobilized for a stronger agreement? Here Piven’s
theory of disruptive power as a type of power where a movement refuses to enter into social
relations is helpful to understand how movement goals can be met. See Piven, supra note 426,
at 21. Failing to do so made the agreement disempowering in this sense.
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effective.477 Without an active national union, however, GFAs have not made
a difference in advancing workers’ freedom of associational rights. 478 The
top-down nature of the H&M GFA and its unclear legal relationship with
national labor legislation limit its effectiveness. 479 Workers cannot use the
institutional power of the GFA to compel suppliers to accept unions or
negotiate collective bargaining agreements. This leverage is useful in
production countries where unionization is difficult due to laws and social
realities. As discussed above,480 worker agency, particularly unions and
workplaces with a CBA, improves labor standards. Even if the H&M GFA
resolves a small number of disputes, on balance, it will not improve the
overall labor standards in the garment industry unless it enables workers to
build their agency and power. As shown from the Cambodian study,481 even
after being aware of the H&M GFA, unions did not use the GFA as much as
one would have expected. Instead of opening new avenues for advocacy, the
GFA seeks to funnel worker grievances through a highly formalized, 482 yet
non-binding, dispute resolution process. This formalized process can limit
workers’ ability to exercise power because it often reflects dominant views in
society.483 Although new rules and procedures can be crafted to facilitate the
exercise of worker power, the GFA here does not do that. 484 Militant national
unions have been successful in utilizing what sociologist and political
scientist Frances Fox Piven calls a disruptive power, not based on compliance
with rules but withdrawal from following them. 485 It is thus not surprising
that national unions have not used the formal NMC process and have not
found the GFA empowering. 486

477.
See, e.g., Wills, supra note 50, at 685 (discussing the success of the International
Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers’
Association’s success with it Trade Union Rights Agreement).
478.
See, e.g., id. at 695 (discussing failures to implement the Trade Union Rights
Agreement in countries lacking strong, local union presence).
479.
C.f. Hadwiger, supra note 50, at 45 (identifying shortcomings in GFAs and
suggesting useful reforms and research to correct them).
480.
See discussion supra Part III(A).
481.
See discussion supra Part II(B)(1).
482.
See McCallum, supra note 1, at 29 (noting how political opportunities presented by
governance institutions are often “bureaucratic traps”).
483.
PIVEN, supra note 426, at 27 (describing how rules can serve as constraints on certain
groups in society).
484.
Id. at 28 (explaining that rules can provide legitimacy and protection and enable
workers to exercise “power from below”); see also MCCALLUM, supra note 1, at 29 (describing
how governance struggles have been most successful where workers are able to rewrite or alter
rules or relations with employers).
485.
See MCCALLUM, supra note 1, at 11 (citing Piven, supra note 426) (describing how
power is activated when actors break rules that structure a relation between the parties).
486.
The case study discussed in India, GATWU/NTUI did not resolve the dispute
through the MNC process but outside of it. In Bangladesh, some disputes were resolved within
the NMC process, but some by directly contacting H&M local managers with whom national
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A legal formalist approach in contrast to a legal mobilization theory gives
the impression of the abundance of legally enforceable rights, when in fact,
they do not exist. Legal formalism focuses more on the text of the GFA to
reason that it provides rights to workers rather than whether it actually
provides those rights. It gives the appearance that freedom of association
rights are being protected because they are included in the text of the GFA,
when in reality they are not. It has the impact of reinforcing hierarchical
power and maintaining current power relationships between workers,
suppliers, brands, and the national government. In contrast, in Bangladesh,
industry changes to the minimum wage in 2013 and 2016 resulted from
worker mobilization and demands on the state. 487 In the Karnataka case in
India, strong national unions led to the positive results.488 Rights creation
from grassroots mobilization and engagement with the state, even if the state
acts in the interests of global capital, yielded far more concrete changes than
GFAs. Using legal mobilization theory reveals that simply having a legal
agreement is not sufficient to empower workers, particularly where it does
not create new rules or processes which workers can use to mobilize to
enforce labor standards and their freedom of association rights.

C. Decolonization Theory 489
Law and legal strategies do not operate in a vacuum; rather, they interact
with broader ideologies in society.490 Decolonization theory acknowledges
international law’s, including labor and human rights law’s,491 relationship to
unions developed links prior to the GFA. See Zoom Interview with Nazma Akter, supra note
52.
487.
See Huq, supra note 299, at 75.
488.
See Secretariat, supra note 265.
489.
Decolonization theory is a broad and wide-ranging field of thought and histories.
Narrowly discussed, it is a political project where formerly colonized countries gained formal
independence. Broadly, it refers to instances where former colonized persons challenge Western
hegemony and power as well as resistance efforts by people in the Global South to disentangle
themselves from the various forms of subordination maintaining the political and economic
dominance of Global North. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Decolonization, Development and Denial,
6 FLA. A&M UNIV. L. REV. 1, 5 (2010) (noting that decolonization efforts sponsored by the
most powerful countries have reduced the legacy of colonialism to poverty and only seek to
mitigate it in a way that avoids any “fundamental change in global economic power.”). In
international law, this dominance occurs through international financial institutions,
international law and ideas of development. See generally SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONIZING
INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT, GROWTH AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011) (examining the promises and failures of international law to
address global disparities); see also E. Tendayi Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, 71
STAN. L. REV. 1509 (2019) (examining the legacy of colonialism as it intersects with migration
and international law). In this section, I only address parts of this framework as it relates to
GFAs and labor rights but hope my future work continue to explore decolonizing labor law.
490.
MCCALLUM, supra note 1, at 35.
491.
B.S. Chimni, Marxism and International Law, 34 ECO. & POL. WKLY 337, 342
(1999) (describing how human rights law can be mobilized to serve the interests of capitalism).
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colonialism and imperialism. 492 It demands a restructuring of international
law.493 If colonialism and imperialism enabled the Global North to impose its
economic interests on the Global South in extractive and inequitable ways, a
decolonial lens seeks to construct laws and legal strategies in ways that enable
people in the Global South to truly be politically and economically
independent.494 In the context of labor law, decolonization theory 495 also
entails challenging labor law’s foundational narrative.496 One way to do this
is to center “counter-hegemonic contestations of law and legal ordering,”497
such as making space for militant unions, raising questions around gender,
and centering workers in the Global South. 498 Given that these GFAs seek to
universalize a global labor governance mechanism that has its origins and
derives its values from European labor-management approaches to industrial
relationships, 499 including social dialogue, an important decolonial critique
of the H&M GFA is necessary yet woefully absent from the literature. Just as
scholars from the Global South have critiqued the universalization of human

492.
ANGHIE, supra note 417, at 3 (stating that colonialism is central to international law);
Chimni, supra 122, at 30 (explaining how international law is integral to colonialism); see also
James Thuo Gathii, Imperialism, Colonialism and International Law, 54 BUFFALO L. REV.
1013, 1013–14 (2007) (defines imperialism as the expansion of industrial capitalism and
colonialism as the territorial annexation and occupation of Europeans in non-European
territories).
493.
See Saito, supra note 489, at 37.
494.
See id. at 42 (describing how the liberatory potential of decolonization is premised
on re-envisioning the international legal order); see also Achiume, supra note 489, at 1522
(discussing decolonization not as simply nations gaining political independence, but because
colonization created “inequitable global interconnections” decolonization strives to create
equitable ones).
495.
Adelle Blackett, Introduction: Decolonizing Labour Law — Contributions to an
Emergent Transnational Labour Law, 33 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 111–14 (2018) (theorizing on the
role of labor law in decolonization.
496.
See Saito, supra note 489, at 6 (noting that foundational beliefs replicate the
dynamics between colonizer and colonized or developing and developed, such as those present
in labor law).
497.
Amin Parsa & Niklas Selberg, Decolonizing Labour Law: A Conversation with
Professor Adelle Blackett, THIRD WORLD APPROACHES TO INT’L L. REV. (Jan. 24, 2021),
https://twailr.com/decolonizing-labour-law-a-conversation-with-professor-adelle-blackett/#.
498.
See Saito, supra note 489, at 44 (noting the importance of making space for all voices
and perspectives, stepping back from the notion that the goal of international law is to “articulate
and enforce a universal world view.”).
499.
GFAs emerged as a result of European labor movement’s response to globalization
and European labor-management model of social dialogue and development of trade union
bureaucracy. This is described as the social partnership model. Formal union bureaucracy
moved GFAs away from the subcontracted sites of production and activating grassroots actors.
This created a more top-down global union structure. See KUMAR, supra note 126 (discussing
the effects of globalization and capitalism on GFAs, unions, and labor generally).
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rights law 500 and the Eurocentric values that it contains, similarly, a critique
of the implications of globalizing a European-model 501 labor-management
governance into production countries, many of which are formerly colonized,
is essential. 502 A decolonial inquiry asks whether the GFA alters the power
relationships among the actors: brands, suppliers, global and national unions,
and workers, given how colonialism and imperialism have shaped and
continue to shape those relationships.503 What possibilities does a GFA
provide to reconstitute those relationships in equitable ways?504 It requires
that any legal or advocacy strategy center those most marginalized and
empower them to collectively organize to achieve their social movement
demands.
Further, the decolonial framework amplifies the importance of social
movements, including “the bottom-up framing of rights [and] the importance
of also thinking through how demands for redistribution have become the
subject of capture.” 505 Transnational labor law scholar Adelle Blackett and
other scholars who define their work as international law “from below”506
emphasize the need to center movements in the Global South or marginalized
workers in the Global North in order to create human rights discourses that
move beyond formalist rights discourses. 507 This means legal orderings must
be informed by social movements from the bottom up, and we should be

500.
Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL?, 94 PROC. ANN. MEETING (AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.) 31,
31 (2000) (discussing how the universalization of international laws were essential to
maintenance of European domination).
501.
U.S. trade unionists commenting on U.S. labor-management relations are most
optimistic with regard to GFAs, in part due to the organizing of sweatshop movements in the
U.S., While there are genuine critiques of U.S. labor imperialism, the vast majority of GFAs
are made by European companies. See, e.g., MCCALLUM, supra note 1; see also KUMAR, supra
note 125 (distinguishes U.S. and European labor movement strategies).
502.
Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in
Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (1999) (stating that the
universalization of international law was a consequence of imperial expansion and conquest of
non-European peoples); see also Saito, supra note 489, at 38 (stating that universalizing a
worldview upholds ideology of colonialism).
503.
Achiume, supra note 489, at 1522 (explaining that “decolonization may entail
shifting power.”).
504.
See Saito, supra note 489, at 47 (describing how the elimination of colonial
relationships entail transformation of people on all sides).
505.
Parsa & Selberg, supra note 498; see also Blackett, supra note 423, at 429.
506.
BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT,
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 271 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009).
507.
Scholars have also advanced an idea of “complex internationalism” to move away
from a binary of movements from below or above, allowing social movements to use all
possible means to meet their goals. See Chimni, supra note 121, at 32. This may involve
alliances with those oppressed in the Global South and their counterparts in the North. Id. at 36.
It could also entail forming transnational advocacy networks that can serve as a counter-balance
to the dominance of MNCs. See Rodriguez-Garavito, supra note 45, at 203.
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vigilant about efforts to co-opt demands for worker power. 508 Here, this
would mean the active engagement of independent national unions and
worker organizations that are committed to ensuring fundamental labor rights
for workers. A decolonization lens would then center the locus of struggle
and decision-making on unions and worker organizations in production
countries, and would be cognizant of local histories, social realities, and
national laws that may impede their ability to build power. A global union or
labor movement conscious of a decolonial lens would not, as happened here,
negotiate an agreement in Sweden that has implications for garment workers
across H&M’s global supply chain with minimal involvement of national
unions.
Decolonization theory illuminates ways to strengthen GFAs as a tool for
workers worldwide.509 It opens up possibilities for labor transnationalism and
genuine grassroots international solidarity. It can help labor activists
differentiate between legal tactics that reinforce hierarchical power with the
global order and those that facilitate its transformation. Relatedly, it can open
up the emancipatory potential of international human rights law. 510 Using a
decolonial lens, this section first addresses some of the imperial and colonial
foundations of global governance within international law. Second, specific
to global labor rights, it reveals how GFAs exhibit features of trade union
imperialism that suppress labor militancy and transnational labor solidarity.
Third, it concludes with some ways to reorient GFAs to becoming a more
effective tool to build worker power and actualize global labor rights.

1. Imperial and Colonial Foundations of Global Governance
While global labor governance may appear to be a more recent
neologism, the concept of governance has its roots in colonialism and
imperialism.511 Antony Anghie, a postcolonial legal scholar, provides this

508.
Here, I am not suggesting focusing only on movements from the Global South, given
that we have also seen vibrant mass based labor movements in the United States globalize but
that the movements are led by those directly impacted by law and policies wherever they
originate. See, e.g., The “Bessemer Effect” has Already Changed Amazon and World, UNI
GLOB. UNION, (Apr. 9, 2021), https://uniglobalunion.org/news/bessemer-effect-has-alreadychanged-amazon-and-world (commenting on the impact of the union organizing in Amazon
warehouse in Alabama). The inspiration or catalyst for a movement can originate in any, or
multiple, places, but how that movement unfolds, the level of engagement and active
participation of workers and ability to create spaces for collective formations to enable rights is
key.
509.
McCallum’s honest assessment of the challenges of the G4S corporate governance
campaign in Kolkata, India is instructive when he writes: “Kolkata, as the erstwhile capital of
the British Empire in India, was on the receiving end of the much imperialistic union activism
from the United Kingdom. This has impacted the perception of international collaboration.” See
MCCALLUM, supra note 1, at 12.
510.
PAHUJA, supra note 489, at 45; see also Saito, supra note 489, at 41.
511.
Antony Anghie, Civilization and Commerce: The Concept of Governance in
Historical Perspective, 45 VILL. L. REV. 887 (2000); see also ANGHIE, supra note 416, at 235.
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historical perspective: “Good governance, in short, provides the moral and
intellectual foundation for the development of a set of doctrines, policies and
principles, formulated and implemented by various international actors to
manage, specifically, the Third World state and Third World peoples.”512
Governance and commerce worked interchangeably to legitimize
colonization and imperialism, and international law became the language to
express these forms of domination.513 Labor advocates should be attuned to
the implications of this history of governance specifically as it relates to
colonial labor policy. For example, on the history of Indian industrial
relations laws, 514 including the present Trade Union Act, 515 governance
approaches promoting worker committees and dispute resolution were used
by the colonial state to suppress labor activism and anti-colonial protests.516
At the height of labor strikes at the turn of the century, the colonial state
pushed for moderate unions and peaceful mechanisms to settle disputes to
maintain stability. 517
Current promotions of good governance and stability, particularly the
emphasis on worker committees and weak dispute resolution systems,
exemplify how GFAs are products of past legal efforts to facilitate
commercial expansion and a civilizing mission in non-European states. 518 As
discussed in section I(A), GFAs are private agreements in the toolbox of labor
governance strategies but are connected to international law through their
incorporation of fundamental labor rights and business and human rights
guidelines seeking to regulate MNCs. GFAs cannot, therefore, be viewed as
separate from or immune to the colonial roots of international law.
Colonialism and imperialism shape their content, scope, and implementation.
Legitimizing 519 on-going production in the supply chain with weak
mechanisms to hold MNCs legally accountable to human or labor rights at
the national level simply maintains the same imperial power relationship

512.
Anghie, supra note 511, at 893–94; see also Chimni, supra note 121 (discussing how
International Financial Institutions like the IMF use good governance rhetoric to prescribe
conditions for the state to receive loans, which promotes deregulation of laws and opens up
national markets to global capital interests).
513.
ANGHIE, supra note 416, at 248.
514.
The British used Industrial Relations laws and their logic to impose order and
political domination. DeSousa, supra note 41, at 66.
515.
The goal of the Act was to register unions that would moderate their demands, and
with whom employers and the state wanted to negotiate in order to develop the idea of
responsible unionism in contrast to militant unions that were viewed as disruptive to the colonial
order. See id. at 82.
516.
Id. at 82 (explaining how worker committees as a forum for grievances was seen by
employers as a way to undermine unions and mediation allowed them to contain dissent).
517.
ANGHIE, supra note 47, at 748.
518.
Id. at 740.
519.
Describing efforts to get H&M to begin negotiations to explore a GFA, Svensson
stated that “credibility” was raised as a pitch and how H&M’s credibility would increase with
trade unions. See Zoom Interview with Mats Svensson, supra note 52.
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between global brands, unions, workers, and the state. While Bangladesh,
Cambodia, and India are politically independent, the laws and institutions that
emerged from colonial labor policy remain and are deployed in the current
political and economic environment through both the GFA and international
law.520
The labor and human rights-oriented nature of the H&M GFA does not
make it less (neo)colonial in its attempt to stabilize production and labor
relations in Asia to maintain business interests in the Global North.521
Evidence shows that brands source from suppliers in countries with weak
institutional support for workers.522 It is not only that brands are not held
accountable due to weak national labor laws (which is true), but also that they
seek those places with weak institutional support for workers so as not to be
held legally accountable. So, a GFA that does not demand brands to be held
legally accountable to human rights obligations simply maintains the business
interests of the MNC and by extension the Global North. Further, industrial
peace and harmony between labor and capital are prioritized 523 while dissent
and dissatisfaction are channeled to bureaucratic dispute resolutions systems,
with any hint of disruption often criminalized. 524 GFAs, implemented locally
through NMCs, need to be cognizant of the colonial histories that shape the
present labor laws, local realities, and context, and that structure the
implementation process, including NMCs. 525 When the content of the H&M
GFA was negotiated, IndustriALL did not research or consider how the
implementation process would interface with national laws and context. 526
GFAs with a weak implementation process also reinforce the idea that
corporations can self-regulate their labor practices through voluntary private
regulation and further normalize capitalist economic development. They
support the political project of globalization, which is to “institutionalize
market rule” by recasting and shifting otherwise governmental functions of
setting labor standards as private governance.527 It is thus not surprising that
these GFAs do very little to create binding and enforceable labor rights akin
to a collective bargaining agreement on a global scale. In the context of

520.
See DeSousa, supra note 41, at 92.
521.
See Chimni, supra note 121, at 11 (explaining how the proliferation of social
institutions to promote human rights facilitates the interest of global capital; these institutions
deflect radical movements into more formal channels).
522.
See Fischer-Daly & Raymond, supra note 390, at 156.
523.
DeSousa, supra note 41, at 68; Kuruvilla & Mundell, supra note 40, at 8 (stating that
preservation of labor peace in the colonial and post-independence economies of the Global
South was essential to economic development, with industrialization as its primary engine).
524.
See Ashraf & Prentice, supra note 303, at 104 (describing the militarized state
response in Bangladesh when workers engaged in protests).
525.
See Hadwiger, supra note 50, at 44.
526.
See Zoom Interview with Mats Svensson, supra note 52.
527.
Philip McMichael, Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective (SAGE,
6th ed. 2017).
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countries in the Global South, good governance discourse allows European
states and institutions to bypass the state and institutions in a country under
the guise of development and progress,528 or, in this case, for global labor
rights. This is precisely what GFAs do, except with the acquiescence of global
federation unions. That the H&M GFA was substantially no different than the
H&M corporate statement plainly reveals how the participation of global
union federations has not resulted in a change in the power of workers or the
articulation of new rights. In fact, most of the rights listed in the agreements
are simply restatements of international law with limited avenues for workers
to exercise those rights or to hold brands legally accountable for human rights
violations. The GFA globalizes formal notions of labor rights without
meaningfully altering the relations between the relevant actors, thereby
reproducing and maintaining neo-colonial hierarchies.
Advocates for GFAs give the impression that corporations are better
equipped to enforce international labor laws as compared to public
international bodies or states.529 This reflects a market-based approach to
legal advocacy. This approach further reinforces capitalist economic
development as inherently good for workers in the Global South and a
continuation of the logic of imperialism which is to expand industrial
capitalism.530 A study comparing a retailer in India that had been privately
audited by the ILO’s Better Work Programme531 found that repeated private
audits of factories showed no significant improvements in labor standards
over time. 532 However, factories under the ILO’s program showed some
improvements from continual assessments. 533 A possible explanation for this
difference is that under the Better Work program, brands source from
suppliers that improve on labor standards, which provides an incentive to

528.
Anghie, supra note 47, at 748; see also Saito, supra note 489, at 32 (explaining that
development programs became the vehicle to replicate economic and political relationships of
the colonial era).
529.
In making this point, I am not suggesting the inverse that states or international public
bodies are better sites for worker advocacy rather to acknowledge the normalization of market
approaches in human rights advocacy. See Upendra Baxi, Voices of Suffering and the Future
of Human Rights, 8 Transnat’l L & Contemp. Probs. 125 (1998), at 139 (noting emergent rights
afforded to “foreign investor, global corporation, and international finance capital” as posing a
challenge to human rights as articulated by Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
530.
Gathii, supra note 504, at 1013–14.
531.
Better Work is a partnership between ILO and International Finance Corporation
(IFC).
Better Work, ILO, https://www.ilo.org/global/programmes-and-projects/WCMS
_084616/lang—de/index.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2021). In making this comparison, I am not
suggesting a program that works with international financial institutions is any better. See
Chimni, supra note 491, at 344 (discussing the privatization of public international law bodies
like the U.N. and the ILO). The imprimatur of a program tied to a public international body like
the ILO seems to generate increased corporate compliance.
532.
See Bae, supra note 60, at 102 (looking at data from Cambodia, Nicaragua, Haiti,
Vietnam, Indonesia and Jordan).
533.
Id. at 104.
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improve labor standards. 534 The incentive to source from suppliers that
improve labor standards provides workers some modicum of leverage over
suppliers vis-à-vis a global buyer. 535 The involvement of a public
international body, such as the ILO, in monitoring compliance also seems to
make a difference. As discussed in the legal mobilization section, 536 here the
legal structure of the ILO is leveraged to create opportunities for movements
to incentivize suppliers to comply with labor standards. While those structural
powers within the ILO framework can be improved and strengthened, and its
partnership with international finance institutions should be viewed with
caution,537 the Better Work program provides something tangible that
workers can mobilize around using their associational power where otherwise
they have no structural power in the global garment supply chain. Also,
because the ILO engages in a tripartite process with workers, and member
states, the program opens up a potential space for national unions to step in
to push for concrete changes at the national level. 538 A non-binding dispute
process provides no such institutional leverage for national unions.
Decolonization theory, which seeks to construct legal strategies that enable
people in the Global South to be independent, reveals how even well-meaning
legal strategies can be coopted for neo-colonial interests.
The GFA advocacy led primarily by global union federations in the
Global North has adapted a market-based approach to activism as compared
to the more confrontational approaches used earlier in the anti-sweatshop
movement.539 This advocacy style makes it easier for corporations to respond

534.
ILO, supra note 531.
535.
See Blasi & Bair, supra note 59, at 6 (describing how incentivizing sourcing
decisions enhance GFA effectiveness).
536.
See supra Part III(B).
537.
See Chimni, supra note 121, at 8 (describing how international financial institutions
intrude on sovereign areas of economic life).
538.
National courts have been receptive to interpret national legislation as incorporating
international human rights law. See, e.g., Supreme Court of India, Mackinnon Mackenzie v.
Audrey D’Costa, (1987) 2 SCC 469 (India) (interpreting national legislation in conjunction with
ILO Convention No. 100 and European jurisprudential practice in the field, the Supreme Court
of India found that Ms D’Costa had received much lower pay than her male colleagues
performing work of equal value). See International Training Center’s Compendium of Court
Decision, https://compendium.itcilo.org/en/decisions-by-subject.
539.
See Muller, Platzer & Rüb, supra note 108 (detailing how GUFs primary objectives
with IFAs are securing minimum standards at locations of TNCS, developing dialogue and
negotiations, promoting international campaigns, utilizing international trade agreements).
Compare this to the objectives of the anti-sweatshop movement, which prioritized international
labor organizing. Rodriguez-Garavito, supra note 45, at 74 (“[M]ultifarious forms of direct
action in different locales to exploit the vulnerabilities of global subcontracting - namely, the
sensitivity of manufacturers, especially TNCs such as Nike, to negative publicity campaigns
that can harm their most valuable asset: their carefully cultivated brand image; [t]o link up
workers, pro-labor NGOs, and unions across borders, anti-sweatshop TANs pursue a wide array
of schemes, from worker exchange and education programs to joint investigative and organizing
teams, to solidarity campaigns in support of striking workers in sweatshops.”).
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to activist demands without providing any mechanism to account for social
outcomes. 540 It is worth noting that many grassroots trade unionists in the
global garment industry and broader labor solidarity movement have voiced
their critiques of non-binding GFAs, and this article does not mean to imply
a monolithic strategy by organizers in the Global North. 541 Further, these
activists note three bare minimum requirements for GFAs to be effective:
knowledge of where all suppliers and subcontractors are located so they can
be monitored on an ongoing basis, access for unions to enter those factories,
and a clear mechanism to resolve disputes. 542 Using these prerequisites, of
the 112 GFAs signed, only a handful are sufficiently effective.543 While
H&M’s GFA does have an implementation process, it is not binding and it
does not meet the other criteria of access to their supplier factories. As
discussed in section II(A), national unions from production countries
expressly asked for these provisions, which H&M refused, and IndustriALL
did not insist on them. Failure to insist on these minimum criteria reveals how
corporate interests and the European model of labor-management relations
based on social dialogue were prioritized over demands of workers in the
production countries.544
On a pragmatic level, bypassing the state or any public regulatory body
in enforcing labor legislation and pursuing purely private regulations has
shown that global unions have not been able to serve as a counterweight to
corporate interest. These GFAs are “perch[ed] high above local regulation”
but do not engage with national laws, or the socio-political context of labor
organizing.545 They obscure and ignore the role of the state and the organizing
that can happen vis-à-vis the state to obtain enforceable rights. 546 Pluralist
approaches that include civil society grassroots groups have been more
effective in pressuring for international labor rights. 547 Although states in the

540.
Florence Palpacuer, Voluntary Versus Binding Forms of Regulation in Global
Production Networks: Exploring the Paradoxes of Partnership in the European Anti-Sweatshop
Movement, in UNMAKING THE GLOBAL SWEATSHOP (Rebecca Prentice & Geert De Neve eds.,
2017).
541.
Jeffrey Hermanson, International Union League for Brand Responsibility (2021)
(commenting on an early draft of this paper on objections raised by trade unionists to H&M
GFA).
542.
Zoom Interview with Victor Garrido, supra note 52; see also Muller, Platzer & Rüb,
supra note 108 (describing a minimum list of standards that GFA should include in terms of
scope and implementation to distinguish itself from corporate codes of conduct).
543.
See Muller, Platzer & Rüb, supra note 108, at 7–8.
544.
See id. at 8 (discussing how dialogues with European companies would be hampered
if these provisions which seem more adversarial such as access to supplier factories were
included).
545.
See Blackett, supra note 423, at 416.
546.
Id. at 428 (detailing how codes of conduct obscure the role of the state).
547.
An example of grassroots mobilization that led to the creation of a human rights norm
is the domestic worker mobilization for Convention 189. See ADELLE BLACKETT, EVERYDAY
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Global South are limited by international financial institutions, 548 they still
retain political sovereignty and international human rights law is organized
around the sovereignty of states. As such, states remain a viable space for
social movements to engage and agitate within. 549 Engagement with the state
must be reconstituted to counter-balance the power of corporate interests that,
as discussed above, 550 the GFA has been unable to challenge.551 In the
garment industry, complex supply chains with brands, suppliers, and
subcontractors require governance mechanisms of different forms and
levels. 552 At the very least they need a “simultaneous bottom-up and top
down” 553 worker-empowered model that will be effective in Asian
production countries like Bangladesh, India, and Cambodia to achieve
meaningful rights for workers.554 At their essence, GFAs are not in line with
efforts to decolonize labor. Under the harshest critique, GFAs may be
described as neo-colonial in that the state possesses internal sovereignty, but
its law and policy are directed from outside. 555

2. Countering hegemonic trade union imperialism
Decolonization, or centering counter-hegemonic ideas of law and legal
ordering as it relates to GFAs and global labor rights, requires a candid
discussion of “hegemonic trade union imperialism.” 556 Top-down global
unionism maintains the interests of labor and capital in the Global North.
Other features include:
TRANSGRESSIONS: DOMESTIC WORKERS’ TRANSNATIONAL CHALLENGE TO INTERNATIONAL
LABOR LAW (Cornell Univ.: Indus. & Lab. Rels. Press 2019).
548.
See Chimni, supra note 121, at 7 (describing the global expansion of capitalism
through the creation of international economic institutions such as World Bank, World Trade
Organization and International Monetary Fund).
549.
It should be noted that the working class has been most affected by the loss of
sovereignty of the state through the formation of international financial institutions. See id. at
8–9.
550.
See supra Part III(a).
551.
Blackett, supra note 423, at 430.
552.
Niforou, supra note 49, at 356; see also Zoom Interview with Nazma Akter, supra
note 52
553.
See Niforou, supra note 49, at 305; see also MCCALLUM, supra note 1, at 16; Zoom
Interview with Athit Kong, supra note 5252; Zoom Interview with Victor Garrido Sotomayor,
supra note 52.
554.
KUMAR, supra note 125, at 235 (explaining how bottom-up strategic organizing is
more likely to lead to sector-wide global collective bargaining).
555.
KWAME NKRUMAH, NEO-COLONIALISM: THE LAST STAGE OF IMPERIALISM, at ix
(Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd. 1965) (“The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which
is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international
sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from
outside.”); see ANGHIE, supra note 416, at 235.
556.
Zia Rahman & Tom Longford, International Solidarity or Renewed Trade Union
Imperialism? The AFL-CIO and Garment Workers in Bangladesh, 17 J. LAB. & SOC’Y 169,
169 (2014).
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[S]etting up of new affiliated unions rather than working with
established trade unions; an avoidance of militancy and mass actions
while protest is channeled into legalistic channels; an air of
superiority toward most of the unions organizing in the RMG
industry. 557
In evaluating the H&M GFA, we see some of these features of hegemonic
trade union imperialism. 558 It is worth noting that hegemonic trade union
imperialism can encompass reformist approaches. 559 H&M selects who it
would enter into a GFA with—IF Metall and IndustriALL—who in turn
determine the national unions they would engage with, which excludes many
national unions who support greater militancy. 560 The GFA, with its priority
of resolving industrial disputes peacefully through social dialogue, seeks to
channel disputes into a legalistic governance framework. 561 H&M’s GFA was
negotiated away from the production countries with no active participation of
affiliate unions. While the GFA applies to all workers in the supply chain, the
negotiation was not open to all unions who may be organizing garment
workers in the supply chain. 562 Yet, IF Metall, which has no workers in
production countries or in H&M, was the lead negotiator of the GFA. 563
Social dialogue approaches to labor management superimposed onto a
diverse political terrain like Bangladesh, Cambodia, and India also render
GFAs ineffective. 564 Social dialogue is a conciliatory approach to capital,565

557.
Id. at 170.
558.
It is worth commenting that this part of the article generated strong reactions from
some interviewees and readers, perhaps, feeling that it linked individual international labor
activists with colonialists and imperialism. See Rajagopal, supra note 17, at 409 (conflicts of
capitalist development are often viewed as interpersonal conflict). Decolonization requires a
shift of social consciousness among those formerly colonized and those who continue to benefit
from colonialism. While this may be “discomfiting,” fear or denial will not change the relations
between workers, employers, suppliers, brands, global and national unions. See Saito, supra
note 489 at 47.
559.
Rahman & Longford, supra note 556, at 184.
560.
In the summer of 2014, then H&M sustainability manager and now CEO Helena
Helmersson approached IndustriaALL to begin discussions for a GFA. See Zoom Interview
with Mats Svensson, supra note 52.
561.
See H&M GFA, supra note 164, at 6.
562.
See discussion supra Part II(A).
563.
See Zoom Interview with Mats Svensson, supra note 52 (involvement on garment
issues through Clean Clothes Campaign, an NGO seeking to improve conditions in the garment
industry but has no workers employed by H&M or workers in the supply chain).
564.
Social dialogue and partnership model to labor-management relationship was rooted
in European trade union bureaucracy. See KUMAR, supra note 125, at 55. Such a practice was
influenced by the model of social dialogue adopted by ILO.
565.
Stevis & Fichter, supra note 64, at 671 (Social dialogue is a corporatist form of
industrial relations.). Where workers below the economic hierarchy lack institutional, structural
power, which is true for garment workers in the global supply chain, disruption becomes a
power that can be deployed to have their demands heard and met. Disruption is often described

2022]

Interdisciplinary Perspectives

499

arising from the fact that European national unions or American unions do
not have the capacity to mount a more direct organizing approach. 566 This
approach ignores that even in Europe and the United States, the labor
movement’s strength is from collective action, not increased
bureaucratization of its trade unions. 567 In Bangladesh, there are divisions
within unions that are conciliatory to global capital and those more critical of
global governance mechanisms like the GFA; the top-down international
strategies risk deepening those divisions. 568 This results in narratives often
heard from trade unionists in the Global North about the inability of garment
workers’ unions in the Global South to unite, which reflects the feelings of
superiority 569 of trade unionists in the Global North based on their assumed
stability. 570 Labor disunity is not unique to the Global South—we also see it
in the United States and Europe.571 This narrative of disunity and disorder
delegitimizes militant unions in both the Global South and North. In fact,
militant unions in the Global South have often been more open to engaging
in non-violent confrontational strategies to address the harmful impacts of
globalization given their links to anti-colonial struggles.572 This narrative
allows global capital to co-opt more moderate unions within the labor
movement under the social dialogue framework. This cooptation prevents
working class unity and global solidarity. 573 While in any country union unity
is a challenge to forge, GFAs as drafted make it harder to build independent
and global grassroots labor power.
In Bangladesh and other South Asian countries, labor movements have
been involved in anti-colonial movements and have a history of labor
militancy. 574 For example, labor organizers in Bangladesh often employ nonviolent confrontational strategies such as gherao, whereby workers surround
the employer for failing to provide wages and did not allow them to leave
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until the wages were paid.575 These strategies emerged from workers having
to confront the colonial state and continue in the current state that is hostile
to union organizing due to its courtship of foreign investments. By colonial
authorities and, later, government of Bangladesh, these approaches were
suppressed under the narrative of vandalism and violence, when in fact they
were often mass civil disobedience strategies in the context of weak
institutional support. 576 Although after independence many unions became
affiliated with establishment political parties, as the state became more
neoliberal in its economic policies, unions have had to take an independent
and non-partisan approach. Given this history and context of unions in
Bangladesh, India, and Cambodia, relying solely on social dialogue and nonconfrontational approaches is bound to be ineffective. 577

3. Reorienting GFAs to empower workers
Given workers’ weak structural power in the global economy, GFAs need
to increase their institutional power at the local level. 578 This illusion of rights
or new norms, without enforcement or opportunities for expansion, serve the
interests of global brands for a stable, cheap, source supplier. As Anghie
notes, the use of “good governance” to manage the Global South serves
commercial expansion from the colonial era to the present. 579 With consistent
evidence that freedom of association and collective bargaining improves
labor standards, and where national governments are hostile to unions, a GFA
must create an implementation mechanism to enable workers to exercise
those fundamental labor rights down to the factory level. Further, given that
data shows that brands source from countries where institutional support is
weak,580 due to a number of factors such as nation-state hostility to union
organizing, lax labor law enforcement, and other political-economic factors,
a GFA should enable the national union or workers to use the GFA to leverage
their power. Without a binding dispute resolution mechanism, at the very
minimum, the GFA reinforces neo-colonial relationships and facilitates the
availability of production countries for commercial interests of MNCs of the
Global North.
Labor militancy and the mobilization of worker power could disrupt
H&M production throughout its supply chain. This disruption would impact
the commercial interests of H&M. It could also provide the leverage
575.
See Rahman & Langford, supra note 174, at 94 (describing gherao as a popular form
of protest in Bangladesh). Workers engaged in labor protests in Bangladesh only after an
employer refused or failed to address worker demands. See WRC 2019 Report, supra note 312,
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necessary to create a countervailing power to corporate interest that social
dialogue in the GFA alone cannot. A mobilized and organized national union
can place pressure on global brands and suppliers through local regulatory
mechanisms, which in turn can operationalize long-established labor and
human rights. Integrating worker movements can fundamentally change
international law and its lack of credibility with respect to actualizing human
rights.581 The privileging of formal non-binding processes and social dialogue
within the GFA system legitimizes it as a labor governance mechanism and
delegitimize the worker mobilization that often employs more successful
confrontational strategies. Although both social dialogue and disruption are
necessary to advance labor rights, under GFAs, sole reliance on social
dialogue and conciliatory approaches mute militancy. 582 When workers,
especially women workers, take to the streets to peacefully protest for
increased wages and their freedom of association rights, their actions have
led to changes.583 Where global union federations lend their support to these
organizing efforts, there have been successes in achieving changes for
workers. 584
Global labor governance mechanisms such as GFAs are not inherently
imperialist or neocolonial. 585 How they are formed and implemented, their
engagement with national movements, state and public international
regulatory bodies, the extent to which they enable worker power and
unionization, and whether unions in the Global North are truly committed to
international global labor solidarity rather than globalizing a Western labormanagement governance system will determine the character and
effectiveness of these agreements.586 This is what a decolonization
framework offers. GFAs can be changed to work to advance global labor
rights and support grassroots labor movements, but that would require a
581.
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582.
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willingness to utilize all the economic and political tools that organized labor
has historically used which includes strikes, boycotts, direct action, and massbased mobilizing. 587 They cannot be limited to social dialogue, conciliatory,
and bureaucratic approaches. GFAs can be negotiated to allow for binding
dispute resolution procedures, ones that provide workers institutional power
over suppliers and brands to improve labor standards and to organize. For
example, the GFA could enable workers to create collective bargaining
agreements as part of their fundamental labor rights by requiring suppliers
who source from H&M to negotiate with national unions. It could integrate
fundamental labor rights from the factory level up to pressure for national
legislation. A bottom-up framing of rights would ensure the GFA is
responsive to the needs of the workers in production countries. NMCs can be
made more effective with the input of national unions. Workers and other
unions can be trained to strategically use GFAs to increase unions and
collective agreements at the factory level. GFAs as a potential global labor
governance strategy within international law, as discussed in Section I, can
be sharpened with respect to the negotiation, content, and implementation of
GFAs to actualize international labor and human rights for garment workers.
It is a truism for any labor advocate that an agreement is only as strong as
worker power. As currently formulated, GFAs mute that power and are
susceptible to reproducing socio-economic inequalities.

CONCLUSION
By contextualizing GFAs within international law, and by closely
examining the H&M GFA’s implementation in three Asian production
countries through various interrelated social movement theories, we observe
that GFAs must be strengthened in order to bind MNCs to enforce freedom
of association and collective bargaining rights. National unions must also be
involved in the negotiation, implementation, and enforcement of the GFA.
Failure to do so reproduces and maintains the colonial and imperial
hierarchies embedded in international law. Unions and collective agreements
increase the likelihood that other labor standards are enforced. H&M’s GFA
has been successful in opening direct communication between national
unions and brands in all three countries. It has been successful in resolution
of individual cases for termination benefits and maternity leave where
national legislation provides that right but where the legal process is slow. It
gives rhetorical power that unions can use to mobilize members to hold H&M
to its obligation to respect fundamental labor rights in its supply chain. It has
not substantially increased unionization or collective agreements in
Cambodia and India but has shown some success in Bangladesh, which
587.
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warrants further careful empirical study as to the reasons why. One
explanation for this differentiation is the focused efforts by national unions
since Rana Plaza to increase the number of unions in the garment industry
prior to the GFA. 588 Overall, GFAs have not improved labor standards in the
global garment industry. Grassroots, multi-layered approaches to governance
that pay attention to the socio-political context are essential to building
worker power and agency from the bottom up. 589
GFAs are legal instruments that do not enlarge spaces for worker-led
organizations to form or allow organizations to leverage such agreements to
build power and maintain the unequal power relations between workers,
suppliers, and brands. Here, the dispute resolution procedures must be
binding on H&M in order to increase worker power. In its absence, the default
local realities and power relations that shape labor and management,
including difficulties in unionizing, hinder the potential of the agreement to
be a vehicle to promote trade unions and fundamental labor rights such as
freedom of association.
A decolonization perspective challenges the colonial and imperial origins
of the concept of governance. By applying the theory to labor movements
reveals that even well-intentioned strategies by global unions are vulnerable
to cooptation of business interests and can maintain colonial relationships.
Decolonization also uncovers the assumptions underlying the social dialogue
process, to illustrate how cooperative model governance can operate to
suppress labor militancy, and the need to create more local mechanisms to
enable unions to exercise power and agency. Organizers in the Global South,
with deep knowledge and long histories of organizing, need to be involved in
shaping the decisions, policies, and strategies of global unions. Global unions,
based in the United States and Europe, need to decenter themselves as the
locus of decision-making. 590 Challenging the colonial foundations to
governance strategies embedded in GFAs would also foster greater labor
transnationalism and solidarity.
Finally, in a global garment industry that is maintained by the devaluation
of women’s labor, the GFAs must squarely address gender-related concerns
and provide clear avenues for women workers to raise these issues. Only then
might GFAs transform the international human rights law that fails to
empower women workers. 591 GFAs must also focus on building grassroots
women’s leadership from the factory floor to change the global culture of
trade unionism that remains, both at the national and global levels, maledominated and Eurocentric.
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